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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Essays on the Economics of Justice and Gender
by
Briana Deann Sullivan
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
University of California San Diego, 2019
Professor Kate Antonovics, Co-Chair
Professor Gordon Dahl, Co-Chair
This dissertation consists of three papers on the economics of justice and gender. The
first chapter pertains to the gender wage gap, and the second and third papers study the effects of
criminal justice reforms.
My first chapter replicates and extends on Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008), which finds
that the change in the female labor force composition significantly contributed to the narrowing
of the gender wage gap. Their results, however, are obtained using the Current Population Survey
(CPS). Therefore, I extend on their work by: (1) replicating their methodology using Census data,
which is more representative of the US population, and (2) addressing changing male labor force
xi
participation rates. Overall, my results continue to suggest that changing selection into the female
labor force drives the convergence of the gender wage gap. But failing to account for changing
male labor force participation rates overestimates convergence.
Chapter 2 studies how Alabama’s shift from voluntary to presumptive sentencing guide-
lines affected sentence length. Using the National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP), I
find that after the guidelines became presumptive for a subset of property and drug offenses,
average sentence length for affected offenders fell, with no statistically significant difference
in effects across race. Using quantile regressions, I find that among affected property and drug
offenders, the largest changes in total sentence length occur in the upper tail of the sentence length
distribution.
Chapter 3 presents a descriptive analysis of the differential impacts of AB 109 (or Realign-
ment) and Proposition 47 across California’s counties. In October 2011, California implemented
Realignment, which shifted the supervision responsibility for low-level offenders from the state
to the county-level. Yet, I do not find a statistically significant relationship between the percent
change in the prison and jail incarceration rates following AB 109. Then in November 2014,
California implemented Proposition 47, which re-classified low-level felonies as misdemeanors
and therefore reduced the jail population. Overall, I find that the fiscal impact of AB 109 may
have been the largest for lower-income counties, with little evidence suggesting that Proposition
47 mitigated the fiscal impacts of AB 109 among these low-income counties.
xii
Chapter 1
A Replication: Selection, Investment, and
Women’s Relative Wages Over Time
1.1 Introduction
Since the 1970s, there has been a striking convergence in the gender wage gap and a
simultaneous increase in the female labor force participation rate. As seen in Figure 1.1, between
1970 and 2014, there was a 56 percent decrease in the gender wage gap among full-time full-year
white, non-Hispanic men and women aged 26 to 55. During the same time period, while there
were small fluctuations in the male full-time full-year labor force participation rate, women
experienced an increase in participation from 28 percent to 51 percent. However, it is not evident
that the convergence in the gender wage gap is due to a change in the relative wages of men
and women, holding constant the composition of the labor force. Historically, women have had
significantly lower labor force participation rates relative to men, so selection into the female
labor force is likely. Additionally, because female labor force participation increased dramatically
between 1970 and 2014, the changing composition of the female labor force may have contributed
to the narrowing of the gender wage gap. If the selection rule for women has changed over time,
1
the observed convergence in the gender wage gap may not reflect the true trend. Therefore, it is
important to examine whether female selection into the labor force has changed over time and
how women’s relative wages have evolved holding constant the composition of the labor force.
This paper replicates Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008), henceforth referred to as MR, and
extends on their paper by using Census data, rather than the Current Population Survey (CPS),
and doing more to model male selection into the full-time full-year labor force. MR examine
how changing female selection bias has contributed to the convergence of the gender wage gap.
They employ two methods using repeated CPS cross sections to calculate a selection-corrected
relative wage series for women between the 1970s and 1990s. The first method is the Heckman
two-step estimator with marital status interacted with the number of children under the age of
6 as the exclusion restriction. Second, MR use identification at infinity to calculate the wage
gap between men and women who are predicted to be strongly attached to the full-time full-year
labor force, and therefore are subject to smaller selection bias. Overall, they find that women
were negatively selected into the labor force in the 1970s and positively selected in the 1990s
and conclude that much of the narrowing of the gender wage gap reflects this change in the
composition of the female labor force. They attribute the convergence of the observed gender
wage gap to the growing wage inequality within gender; an increase in the return to skill over
time will attract more skilled women into the labor force and push less skilled women out.
A key component of the Heckman two-step method is the correct estimation of the
first-stage labor force participation equation. Yet, because the CPS is a select sample that
excludes individuals residing in group quarters, such as correctional institutions, and selection is
nonrandom, the first-stage estimates and associated selection-corrected wage estimates are likely
to be biased. Since the CPS is becoming more select over time due to the growing incarcerated
population, using the CPS to estimate selection-corrected wages can also yield a misleading
estimate of the change in the gender wage gap. In contrast, the Census is more representative
2
of the U.S. population and includes individuals residing in group quarters.1 However, due to
limitations of the Census in recording the number of children for individuals living in group
quarters, I am unable to use the full Census sample to address how the omission of individuals
residing in group quarters from the CPS affects the Heckman two-step results. Thus, I replicate
the Heckman two-step method using a modified Census sample.
MR further examine the effects of selection into the full-time full-year labor force by
using individuals predicted to have strong labor force attachment to estimate a gender wage
gap less influenced by selection bias. But the select nature of the CPS sample also presents a
problem for identification at infinity because it requires the correct identification of demographic
groups that have high labor force participation rates, and thus, for whom selection is likely to be a
minor concern. Namely, when the data are missing for certain subpopulations, using the CPS
may overestimate full-time full-year labor force participation for some demographic groups and,
consequently, yield a more biased estimate of the gender wage gap relative to estimates obtained
using the Census. In particular, because a larger percentage of men, relative to women, reside
in group quarters, men’s estimated wages are disproportionately affected by the omission of the
group quarters population from the CPS. Furthermore, because the CPS is becoming more select
over time, if the gender wage gap is estimated using a subset of men that appears to have strong
labor force attachment, but the group is actually becoming more positively selected over time,
then the CPS is likely to mis-estimate the level of the wage gap, particularly in later years, and
therefore mis-estimate the convergence of the gender wage gap.
A limitation of MR, and this paper, is that by not modeling male selection in the Heckman
two-step method, they do not address whether selection for men has changed. And while MR
account for the selection of men into the full-time full-year labor force in identification at infinity,
1Group quarters are often defined as units with 10 or more individuals unrelated to the householder. Institutional
group quarters refer to correctional institutions, mental institutions, and institutions for the elderly, handicapped,
and poor. Non-institutional group quarters refers to military barracks, college dormitories, and rooming houses.
Individuals living in group quarters are sampled as individuals; therefore, the number of children or other household
related entries are not reported.
3
they do not address how changing selection rules among men can affect the convergence of the
gender wage gap. In 1975, the wages for males with a high school degree were 80 percent of those
earned by males with at least a college degree. In 2014, this number fell to 60 percent (Council of
Economic Advisers 2016). This decline in wages for less-skilled men is likely to be influenced by
selection into the labor force because of the fall in the employment of less-educated and low-wage
males. Incarceration rates for men have also been rising rapidly; in 1990 the rate of incarceration
was 564 per 1000,000 in the population and rose to 890 per 100,000 in 2014 (Council of Economic
Advisers 2016). Consequently, because changing selection bias among men will bias the observed
gender wage gap, this paper attempts to improve the identification at infinity selection equation
for men by using the full Census sample, which includes individuals living in group quarters, and
by accounting for the recent declines in male labor force participation rates. I also use a modified
Census sample, meant to mimic the CPS, to replicate the MR identification at infinity results
and assess whether differences between the results using the CPS and the full Census sample are
driven by different sample universes or different datasets.
Section 2 of this paper discusses the relevant literature. Section 3 replicates MR using the
same methodology and sample from the CPS. While there are some elements of MR’s findings
I am unable to replicate, like them, I find that after controlling for female selection into the
full-time full-year labor force, the convergence of the gender wage gap disappears. Section 3 of
the paper describes the use of Census data to replicate MR’s methodology. When I control for
female selection using the same exclusion restriction as MR for the Heckman two-step method,
the gender wage gap again appears relatively constant over time. However, between the 1970s
and 1990s, while the CPS results show a slight widening of the gender wage gap by 0.011 log
points, the Census results display a small narrowing of the gap by 0.014 log points. I extend on
the identification at infinity analysis by including the group quarters population in the sample and
modifying how male selection into the labor force is modeled. I find slightly more convergence
in the selection-corrected gender wage gap among individuals predicted to be strongly attached to
4
the labor force when using Census data relative to CPS data. Nonetheless, MR’s conclusion that
changing selection into the female labor force contributes to the convergence of the gender wage
gap does not appear to be sensitive to the dataset used. Section 4 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
Researchers have provided a variety of reasons to explain the convergence of the gender
wage gap, such as an increase in womens experience relative to that of men, the reversal of
the gender education gap, and a shift into better paid occupations.2 Because the proportion of
women employed full-time full-year has changed over time in size and composition, changing
selection bias is also likely to contribute to the narrowing of the gender wage gap. Yet, due
to differences in the methodology and data used, papers studying the effects of selection bias
have reached contradictory conclusions about the direction of the bias and the extent to which
changing selection can explain the convergence of the wage gap. Namely, most papers suggest
that selection into the female labor force was positive in the 1990s, but there is no consensus on
whether selection was negative or positive in the 1970s.
Like MR, some papers use the CPS and Heckman two-step method, albeit with different
exclusion restrictions, to estimate a selection-corrected gender wage gap. In contrast to MR, these
papers control for both male and female selection into the labor force, yet it is difficult to find an
exclusion restriction for men that affects labor force participation but not market wages. Blau
and Beller (1988) use the 1972 and 1982 CPS to study earnings differentials by gender and race.
Using nonlabor income, an indicator for whether an individual was at least 62 years of age, and
the number of other family members between 18 and 64 years old as instruments, they find that
selection into the labor force among white men was negative in 1971 but fell in magnitude in
1981 and that selection among white women became increasingly positive. Overall, they find that
2See Blau and Kahn (2017) for an extensive literature review on the gender wage gap.
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between 1971 and 1981, the selection-corrected wages of white women rose relative to those of
white men, in contrast to the constant trend in observed earnings differentials. Unlike Blau and
Beller, but consistent with MRs findings, Jacobsen, Khamis, and Yuksel (2015) use 50 years of
CPS data and the Heckman two-step method with marital status as an exclusion restriction, to
find that selection into the female labor force was negative in the 1970s but became positive over
time. Yet, similar to Blau and Beller, they find negative, but relatively constant, selection into the
male labor force.
Another method used to study selection bias and the gender wage gap is the imputation of
wages for those not in the full-time full-year labor force. To estimate a selection-corrected gender
wage gap, wage imputations can non-parametrically control for the omission of non-employed
women with high potential wages and non-employed men with low potential wages. While most
papers find that selection into the female labor force was positive since the 1990s, Blau and Kahn
(2006), using wage history and imputation methods, find that women were positively selected
into the labor force in the 1980s and negatively selected in the 1990s, possibly due to changes in
welfare laws that encouraged relatively low-skilled women to enter the labor force.
Despite the gender wage gap literature attempting to account for or impute the wages of
the non-employed, it fails to consider the wages of individuals residing in group quarters, most of
whom are men. Although Herrmann and Machado (2012) do not account for the wages of those
in group quarters, they emphasize the importance of accounting for male selection into the labor
force. The authors examine how cognitive ability affects selection into employment and find that
differential female selection into the labor force over time cannot explain much of the narrowing
of the gender wage gap. They show that young women became less positively selected between
the 1960s and 1990s but that the relationship between ability and full-time full-year labor force
participation disappears for older women. Men, on the other hand, appeared to positively select
into employment. They conclude that selection bias due to ability is exaggerated for women and
observed wages can be used to measure average female potential wages, while male selection
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may be important when measuring the gender wage gap.
Lastly, other authors have sought to expand on MR. They have found that the selection of
women into the labor force in the late 1970s was positive, rather than negative, and that selection
bias plays a smaller role, relative to MRs results, in the convergence of the gender wage gap. Bar,
Kim, and Leukhina (2015) correct for inconsistent estimates of the wages of married women,
resulting from omitted variable bias, by including spousal income as a determinant of female
full-time full-year labor force participation in the first stage of the Heckman two-step method.
They find that relative to MR’s results, changing selection bias plays a less important role in
the convergence of the gender wage gap. Rather, the decline in the market price gap paid on
observables, such as experience and educational attainment, can explain a larger proportion of
the narrowing of the gender wage gap. They also find that selection is positive in both the 1970s
and 1990s. Schwiebert (2012) also builds on MR by addressing the possibility of inconsistent
parameter estimates caused by the endogeneity of education, which can arise due to unobservable
factors that affect wages, the probability of labor force participation, and educational attainment.
The paper uses quarter of birth as an instrument for education and estimates womens wages over
time using the Heckman two-step method. Because the instrument is not available in the CPS,
the paper uses the 1980 Census and 2005 to 2010 American Community Survey (ACS) data but
continues to limit the sample to individuals not residing in group quarters. The paper finds that
selection has become more positive over time and was not negative in 1980.
Since it is difficult to find an appropriate exclusion restriction for males, this paper uses
Census data to estimate a selection-corrected wage gap through identification at infinity, rather
than the Heckman two-step method. I aim to contribute to the gender wage gap literature by using
the Census and ACS to include individuals residing in group quarters in the first and second stages
of the identification at infinity analysis. I also account for how declining male full-time full-year
labor force participation rates can affect which groups of men have wages that are minimally
affected by selection bias.
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1.3 Replication
1.3.1 Data
Following MR, this paper uses the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) of
the Current Population Survey (CPS), also known as the March Supplement. As in MR’s original
paper, to increase sample size, this section creates two sets of repeated cross sections, each of
which contain five years of survey data: 1976 to 1980 and 1996 to 2000 survey-years, or 1975 to
1979 and 1995 to 1999 work-years, respectively.
The sample consists of white, non-Hispanic individuals aged 26 to 55, not living in group
quarters. MR classify individuals as full-time full-year if they worked at least 35 hours per week
and at least 50 weeks per year last year. For log hourly wage estimation, they exclude the Armed
Forces population, the self-employed, and individuals in agriculture or private household sectors.
MR also exclude individuals with allocated earnings.
Hourly wages, denominated in year-2000 dollars, are calculated using annual earnings,
usual hours worked per week, and weeks worked last year.3 As a further sample restriction for
log wage estimation, MR trim wages such that observations with an hourly wage under $2.80 per
hour are excluded. Next, they generate a full-time full-year log hourly wage distribution, which
includes wages for white males of all categories of marital status and non-white, never-married
men aged 18 to 65 (at the time income was received). Individuals below the 1st percentile and
above the 98th percentile are excluded from the log wage regressions. Trimming drops most
individuals whose wages were topcoded. While MR make their wage cutoffs publicly available,
I am unable to generate the same values using the method described above. I obtain a higher
minimum and maximum wage cutoff. My 1st percentile cutoffs are often larger by at most $1,
3Prior to 1976, the ASEC did not inquire about usual weekly hours worked and weeks worked in the last year;
rather, hours and weeks worked are reported in intervals. Therefore, I use the data provided by Casey Mulligan which
includes imputations for hours and weeks worked variables. See MR for a description of the imputation procedure.
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and my 98th percentile values are, on average, larger by approximately $9. I use my derived wage
cutoffs to generate all results that use the wage-trimmed sample.
Following MR, I use six education categories: 0 to 8 years of schooling, 9 to 11 years of
schooling, received high school degree, received college degree, and received advanced degree.4
I calculate potential experience by taking the maximum of zero or age minus years of schooling
completed minus 7. All calculations use person weights provided in the CPS.
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 contain summary statistics and are analogues of Table A.1 in MR.
Table 1.1 compares the full CPS sample’s descriptive statistics from MR to descriptive statistics
from the replication. Means from MR and my replication are often identical, with differences
likely due to rounding. Table 1.2 compares descriptive statistics for the full-time full-year CPS
sample from MR and from the replication. While the differences, stemming from different wage
cutoffs, are statistically significant, they are typically less than .002 in magnitude.5
1.3.2 Heckman Two-Step
1.3.2.1 Methodology
Following MR, this paper begins by using Heckman two-step estimation (see Gronau
(1974) and Heckman (1979)) to adjust for the selection of women into the full-time full-year labor
force. The first step of the Heckman procedure estimates a probit model, Equation (1.1), using the
full sample of women with full-time full-year status as the dependent variable. To better model
4Prior to 1992, the CPS classified education by the years of schooling, rather than the highest degree received.
Therefore, before 1992 high school graduates refers to individuals with 12 years of schooling, some college refers
to 13 to 15 years of schooling, college refers to 16 to 17 years of schooling, and advanced degree refers to at least
18 years of schooling. Years of schooling are imputed for survey years 1992 to 2003 following Autor, Katz, and
Kearney (2005).
5The largest difference between the MR and replicated summary statistics is in average Potential Experience-15
for 1975-1979. In Table 1.1, MR list the average potential experience for women as 5.073 years (Column 1), while
the average potential experience under the replication is 5.067 years (Column 3). I cannot comment on statistical
significance because MR do not list standard errors in the summary statistics. In comparing MR and the exact
replication, these differences are unusual because all other averages have at most a difference in magnitude of 0.001.
Nonetheless, they do not appear to significantly affect the marginal effects or coefficients on potential experience
when exactly replicating MR.
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selection, Heckman two-step estimation requires an exclusion restriction meant only to affect
reservation wages not market wages. Following MR, the exclusion restriction is marital status
interacted with the number of children under the age of 6.6 The second step of the Heckman
method, Equation (1.2), estimates a log wage least-squares regression using the full-time full-year
sample of women and includes the inverse Mills’ ratio estimated in the first stage.
Pt(Z)≡ Pr(L= 1|Z,g= 1) =Φ(Zδt) (1.1)
wit = αt +Xitβt +θtλ(Zitδt)+uit (1.2)
Let t denote time period, particularly the 1975-1979 and 1995-1999 work-years. Let
L= 1 denote full-time full-year labor force participation. Let g represent sex, such that 1 and 0
represent females and males, respectively. The row vector X contains demographic characteristics
affecting market wages, namely educational attainment, marital status, region, and a potential
experience quartic interacted with education indicators. Let Z denote a row vector that includes
all elements of X and the exclusion restriction of marital status interacted with the number of
children under the age of 6. Φ(·) represents the cumulative distribution function of the standard
normal distribution. Estimating Equation (1.1) yields δˆt , a vector of coefficients at time t. Overall,
Equation (1.1) estimates the probability that a woman participates in the full-time full-year labor
force at time period t, conditional on a set of demographic variables and the exclusion restriction.
Let wit represent a female’s log hourly wage at time t. Using estimates from the probit
equation, an inverse Mills’ ratio, λ(Zit δˆt), is assigned to each observation. Let βt be the vector of
coefficients on demographic variables X and θt be the coefficient on the female inverse Mills’
6Heckman (1974) first used the number of children under the age of 6 as an instrument for women’s reservation
wages. The idea is that as the number of young children increases, a woman’s reservation wage increases and the
more likely she is to be out of the labor force. However, the number of children should have no effect on the mother’s
market wage. By interacting the number of children with marital status, MR take into account the fact that married
women with children are more likely to stay out of the labor force than single women with children. Nonetheless,
this may be an imperfect exclusion restriction because high earnings potential can affect a woman’s decision to have
children and marital status can be affected by wage structure.
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ratio. The unobserved component of wages, the error term, is uit . As in MR, there are some
instances where marital status is excluded as a regressor in the log wage estimations because it is
possible that an individual’s marital status responds to wage structure.
1.3.2.2 Results
This section compares the estimates from my replication to the estimates from MR and
re-summarizes MR’s interpretation of the results. All tables referred to in this section contain two
sets of columns: the first set lists results taken from MR, while the second set lists the replication
results. Overall, in following MR’s methodology and using their CPS data, I am able to achieve
similar OLS and Heckman two-step estimates.
MR first compute OLS estimates of men’s and women’s log hourly wages using the full-
time full-year sample of men and women. The OLS regression equation, run separately by sex, is
similar to Equation (1.2), but the inverse Mills’ term is omitted. Then, the Heckman two-step
method is used to estimate selection-corrected log hourly wages for women. As described in
Section 1.3.2.1, in the first stage of the Heckman two-step method, I use the full CPS sample
to estimate the probit equation with full-time full-year female labor force participation as the
dependent variable. Coefficients from probit regressions that include the exclusion restriction,
marital status interacted with the number of children under the age of 6, are used to estimate an
individual’s inverse Mills’ ratio, which is then included in the second-stage log wage regressions
to control for selection into the labor force.
Tables 1.C.1, 1.C.2, and 1.C.3 are the equivalent of Table A.2 in MR, which lists the
marginal effects from the probit and the OLS and Heckman two step-coefficients from the
log hourly wage regressions. Table 1.C.1 compares the marginal effects derived from probit
estimation with and without the exclusion restriction. There is at most a 0.001 (rounded) difference
in magnitude between the marginal effects presented in MR and the replication. Tables 1.C.2
and 1.C.3 compare the coefficients from the regressions on log hourly wage, with and without
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the inverse Mills’ ratio, for 1975-1979 and 1995-1999 work-years, respectively. Differences
between the wage cutoffs I generate and those used in MR lead to small but statistically significant
differences between the estimated log wage coefficients in the replication and in MR.
Next, MR estimate gender wage gaps using the OLS and Heckman two-step log hourly
wage coefficients from Tables 1.C.2 and 1.C.3. I use what MR term as variable and fixed weights
to estimate a male and female log hourly wage by substituting the weights into the estimated
OLS and Heckman two-step regressions.7 Weights are such that the average full-time full-year
female and male are identical, except for sex.8 Fixed weights have the average characteristics of
full-time full-year women aggregated over 1975-1979 and 1995-1999, while variable weights
differ by time period. In addition to unsuccessfully replicating the wage cutoffs used in MR, I am
also unable to replicate the weights used to calculate the estimated gender wage gaps. Using the
weights I generate, I then estimate an OLS gender wage gap for each time period by taking the
difference between the OLS-estimated female and male log wages. Following MR, to estimate
a Heckman two-step wage gap, I take the difference between the Heckman two-step-estimated
female and the OLS-estimated male log hourly wages.
Table 1.3 mirrors Table I in MR, which illustrates how the gender wage gap has changed
over time with and without controlling for selection into the full-time full-year labor force.9 In
Table 1.3, Panel A uses variable weights, while Panel B uses fixed weights. Columns titled “OLS”
use the coefficients from the wage regressions without an inverse Mills’ ratio to calculate the
gender wage gap. Columns titled “Two-Step” use the coefficients from the wage regressions with
an inverse Mills’ ratio to calculate the gender wage gap. This yields the estimated gender wage
gaps listed in Columns 1, 2, 4, and 5. The “Bias” columns (Columns 3 and 4) are calculated by
taking the difference between the OLS-estimated wage gap and the Heckman two-step-estimated
wage gap. These columns quantify selection bias since the OLS estimates do not use the inverse
7See Appendix 1.A for a description of how weights are generated and why variable and fixed weights are used.
8For weights, the inverse Mills’ ratio is set to zero.
9Note that the estimated gender wage gaps in Table 1.3 are equivalent to the unexplained portion of the gender
wage gaps from an Oaxaca decomposition.
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Mills’ ratio as a regressor to control for selection. Rows titled “Change” take the difference
between the 1995-1999 estimated wage gap and the 1975-1979 estimated wage gap. They also
include the difference of the 1995-1999 estimated bias and the 1975-1979 estimated bias.10
The differences between the wage cutoffs and weights used in the replication and in MR
yield small but typically statistically significant differences in the OLS and Heckman two-step
gender wage gaps listed in Table 1.3. For example, in MR the selection bias listed in Panel A
increases by 0.162 log points (Column 3), while in the replication paper selection bias increases by
0.169 log points (Column 6). Because the differences between the MR and replication estimates
are small, the interpretation of Table 1.3 remains unchanged. Overall, on average, the selection-
corrected gender wage gap appears to have been relatively constant between the 1970s and 1990s,
while the uncorrected (or OLS) gender wage gap has fallen over time. MR take this to suggest
that part of the measured gender wage gap convergence stems from changes in the selection rules
and composition of the female full-time full-year labor force. In particular, the “Change” rows of
Column 4 in Table 1.3 show that between the 1970s and 1990s, the OLS estimates of the gender
wage gap closed by 0.158 log points in Panel A and 0.143 log points in Panel B. These decreases
in the OLS-estimated gender wage gaps support the convergence of the observed gender wage
gap seen in Figure 1.1. Yet, controlling for selection bias, the point estimates of the gender wage
gap widen over time, although the difference in the two-step estimates over time is insignificant.
The estimates in the “Change” rows of Column 5 are now -.0011 and -0.025 in Panels A and B,
respectively. Therefore, once the selection of females into the full-time full-year labor force is
accounted for, the convergence of the estimated gender wage gap disappears. Column 6 shows
that the estimated selection bias is negative for 1975-1979 (-0.078 in Panel A and -0.074 in Panel
B), and for 1995-1999 the selection bias is positive (0.091 in Panel A and 0.094 in Panel B). Both
10The variance of the change in OLS estimates is calculated by summing the variance of the gender wage gap in
the 1970s and the variance of the gender wage gap in the 1990s. The variance of the change in the two-step-estimated
gender wage gap is calculated similarly. To calculate the variance of the bias, sum the variance in the OLS change
and the variance in the two-step change. Note that this requires an assumption of independence. Following MR,
standard errors are calculated using the non-parametric pairwise bootstrap method (1,000 replications) with a seed of
123.
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differences are statistically different from zero. MR conclude that because the selection bias
shifted from negative to positive between the 1970s and 1990s, the selection rule has changed
over time.
MR summarize the partial “effects” of marital status and schooling by illustrating how
the gender wage gaps would have evolved over time if all full-time full-year women fell into a
particular marital or educational attainment demographic (if for example, all women were married
or received college degrees). MR then compare how gender wage gaps for the average full-time
full-year woman changed over time relative to the gender wage gaps of particular demographic
subgroups. Table 1.4, which uses fixed weights, mirrors Table II in MR. As with Table 1.3, in
Table 1.4, there small and sometimes statistically significant differences between the estimated
gender wage gaps in MR and the replication, but the table’s interpretation remains the same.
Columns 1 and 6 and 2 and 7 list the OLS-estimated gender wage gaps in 1975-1979 and 1995-
1999, respectively. Columns 3 and 8 take the difference between the 1995-1999 and 1975-1979
OLS-estimated wage gaps. Comparing Panels A and B, Column 8 illustrates that conditional
on being never-married, the OLS-estimated wage gap closed less relative to the OLS-estimated
wage gap for the average woman (0.058 and 0.143, respectively). All other categories of marital
status do not display such a small convergence in the OLS-estimated gender wage gap. Columns
4 and 9 list the difference between the 1995-1999 and 1975-1979 Heckman two-step-estimated
wage gaps. They show that for all marital status categories other than never-married, the change
over time in the selection-corrected estimate of the gender wage gap is not statistically different
from zero. Columns 5 and 10, which estimate the change in selection bias over time, take the
difference of the Heckman two-step change (Columns 4 and 9) and the OLS change (Columns 3
and 8). This is equivalent to calculating the amount of selection bias in each time period and then
taking the difference between the bias calculated for 1995-1999 and the bias for 1975-1979. In
Column 10, the estimated selection bias in the never-married row increased by 0.117 log points,
relative to a maximum of 0.193 log points for the currently married group. A similar pattern
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can be seen in Panel C of Table 1.4. Namely, the change in the OLS-estimated gender wage gap
(Column 8) and the change in selection bias (Column 10) are small for the advanced degree row
relative to other educational attainment subgroups. Therefore, as discussed in MR, Table 1.4
illustrates that among demographic groups with high female labor force participation, such as the
never-married or those with an advanced degree, because the estimated change in selection bias is
relatively small, their wages are subject to less selection bias.
Despite the differences between MR and this paper in the wage cutoffs and weights used
to generate Tables 1.3 and 1.4, the results continue to suggest that between the 1970s and 1990s,
changing selection rules drove the convergence of the observed gender wage gap.11,12 Namely,
by controlling for female selection into the full-time full-year labor force, the selection-corrected
gender wage gap appears to have been relatively constant during this time.
1.3.3 Identification at Infinity
MR use a simplified version of identification at infinity to further illustrate how, over
time, there has been little change in the gender wage gap for demographic groups with strong
full-time full-year labor force attachment. The Heckman two-step method requires an exclusion
restriction, a variable that affects labor supply without affecting wages, to ensure that selection
bias is not measured using the assumption of joint normality of errors (Heckman 1979). The
purpose of identification at infinity, derived from Chamberlain (1986), Heckman (1990), and
Schafgans and Zinde-Walsh (2002), is to estimate a wage equation using a sample selected to
have strong labor force attachment, which equates to lower selection bias, without the use of
an exclusion restriction. If the gender wage gap has converged due to changing selection bias,
MR assume that measured wage changes should be smaller for demographic groups with high
11The wage cutoffs and weights used in MR are publicly provided by Casey Mulligan. When using the provided
values, I am able to exactly replicate MR’s results listed in Tables 1.3 and 1.4.
12In MR and my replication, I use pre-generated interactions for probit and log wage regressions. However,
pre-generated interactions yield incorrect marginal effects and estimated gender wage gaps. Therefore, in Appendix
1.B, I replicate the Heckman two-step results from Section 1.3.2.2 using factor variables.
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full-time full-year employment since selection bias is approximately zero in these groups. Note,
there is a trade-off between sample size and the amount of selection bias: the higher the minimum
labor force participation threshold, the fewer the number of demographic groups, and therefore
individuals, there are that will meet this minimum. Additionally, identification at infinity does not
estimate wage gaps for demographic groups that are excluded from log hourly wage estimation, so
it is difficult to generalize the results from demographic groups with high labor force participation
to groups with low labor force participation.
The first step of identification at infinity estimates a probit equation on full-time full-year
status, separately by gender, using the vector of wage regressors, Xit , from Equation (1.2) and
omitting the exclusion restriction used in the Heckman two-step estimation. It yields ̂P(Xitδg),
the estimated probability of participating in the labor force full-time full-year, where δg is a vector
of coefficients on the probit regressors for sex g. The probit is run using only 1975-1979 data for
both men and women. Following MR, I then use the probit estimates to select men and women
who are full-time full-year and have characteristics such that the predicted probability of full-time
full-year labor force participation exceeds some α near 1.
The next step is to calculate a selection-corrected gender wage gap using the demographic
groups with high predicted labor force attachment:
(wit−Xit βˆ∞t ) = giγt + εwit ,{i|P(Xitδg)≥ α,Lit = 1} (1.3)
Let wit be the log hourly wage, gi is the sex of individual i (1 being female and 0 being male), and
γt is the coefficient on sex at time t. Let Lit = 1 indicate that individual i at time t is participating in
the labor force full-time full-year. Xit βˆ∞t is the predicted wage using the vector of demographics
X described in Section 1.3.2.1 (Heckman 1990; Schafgans and Andrews 1998). The coefficients
in the vector β∞t are estimated using OLS and are the same for males and females; sex is not
interacted with all other regressors but is included as a regressor. The predicted wage is derived
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from the complete full-time full-year sample used in the Section 1.3.2. Note that using the OLS
coefficients ignores whether the coefficients themselves are affected by selection bias. Denote the
error term as εwit .
Following MR, I estimate γt in two steps. First, I take the difference between the measured
log hourly wage, wit , and the predicted log hourly wage, Xit βˆ∞t . Then I regress this difference,
the left-hand side of Equation (1.3), on sex. The coefficient on sex, γˆt , is considered the estimated
gender wage gap.
Figure 1.2, which is equivalent to Figure V in MR, plots the estimated gender wage gap,
γˆt , using different threshold values for α. Because I am unable to replicate the wage cutoffs used
in MR, as in Section 1.3.2, I use the wage cutoffs I generated following MR’s wage trimming
method to create the wage sample for the log wage regressions. As a result, there are small but
statistically significant differences between Figure 1.2 and Figure V.13 Regardless of the threshold,
each γˆt in the replication is larger relative to γˆt in MR (see Figure 1.C.1).14 Additionally, for
each threshold, relative to the convergence illustrated in MR, there is less convergence in the
replication’s estimated wage gaps between 1970 and 2000. For example, in the replication the
estimated gender wage gap for the 80 percent threshold converges by 0.004 log points, while the
estimated gender wage gap in MR narrows by 0.02 log points.
Nonetheless, as in MR, Figure 1.2 illustrates that among demographic groups with high
predicted full-time full-year labor force participation, the estimated gender wage gap trends
little over time. This is especially true for groups with predicted labor force participation of 70
percent and 80 percent. Recall that as the threshold for the predicted probability of labor force
participation falls, the amount of selection bias increases. This can explain why in Figure 1.2,
there is more of a trend in the gender wage gap among individuals with at least a 60 percent
predicted probability of working full-time full-year.
13When using the wage cutoffs provided by MR, there appears to be no significant differences between Figure
1.2 and Figure V in MR.
14The 80 percent threshold appears to be most sensitive to the change in wage cutoffs.
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To address the concern that endogeneity may bias the probit and wage regression results,
since marital status can be affected by wage structure and may have changed over time, MR
include an x-marked series in Figure 1.2 that uses all regressors other than marital status to
estimate the gender wage gap. However, a 50 percent threshold is used to ensure a large enough
sample size of females. Therefore, MR expect some of the trend in the x-marked series to be a
result of changing selection bias. Nevertheless, because the trend in the x-marked series is small,
MR conclude that the convergence of the gender wage gap does not depend on the use of marital
status as a regressor.
Overall, as in MR, the unmarked line denoting the uncorrected gender wage gap shows a
convergence of over 0.17 log points. The square-marked series, denoting the estimated gender
wage gap between men and women predicted to have a probability of working full-time full-year
of at least 80 percent, shows that the gender wage gap has not changed substantially over time. As
a result, MR conclude that the convergence in the observed gender wage gap is due to changing
selection into the female full-time full-year labor force.
1.4 Extensions using Census Data
This paper extends on MR in two ways. First, to verify whether MR’s results are sensitive
to the dataset used, I will replicate MR’s Heckman two-step and identification at infinity analyses
using a sample of Census data that mimics the CPS. Second, to better model selection into the
labor force by using a more complete sample, I will replicate the identification at infinity analysis
using the entire Census sample.15 While MR use the 1975-1979 CPS samples estimate a probit
on full-time full-year labor force participation to select both men and women with high predicted
labor force participation, in order to account for declining male labor force participation, I use the
2010 ACS to estimate the first-stage coefficients for males. Following MR, I use the 1980 Census
15This paper uses the 2010 American Community Survey (ACS), the 2000 and 1990 5% Census samples, the 1980
5% Census sample, and the 1970 1% state fm1 Census sample, available from IPUMS-USA (Ruggles et al. 2015).
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to estimate the probability of labor force participation for women.
Unlike the Census, the CPS excludes individuals residing in group quarters, such as the
incarcerated.16 The select nature of the CPS sample makes it difficult to estimate selection-
corrected wages for both men and women. The issue is particularly relevant for men, who are
likely to be disproportionately affected by the CPS’ omission of individuals residing in group
quarters. The select nature of the CPS is also problematic for correctly estimating the change in
the gender wage gap over time. For the identification at infinity analysis, if the change over time
in the gender wage gap is being estimated using a subset of men that appears to have strong labor
force attachment, as suggested by the CPS, but the group is actually becoming more positively
selected over time, then all else equal, the second-stage wage estimates will mis-estimate both
the level and convergence of the gender wage gap. On the other hand, the Census is more
representative of the U.S. population and can better model the selection of men and women.
1.4.1 Heckman Two-Step
1.4.1.1 Data
This section compares the OLS and Heckman two-step results from the 1980 and 2000
Censuses to the 1975-1979 and 1995-1999 work-year CPS samples, respectively. I also extend
the Heckman two-step analysis to later years using the 2010 ACS. MR hypothesize that wage
inequality within gender drives wage equality across genders. Since 2000, wage inequality within
gender (the difference between the 90th and 10th percentiles of log hourly wages) has steadily
increased, and the observed gender wage gap has closed further (see Figure 1.C.2). If selection
bias has continued to contribute to the narrowing of the gender wage gap, convergence in the
selection-corrected wage gap should remain small (or negligible).17
16As of 1983, among those residing in group quarters, only individuals residing in non-institutional group quarters
were sampled in the CPS.
17As a comparison to the results from the 2010 ACS, I also include the Heckman two-step results estimated using
the 2005-2009 and 2010-2014 (work-year) CPS samples in Appendix 1.C. Summary statistics for these CPS samples
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Ideally, by using the Census I would be able to estimate the Heckman two-step selection
equation using a more complete sample of women. However, I am unable to use the Heckman
two-step model with the full Census sample because individuals living in group quarters are listed
as having no children since they are sampled as individuals and not households. All Heckman
results are therefore estimated using a “CPS-Similar” sample, which is meant to match the CPS
sample used by MR. Although imperfect, the purpose of the “CPS-Similar” sample is to verify
the CPS Heckman results using another dataset.
As described in Section 1.3.1, the sample includes white, non-Hispanic individuals aged
26 to 55, not residing in group quarters. I attempt to match education categories across the CPS
and Census.18 Following MR, I generate wage cutoffs using the Census’ wage distribution for
full-time full-year men (excluding those in group quarters) and estimate variable and fixed weights
using the average full-time full-year woman. All calculations use person weights provided in the
Census files.
Because the CPS is meant to be a labor market survey, the Bureau of Labor Statistics
excludes members of the Armed Forces, namely active duty members, when reporting the U.S.
unemployment rate. Weeks worked last year and usual hours worked per week (last year) for
individuals in the Armed Forces are not recorded until 1990 (for both males and females), because
in 1990, the CPS changed its definition of the sample universe from civilians to persons. Except
for 1968, no women are listed as Armed Forces’ members until 1988. Therefore, the “CPS-
Similar” sample includes male members of the military for the 1980 and 2000 Censuses and
the 2010 ACS; it includes female members of the military for the 2000 and 2010 samples. For
selection into the labor force, all individuals in the military are considered as not working full-time
full-year in the 1980 Census. Their full-time full-year status in the 2000 Census and 2010 ACS
are listed in Table 1.C.15.
18The Census uses highest grade completed. Detail varies by year of the survey, but I apply the same restrictions
from MR to generate my education indicators. To calculate potential experience in the 1990 and 2000 Censuses,
I first impute years of education for each individual using data from Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2005) and then
calculate experience using the definition described in Section 1.3.1.
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is determined by the weeks per year worked and hours per week worked reported. As in MR,
individuals in the military are dropped for the wage regressions.
Summary statistics using the “CPS-Similar” sample are listed in the first four columns
of Tables 1.5, 1.6, and 1.7 (which correspond to the 1980 Census, the 2000 Census, and the
2010 ACS, respectively). Columns 1 and 2 of each table list the descriptive statistics for the full
“CPS-Similar” sample, and Columns 3 and 4 list the descriptive statistics for the full-time full-year
sample. A comparison of the summary statistics in Table 1.1 to those in Tables 1.5 and 1.6 shows
that, on average, a greater fraction of men and women are employed full-time full-year in the CPS
than in the Census.19 Additionally, among all individuals in the “CPS-Similar” sample, average
potential experience increased between 1980 and 2000, while in the CPS, average potential
experience decreased. For example, in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.1, average potential experience
for women in the CPS fell by 0.54 years (4.527 - 5.067). In Column 1 of Tables 1.5 and 1.6,
average potential experience for women in the “CPS-Similar” sample increased by 0.394 years
(4.919 - 4.525). For the full-time full-year sample in the CPS, potential experience increases
over time. Between the 1970s and 1990s, Columns 5 and 6 of Table 1.2 show that the average
potential experience for a full-time full-year woman in the CPS increased by 0.034 years (4.136 -
4.102). There are even larger increases in average potential experience in the full-time full-year
“CPS-Similar” sample. Column 3 of Tables 1.5 and 1.6 show that full-time full-year women
increased their average potential experience by 0.531 years (4.436 - 3.905).20 Average education
is similar across the CPS and the “CPS-Similar” sample; although there are small but statistically
significant differences between the educational attainment distributions.
19According to the BLS, differences between the CPS and Census in employment rates stem from differences
in the interview environment (or lack thereof), specificity of the survey questions, and the definition of reference
week. Additionally, as will be addressed in Section 1.4.2.1, there appear to be large differences between the CPS and
Census in the full-time full-year labor force participation of women with at least a college degree, primarily due to
how teachers in the Census report their weeks worked per year.
20The large differences between average potential experience in the CPS and Census may stem from the fact that
the 1976 to 1980 survey-year CPS data is aggregated. When using the 1980 and 2000 CPS samples, the changes in
average potential experience are of the same direction relative to those in the Census. Potential experience is also
sensitive to how years of education is calculated. There do not appear to be any large differences in the CPS and
Census age distributions.
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1.4.1.2 Results
Following MR, I begin by estimating OLS and Heckman two-step log hourly wages. In
the first stage of the Heckman two-step method, I model the selection of women into the full-time
full-year labor force using the exclusion restriction of marital status interacted with the number of
children under the age of 6 (see Section 1.3.2.1). The estimated first-stage coefficients are then
used to estimate women’s inverse Mills’ ratio, which is included in the second stage log wage
regressions. Table 1.C.4 lists the marginal effects from the probit estimation, and Table 1.C.5 lists
the OLS and Heckman log hourly wage coefficients. Comparing the marginal effects listed in
Tables 1.C.1 and 1.C.4, the only striking difference is that, relative to women with some college,
women with at least a college degree in the CPS are more likely to work full-time full-year, while
in the 1980 and 2000 Censuses they are less likely to work full-time full-year. Nonetheless,
the difference in the sign of the marginal effects across samples does not seem to qualitatively
impact the log wage regression coefficients, namely having at least a college degree is positively
associated with log hourly wages.
I then use the coefficients from the OLS and Heckman two-step log wage regressions
and the variable and fixed weights discussed in Section 1.3.2.2 to estimate the gender wage gaps
listed in Tables 1.8 and 1.9.21 Table 1.8 compares the estimated gender wage gaps between
1980 and 2000, and Table 1.9 compares the estimated gender wage gaps between 1980 and 2010.
Panel A uses variable weights, while Panel B uses fixed weights. In both Panels A and B of
Table 1.8, the “CPS-Similar” sample shows that the OLS-estimated gender wage gap converges
more between 1980 and 2000 when using the Census rather than the CPS (see Table 1.3), a
statistically significant difference. Panel A of Table 1.8 also shows a small, but statistically
significant, narrowing of the selection-corrected gender wage gap by 0.014 log points (Column 2).
On the other hand, Panel A of Table 1.3, which uses the CPS, shows a statistically insignificant
21Following MR, standard errors are calculated using the non-parametric pairwise bootstrap method (1,000
replications) with seeds of 123, 456, 78, and 91.
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widening of the selection-corrected gender wage gap by 0.011 log points (Column 5). Table 1.9,
which compares the estimated gender wage gaps across 1980 and 2010, tells a similar story.22
As illustrated by MR using the CPS, the results using Census data continue to suggest
that much of the convergence in the gender wage gap can be attributed to changing selection bias.
Both the CPS and Census results show a change in the selection rule over time, negative in the
late 1970s and positive in the late 1990s. Comparing the “Bias” column in Tables 1.3 and 1.8
(Columns 6 and 3, respectively) the changes in the selection bias between 1980 and 2000 are of
the same sign and similar magnitude, namely over 0.16 log points in both Panels A and B. Note,
estimated female selection into the full-time full-year labor force remains positive when using the
2010 ACS (see Column 3 of Table 1.9).
Comparing the “partial effects” of marital status and educational attainment on the
estimated gender wage gap, Table 1.10, which uses 1980 and 2000 Census data, yields similar
qualitative results as in Table 1.4, which uses CPS data. Within their respective panels, the
never-married and advanced degree groups in Table 1.10 have some of the smallest values for the
change in the OLS-estimated wage gap (Column 3). In Column 5, these two groups also have
smaller values for the change in selection bias relative to the other marital status and educational
categories. For example, the change in selection bias for the never-married group is 0.125 log
points relative to a maximum of 0.185 log points for the currently married group or relative to
0.164 log points for the average full-time full-year woman. Similar to MR, this suggests that for
particular demographic groups that have a smaller estimated bias relative to that of the average
full-time full-year woman, the estimated gender wage gap is less affected by selection bias.23
Overall, using the “CPS-Similar” sample and the Heckman two-step method continues
to illustrate that once female selection into the full-time full-year labor force is accounted for,
22Table 1.C.17, in Appendix 1.C, uses the 2006 to 2010 and 2011 to 2015 CPS samples to draw a comparison
between the Census and CPS in later years. Marginal effects from the probit estimation and log hourly wage
coefficients are listed in Table 1.C.16.
23Using the Census and ACS, Table 1.C.6 compares the “partial effects” of marital status and educational
attainment between 1980 and 2010. These can be compared to the “partial effects” estimated using the 2006 to 2010
and 2011 to 2015 CPS samples in Table 1.C.18.
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the convergence in the observed gender wage gap disappears. Namely, both the CPS and the
Census’ “CPS-Similar” samples suggest that much of the narrowing of the gender wage gap is
due to the changing selection of women into the labor force. The primary difference between
the results obtained using the Census and the CPS, which will also be seen in the identification
at infinity results below, is that a small and sometimes statistically significant narrowing of the
selection-corrected gender wage gap occurs when using the Census sample; whereas a small
widening in the wage gap is obtained when using the CPS.24
1.4.2 Identification at Infinity
Recall that by estimating a wage regression using a sample of individuals predicted to
have strong full-time full-year labor force attachment, MR use identification at infinity to illustrate
how the estimated gender wage gap trends over time for demographic groups that experience
minimal selection bias. The first step estimates a probit on full-time full-year employment status.
Following MR, I use the estimated probit to select a sample of individuals with high predicted
labor force participation, and I then use the sample to estimate a selection-corrected gender wage
gap. I first use the “CPS-Similar” sample, discussed in Section 1.4.1.1, to replicate the CPS
identification at infinity results. Then I extend the analysis to the full Census sample. The first
step determines whether any differences between the results using the full Census sample and
CPS sample are driven by using different datasets rather than different sample universes.
Unlike the Census, the CPS excludes individuals residing in group quarters, so estimating
the selection equation using the CPS may overestimate full-time full-year labor force participation
for certain demographic groups. While this is true for men and women, men’s estimated wages
24This difference might be a result of the mismeasurement of usual hours worked in the Census, since unlike the
CPS, the Census does not use an interviewer to assist with questions. Baum-Snow and Neal (2009) find that in the
1980s there was a statistically insignificant difference between hourly wages from the CPS and Census. However, for
white men and women, the 2000 Census yields larger hourly wages relative to hourly wages from the 2000 CPS.
This difference is statistically significant, and women appear to have a larger discrepancy between hourly wages
calculated using the Census relative to the CPS.
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are more likely to be affected due to the CPS’s selection rules. In particular, a larger percentage
of men, relative to women, reside in group quarters. Additionally, when using the CPS, if the first
stage of identification at infinity yields a subset of men that appears to have strong labor force
attachment, but this group is actually becoming more positively selected over time, then, all else
equal, using the CPS will mis-estimate the convergence of the gender wage gap.
Figure 1.C.3 depicts male and female full-time full-year labor force participation rates
by educational attainment. It illustrates the differences in labor force attachment across the CPS
and full Census samples and demonstrates the increasingly select nature of the CPS. Comparing
the 1975-1979 CPS to the 1980 full Census sample and the 1995-1999 CPS to the 2000 full
Census sample, Figure 1.C.3 shows that for each education category, there is a larger fraction
of men employed full-time full-year in the CPS relative to the Census. The difference in labor
force participation rates is particularly pronounced among less-educated men and the differences
between the CPS and Census samples increase between 1980 and 2000. For example, among
men with less than 8 years of schooling, in 1980, the fraction of men employed full-time full-year
is 8 percent larger in the CPS relative to the Census, and in 2000, the fraction of men employed
full-time full-year is 21 percent larger in the CPS relative to the Census. I, therefore, estimate the
selection equation in the first stage and the wage regression in the second stage over a sample that
includes individuals residing in group quarters.
To control for changing selection rules, MR use the 1975-1979 CPS data to generate the
selection equation for both men and women. This estimated selection equation is used for all time
periods; namely, the probit coefficients are the same for each set of years. Therefore, demographic
groups selected for the wage regression in Equation (1.3) are predicted to have strong labor force
attachment in the 1970s and are assumed to continue to have strong attachment. For women,
using 1975-1979 CPS data makes sense because groups that have high labor force attachment in
later years may not have been strongly attached in the 1970s. Using later years to estimate the
selection equation would introduce selection bias into earlier estimates of the gender wage gap.
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However, the full Census sample shows that male full-time full-year labor force participation
has decreased from 73 percent to 68 percent between 1980 and 2010 (see Tables 1.5 and 1.7).
Therefore, if men are increasingly and non-randomly exiting the labor force, in the 2010 ACS,
some subsets of men who are predicted to have strong labor force attachment when using the
1980 Census will have estimated wages subject to more selection bias relative to subsets of men
with consistently strong labor force attachment over time. As a result, the selection-corrected
wage gap in the 2000s, and therefore the trend in the gender wage gap over time, are more likely
to be mis-estimated.
As in Section 1.3.3, the first stage of identification at infinity estimates a probit on full-time
full-year labor force status and the coefficients are used to select demographic groups predicted to
have strong labor force attachment. Namely, subgroups of men for whom P(X̂itδg=0)≥ α (where
Xit is the vector of wage regressors, δg is a vector of coefficients on the probit regressors for sex
g, and α is some threshold near 1) are used to estimate the gender wage gap in the second stage.
MR use 1975-1979 CPS data (or equivalently the 1980 Census) to estimate the probit coefficients.
Suppose there are men in particular demographic groups whose predicted labor force participation,
estimated using 1980 data, is greater than α between 1980 and 2010. If, however, men in these
subgroups are non-randomly exiting the labor force over time and I re-estimate their labor force
participation using the 2010 data, then there may be too few men in this subgroup classified as
full-time full-year, such that P( ̂Xi,2010δg=0) < α. To see how this affects the estimated gender
wage gap, consider the following wage equations for men in 1980 and 2010:
wi,1980 = Xi,1980β1 +ui,1980 (1.4a)
wi,2010 = Xi,2010β2 +ui,2010 (1.4b)
Log hourly wages in 1980 and 2010 are denoted by wi,1980 and wi,2010, respectively. Let β1 and β2
represent the OLS coefficients on the vector of wage regressors X and ui,1980 and ui,2010 represent
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the error terms. Equations (1.5a) and (1.5b), below, are the conditional expectations of log hourly
wages in 1980 and 2010, respectively.
E(wi,1980|Xi,1980,select1980) = Xi,1980β1 +E(ui,1980|Xi,1980,select1980) (1.5a)
E(wi,2010|Xi,2010,select2010) = Xi,2010β2 +E(ui,2010|Xi,2010,select2010) (1.5b)
The sample selection rules are defined as:
select1980 = (Li,1980 = 1,P(Xi,1980δg=0)≥ α)
select2010 = (Li,2010 = 1,P(Xi,2010δg=0)≥ α)
The selection rules indicate that male i at time t (1980 or 2010) is participating in the labor force
full-time full-year and is predicted to have labor force participation greater than or equal to α.
Assume that δg=0 is estimated using 1980 data. If men are becoming more positively selected
over time, then
E(ui,1980|Xi,1980,select1980)< E(ui,2010|Xi,2010,select2010)
Namely, in the second stage of identification at infinity, men’s estimated log hourly wages in
2010, relative to 1980, are subject to more selection bias. Consequently, both the gender wage
gap and trend in the wage gap will be mis-estimated. If, instead, I estimate the first stage using
2010 data, the probit coefficients will select a group of men whose wages are less affected by
selection bias over the entire sample period. Therefore, to address changing selection rules for
men and women, I will use the 2010 ACS to estimate the selection equation for males, and I will
continue to use the 1980 Census to model selection for females.
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1.4.2.1 Data
The identification at infinity results illustrated in Figure V of MR and Figure 1.2 of this
paper use CPS data from 1971 to 2000. To extend my analysis to the Census, I use the 1970
through 2000 Censuses. I add in the 2010 ACS to emphasize the fact that male full-time full-year
labor force participation is declining over time. I estimate selection-corrected wage gaps using
both the “CPS-Similar” sample and the full Census sample.25 The full Census sample includes
individuals residing in group quarters and those in the Armed Forces. Following MR, for the
full Census sample, I generate wage cutoffs using the Census’ wage distribution for full-time
full-year men. For the “CPS-Similar” sample, I use the wage cutoffs described in Section 1.4.1.1.
MR use CPS data aggregated over 5-year intervals to estimate the identification at infinity
gender wage gaps. I, instead, use 10-year intervals to compare the CPS and Census results. For
example, I compare the estimated gender wage gaps from the 1980 Census and the pooled 1975 to
1984 (work-year) CPS samples. Because I use the 2010 ACS, I also include CPS data from 2004
to 2015 to the 1964 to 2003 survey-year data provided by Mulligan and Rubinstein.26 In MR
and Section 1.3.3, the 1975-1979 CPS data is used to estimate the first-stage probit coefficients
for selecting individuals with high predicted labor force attachment. To compare the CPS and
Census selection-corrected gender wage gaps, I instead, re-generate the CPS results using 10-year
intervals; namely, I use the 1975-1984 CPS samples to estimate the probit coefficients.
Summary statistics using the 1980 and 2000 full Census samples and the 2010 full ACS
sample are listed in the last four columns of Tables 1.5, 1.6 and 1.7, respectively. The “CPS-
Similar” and full Census samples are different in terms of the sample over which I estimate
the probability of participating in the full-time full-year labor force and in terms of the sample
used for the log wage regressions. Comparing the first and last four columns within each table,
25For both samples, I impute hours per week and weeks per year worked in the 1970 Census and weeks per year
worked in the 2010 ACS following Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2005).
26The 2004 to 2014 ASEC data is provided by IPUMS-CPS (Flood et al. 2015). Following Autor, Katz, and
Kearney (2005), to calculate potential experience, I impute the highest grade attained.
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including individuals residing in group quarters to create the full Census sample only yields small
changes to the descriptive statistics relative to those of the “CPS-Similar” sample. The last two
rows of Tables 1.5, 1.6, and 1.7 list the percentage of the full Census sample that reside in group
quarters. Comparing Table 1.5 to Tables 1.6 and 1.7, Column 6 indicates that since 1980 the
percentage of men in group quarters has increased from 1.2 percent to 1.9 percent, with much of
the increase driven by incarceration.
1.4.2.2 Results
I begin this section by describing adjustments I make to the definition of the full-time
full-year labor force. Then, I show how the selection-corrected gender wage gaps estimated using
the full Census compare to those estimated using the CPS. When I account for declining male
labor force participation rates and use the full Census sample, rather than the CPS, to estimate a
gender wage gap among demographic groups with strong predicted full-time full-year labor force
participation, I find relatively more convergence in the wage gap. Yet, as in MR, the narrowing
of the selection-corrected gender wage gaps is much smaller relative to the uncorrected gender
wage gap, which suggests that changing selection among women contributes to the observed
convergence.
The highest full-time full-year labor force participation threshold that MR use is 80
percent, meaning that MR estimate a wage regression on individuals who have a predicted
probability of participating in the labor force of at least 80 percent. When using the “CPS-Similar”
sample and the full Census sample, I am unable to construct a graph of the gender wage gap over
time, like Figure 1.2, for groups with strong predicted labor force attachment. Often, the estimated
gender wage gap at each time point is zero, not because the wage gap is zero, but because there
are no women who satisfy the criterion of having an estimated probability of full-time full-year
labor force participation above 80 percent.
One possible explanation for lacking women with a high predicted probability of full-time
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full-year labor force participation is that women have lower participation rates in the Census
relative to the CPS. To examine why I am unable to estimate a wage gap for large values of α, I
compare women’s full-time full-year labor force participation rates by educational attainment
across the CPS and Census. I find that in the CPS, relative to the “CPS-Similar” sample, a greater
fraction of women with at least a college degree are classified as full-time full-year; yet the two
samples share a similar fraction of women with less than a college degree working full-time
full-year. Since there are few highly-educated women classified as full-time full-year in the
Census, having a college degree negatively predicts labor force participation (see Table 1.C.4).
Despite other demographic variables positively predicting female labor force participation, such
as potential experience, the marginal effect of educational attainment is either negative or small
and positive; therefore, no female in the Census has an estimated probability above 80 percent.
The differences between the CPS and Census in labor force participation rates appear to
be caused by discrepancies in the distributions of weeks worked for women who work as teachers
or professors.27 While not as apparent, male teachers and professors in the Census also have a
different distribution of weeks worked per year relative to their counterparts in the CPS. Figures
1.C.4 and 1.C.5 illustrate how the distribution of weeks worked per year differ between the CPS
and “CPS-Similar” samples for women and men who are classified as teachers or professors and
for all other occupations. The figures indicate that individuals in non-teaching occupations in
the Census and CPS share a similar distribution of weeks worked per year. However, Figure
1.C.4 shows that 20 percent of female teachers in the 1980 Census, compared to 53 percent in
the 1976-1980 CPS samples, worked at least 50 weeks per year. To address the discrepancy in
weeks worked per year for the identification at infinity analysis, I classify teachers in both the
CPS and Census as full-time full-year if they work at least 35 hours per week and at least 36
27The difference in the distribution of weeks worked between the CPS and Census may be caused by how teachers
record their weeks worked in the Census relative to the CPS. The CPS first asks the individual to consider all the jobs
they worked during the past year and any weeks for which they worked even a few hours. Then the survey asks how
many weeks they worked over the past year (including paid/sick leave). On the other hand, while the nature of the
weeks worked question in the Census is similar, there are no prior questions that encourage respondents to think in
detail about their work history.
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weeks per year (an academic year is often 180 days or 36 weeks excluding winter, spring, and
summer breaks).
To illustrate how modifying the definition of the full-time full-year labor force increases
labor force participation rates among highly educated women, Figures 1.C.6 and 1.C.7 graph
the percentage of women classified as full-time full-year by educational attainment. The graphs
on the left correspond to the original full-time full-year definition of working at least 35 hours
per week and at least 50 weeks per year. The graphs on the right correspond to the modified
definition of labor force participation for teachers or professors and the original definition for all
other occupations. The graphs show that when teachers or professors working at least 36 weeks
per year are classified as full-time full-year, women’s labor force status in the “CPS-Similar”
sample becomes more comparable to the CPS. Namely, in Figure 1.C.6, the difference in full-time
full-year labor force participation for women with at least a college degree between the 1975-1979
CPS and 1980 “CPS-Similar” sample went from 10 percentage points to 1 percentage point. In
Figure 1.C.7, which compares the 1995-1999 CPS samples and the 2000 “CPS-Similar” sample,
the difference falls from 7 percentage points to 3 percentage points.
After classifying teachers who work at least 36 weeks per year as full-time full-year, I am
able to graph the gender wage gap time series, for all values of α, following the methodology
in Section 1.3.3. I estimate the first stage of identification at infinity, a probit on full-time
full-year labor force participation, to select demographic groups with high predicted labor force
participation. The marginal effects on the probability of labor force participation, calculated
using the “CPS-Similar” and full Census samples, are listed in Table 1.C.7. Next, I estimate a
selection-corrected gender wage gap by regressing the difference of observed and predicted wages
on sex using the sample of demographic groups with strong predicted labor force attachment
Figure 1.3 plots γt , the coefficient on sex estimated by Equation (1.3), using the full
Census sample. The 1980 Census and the 2010 ACS are used to model female and male selection
into the full-time full-year labor force, respectively. Figure 1.3, like Figure 1.2, illustrates that
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the convergence of the gender wage gap among those with high predicted labor force attachment
is smaller relative to the narrowing of the uncorrected wage gap. Yet, as I discuss below, the
selection-corrected wage gaps estimated using the full Census sample converge more relative
to those estimated using the CPS. As in MR, convergence decreases as the threshold increases,
suggesting that wages are subject to less selection bias as α increases.
To study the differences in convergence across samples, I separate the analysis into three
components. First, I compare the identification at infinity results from the CPS and the “CPS-
Similar sample, using 1980 (or 1975-1984) data to estimate both the male and female first-stage
selection equations. Since the “CPS-Similar” sample is meant to mimic the CPS, the first step
illustrates the effects of moving to a different dataset while using a sample with characteristics
similar to those of the CPS. Second, to analyze how including individuals residing in group
quarters affects the convergence of the wage gap, I compare the results from the “CPS-Similar
sample to the results from the full Census sample, using the 1980 Census to model male and
female selection into the labor force. Third, I examine how modifying male selection affects
the estimated gender wage gaps. I compare results from the full Census sample using the 1980
Census to model female and male selection to results from the full Census sample using the 1980
Census for female selection and the 2010 ACS for male selection.
Differences between the CPS and “CPS-Similar” samples may stem from the type of
demographic groups predicted to have strong full-time full-year labor force participation, particu-
larly among women (see Tables 1.C.8, 1.C.9, 1.C.10, and 1.C.11 in Appendix 1.C). For instance,
using the CPS, women predicted to have full-time full-year labor force participation of at least 70
percent have at least a high school degree. In contrast, using the Census samples, only women
with at least a college degree are predicted to have strong labor force attachment in each year
(even after modifying the definition of full-time full-year).28
28Note that the demographic groups for identification at infinity are not solely defined by one dimension, such as
educational attainment or marital status. Rather they are defined by marital status x education x potential experience
x region. Therefore, not all women with at least a college degree, for example, are predicted to have strong labor
force attachment because having a college degree does guarantee that P(Xit δˆg) is greater than α.
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To further illustrate differences in results across datasets, Figure 1.4 graphs a time series
of the relative selection-corrected gender wage gaps estimated using individuals with a labor force
participation rate of at least 80 percent. The square-marked series compares the gender wage gaps
estimated using the “CPS-Similar” sample and the CPS. The figure shows that, between 1980
and 2010, the level of the gender wage gap is smaller in each year when using the “CPS-Similar
sample, compared to when using the CPS. Namely, because the difference between the average
male and female wage residuals (see Equation (1.3)) is smaller when using the “CPS-Similar
sample, the sex regressor has less variability to explain.29
Additionally, how these differences in estimated wage gap levels evolve over time affects
the narrowing of the gender wage gap. Figure 1.5 depicts the convergence of the selection-
corrected wage gaps at each threshold between 1980 and 2010 for the CPS and “CPS-Similar”
samples.30 The 1980 Census (or 1975-1984 CPS) is used to control for both male and female
selection into the full-time full-year labor force. In Figure 1.5, at each threshold, the shift to the
“CPS-Similar” sample results in relatively less convergence. The largest difference in convergence
is at the 50 percent threshold. In 1980, the average wage residual for women is larger in the
CPS, relative to the “CPS-Similar” sample. By 2010, the difference between women’s average
residual in the CPS and women’s average residual in the “CPS-Similar” sample becomes smaller.
Because men’s average wage residual in both samples are of similar magnitude and change little
over time, the spread between men and womens average residuals falls less in the “CPS-Similar”
sample relative to the CPS; the estimated gender wage gap narrows by 0.055 log points using the
“CPS-Similar” sample and by 0.074 log points using CPS data.31 Therefore, differences in wage
29Identification at infinity uses the full wage sample to estimate the OLS log hourly wage, Xit βˆ∞t , such that the
vector of coefficients on Xit are the same regardless of sex or predicted labor force participation. Note that the
predicted wage for females is the wage they would have received if they were males. Equation (1.3) then takes the
difference between the observed and predicted OLS wage, and regresses this residual on sex.
30I calculate the convergence of the gender wage gap starting with 1980 rather than 1970 because the 1970 full
Census sample only yields 16 women with a predicted full-time full-year labor force participation over 80 percent.
31Using the “CPS-Similar” sample, the difference between the male and female average wage residuals is 0.265
log points in 1980 and .21 log points in 2010. Therefore, the spread falls by 0.055 log points. Using the CPS, the
spread decreases by 0.074 log points.
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gap convergence at the 50 percent threshold are likely due to the use of different datasets. On
the other hand, the gender wage gaps at the 80 percent threshold, estimated using the CPS and
“CPS-Similar” samples, both converge by about 0.052 log points, despite the level of the gender
wage gap at each point in time being relatively smaller using the “CPS-Similar” sample. As a
result, at higher thresholds, differences in convergence between the CPS and full Census samples
are not solely due to the use of different datasets.
Figure 1.6 compares the estimated convergence in the gender wage gap across three
iterations of the Census sample: (1) the “CPS-Similar” sample using the 1980 Census to model
male and female selection, (2) the full Census sample using the 1980 Census to model male
and female selection, and (3) the full Census sample using the 1980 Census to model female
selection and the 2010 ACS to model male selection. To illustrate the effects of including the
group quarters population in the first and second stages of identification at infinity, I compare
the selection-corrected gender wage gaps estimated using the “CPS-Similar sample and the full
Census sample. For both samples, I use the 1980 Census to model male and female selection
into the full-time full-year labor force. The largest difference in estimated convergence across
these samples is at the 80 percent threshold, not because I expand the population used to estimate
labor force participation, but because the selection of women with strong predicted labor force
attachment appears to be sensitive to small changes in the first-stage probit coefficients in Table
1.C.7.32 About 355 women in the 1980 “CPS-Similar” sample have a predicted probability of
full-time full-year labor force participation above 80 percent, while in the full 1980 Census
sample, only 98 women have a predicted probability exceeding 80 percent.33 In 1980, because
of the differences in the types of women that have a predicted labor force participation rate
above 80 percent (see Table 1.C.11), the average wage residual among women who satisfy the 80
32At lower thresholds, the shift between the “CPS-Similar” and full Census samples only results in small changes
in convergence.
33In the 1980 “CPS-Similar” sample, the maximum predicted probability of full-time full-year labor force
participation among women in 81.9 percent. For men, the maximum predicted probability is 88.7 percent. In the
1980 full Census sample, the maximum predicted probability of full-time full-year labor force participation among
women in 80.5 percent.
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percent threshold is larger when using the full Census. But, by 2010, the difference in women’s
average wage residuals across the “CPS-Similar” and full Census samples decreases (average
wage residuals for men do not differ much across time and samples). As a result, at the 80 percent
threshold, the average wage residual among women in the “CPS-Similar” sample converges less
than the average wage residual among women in the full Census.
Lastly, I show how accounting for declining male labor force participation by using the
full 2010 ACS, rather than the full 1980 Census, to estimate the first-stage selection coefficients
affects the level and convergence of the selection-corrected gender wage gap. For both samples, I
use the 1980 Census to model female selection into the labor force. Therefore, any differences
between the estimated gender wage gaps are due to changes in the sample of men selected for the
second stage of identification at infinity. The triangle-marked series in Figure 1.4 shows that at
the 80 percent threshold, using the 2010 ACS to estimate male selection yields a relatively smaller
estimated gender wage gap at each point in time; the difference between male and female average
wage residuals is smaller in each year. Furthermore, in Figure 1.6, the estimated gender wage gap
narrows less when using the 2010 ACS to model male selection because the difference between
male and female average wage residuals converges relatively less. In particular, by modifying
how male selection into the labor force is modeled, the convergence in the selection-corrected
wage gap falls from 0.08 log points to 0.061 log points.
Differences in convergence may be a result of how the type of man that is predicted to
have strong labor force attachment changes when the 2010 ACS is used for the first stage of
identification at infinity. Using either 1980 or 2010 data to model male selection into the full-time
full-year labor force, men with a predicted probability of labor force participation greater than
80 percent (P( ̂Xi,1980,2010δg=0)≥ 80%), have, on average, about 16.6 years of education. Their
average log hourly wage increased from 3.18 in 1980 to 3.27 in 2010. Men whose predicted
probability is greater than 80 percent when using the 1980 Census to model male selection, but less
than 80 percent when using the 2010 ACS (P( ̂Xi,1980δg=0)≥ 80% and P( ̂Xi,2010δg=0)< 80%),
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have, on average, approximately 13 years of education. Their average log hourly wages fell
from 3.01 in 1980 to 2.88 in 2010.34 Therefore, the differences in convergence at the 80 percent
threshold suggest that, in general, males are becoming more positively selected into the labor
force and that not accounting for declining male labor force participation rates may overestimate
the convergence gender wage gap.
In all, I extend on MR by estimating selection-corrected gender wage gaps using the
Census to include individuals residing in group quarters in the first- and second-stage estimates.
I also modify how selection is modeled for men to account for declining male labor force
participation. I find that, relative to MR, using the full Census sample and the 2010 ACS to model
male selection into the full-time full-year labor force yields relatively more convergence in the
selection-corrected gender wage gaps. The x-marked series in Figure 1.4 shows that at the 80
percent threshold, differences between the CPS and full Census in the estimated wage gap level at
each point in time are likely due to differences in the dataset used. Nonetheless, at the 80 percent
threshold, changing how I model male selection appears to affect the convergence of the gender
wage gap. Therefore, my results suggest that declining male labor force participation rates may be
a factor in the narrowing of the gender wage gap, particularly among the most strongly attached
men and women. Ultimately, my results using the Census and ACS data in an identification at
infinity framework continue to support the results obtained by MR when using the CPS: under
the assumption that the amount of selection bias decreases as the full-time full-year participation
threshold increases, changing selection among women over time can help explain the convergence
in the observed gender wage gap.
34Note, there are about 2,000 to 9,000 men in each time period whose predicted probability is less than 80
percent when using the 1980 Census to model male selection, but greater than 80 percent when using the 2010 ACS
(P( ̂Xi,1980δg=0) < 80% and P( ̂Xi,2010δg=0) ≥ 80%). They have approximately 17.5 years of education, and their
average log hourly wages increased from 2.99 in 1980 to 3.19 in 2010.
36
1.5 Conclusion
This paper replicates Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) and extends on their work by using
the Census to re-estimate selection-corrected gender wage gaps. To replicate MR’s CPS results, I
use the Heckman two-step method, with marital status interacted with the number of children
under the age of 6 as the exclusion restriction, and identification at infinity to calculate a selection-
corrected relative wage series for women between the 1970s and 1990s. There are small, but
statistically significant, differences between the results in the replication and MR because I am
unable to replicate the wage cutoffs and fixed and variable weights used in MR. Nonetheless, the
Heckman two-step and identification at infinity results continue to suggest that after controlling
for female selection into the full-time full-year labor force, much of the convergence in the gender
wage gap disappears.
Yet, because the CPS excludes individuals residing in group quarters and selection is
nonrandom, the first- and second-stage Heckman two-step estimates will be biased. The change in
the gender wage gap over time will also be mis-estimated since the CPS is becoming more select
over time due to the growing incarcerated population. Although the Census is more representative
of the U.S. population and includes individuals residing in group quarters, it does not indicate
how many children individuals in group quarters have. Therefore, I use the “CPS-Similar” Census
sample, which excludes group quarters, to estimate the Heckman two-step model. I continue to
find that changing female selection bias helps to explain the convergence of the gender wage gap.
Lastly, I extend the identification at infinity analysis to the Census because the select
nature of the CPS makes it difficult to correctly identify demographic groups that have strong
full-time full-year labor force participation rates and, thus, wages less subject to selection bias.
The nonrandom omission of certain subpopulations will yield overestimated first-stage labor force
participation rates and mis-estimated wage levels, particularly for they type of men who are more
likely to reside in group quarters. The increasingly select nature of the CPS also mis-estimates
37
the change in the gender wage gap because in later years there are demographic groups who may
be subject to more selection bias than is evident in the CPS. Furthermore, unlike MR which uses
1975-1979 CPS data to select males with high labor force attachment, I use the 2010 ACS in the
first stage of identification at infinity because fewer men worked full-time full-year in the 2000s.
As a result of declining male labor force participation, using 1975-1979 data to select strongly
attached men would yield a gender wage gap more likely to be subject to changing selection bias
among men.
The differences between the identification at infinity results from the Census and the
CPS appear to be driven by both the use of different datasets and the use of different selection
rules which account for declining male labor force participation. I find that, similar to MR, the
selection-corrected gender wage gap between strongly attached men and women did not close
as much as the observed wage gap. However, there is more convergence in the gender wage
gap estimated using the Census rather than the CPS. Overall, the identification at infinity results
suggest that changing selection into the female and male full-time full-year labor force contributes
to the narrowing of the observed gender wage gap.
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Figure 1.1: Gender wage gap and FTFY participation time series using the CPS
Using the CPS, the figure compares how the average log hourly wage of women relative to the
average log hourly wage of men has changed over time (left y-axis). It also displays a time
series of the male and female full-time full-year labor force participation rates (right y-axis).
The sample consists of white, non-Hispanic individuals aged 26 to 55, not living in group
quarters. Each time period is created by grouping 5 consecutive years of CPS ASEC data.
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Figure 1.2: Gender wage gaps among strongly attached groups, various thresholds, using the
CPS
Following Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008), the figure graphs five time series of women’s log
wages relative to men’s, net of demographic characteristics. The series differ according to the
demographic groups (defined according to gender, schooling, marital status, and potential
experience, except for the x-marked series which does not use marital status) included in the
estimation. The unmarked series includes all demographic groups to calculate the wage ratio
over time. For all of the marked series, demographic groups are selected based on their full-time
full-year labor force participation rate, which is predicted using the first-stage coefficients
estimated with 1975 to 1979 (work-year) CPS data. The calculations use the CPS wage sample
of white, non-Hispanic individuals aged 26 to 55. The wage trimming process is described in
Section 1.3.1.
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Figure 1.3: Gender wage gaps among strongly attached groups, various thresholds - Using the
full Census sample and 1980 to model female selection and 2010 to model male selection
The figure graphs five time series of women’s log wages relative to men’s, net of demographic
characteristics. The series differ according to the demographic groups (defined according to
gender, schooling, marital status, and potential experience, except for the x-marked series which
does not use marital status) included in the estimation. The unmarked series includes all
demographic groups to calculate the wage ratio over time. For all of the marked series, female
and male demographic groups are selected based on their predicted full-time full-year labor
force participation rate. The 1980 Census data is used to estimate the first-stage female
selection equation. The 2010 ACS is used to estimate the male selection equation. The
calculations use the full Census wage sample of white, non-Hispanic individuals aged 26 to 55.
Wage cutoffs are generated using Census data, following the wage trimming process described
in Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008). Following Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2005), I impute hours
and weeks worked for the 1970 Census and weeks worked for the 2010 ACS.
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Figure 1.4: Relative gender wage gaps among strongly attached groups, 80% threshold
The figure graphs four time series of relative estimated gender wage gaps by comparing the
following datasets: the CPS, the “CPS-Similar” sample, and the full Census sample. All
samples use the 1980 Census to predict full-time full-year labor force participation for females.
The triangle- and x-marked series use the 2010 ACS to model male selection into the labor
force; all others use the 1980 Census for men’s first-stage estimates. Each time series is
calculated by taking the ratio of estimated gender wage gaps (using the 80% threshold for wage
sample selection) at each point in time. For example, the square-marked series divides the
“CPS-Similar” estimated wage gap by the CPS estimated wage gap, or γˆt,CPS−Sim divided by
γˆt,CPS (see Equation (1.3)). The calculations use the wage samples of white, non-Hispanic
individuals aged 26 to 55. Wage cutoffs are generated following the wage trimming process
described in Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008).
42
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
G
en
de
r W
ag
e 
G
ap
 C
on
ve
rg
en
ce
 
19
80
−2
01
0
 
50 60 70 80
Alpha
CPS, 1980−Female and Male Selection
CPS−Similar, 1980−Female and Male Selection
Figure 1.5: Convergence of gender wage gaps among strongly attached groups, various
thresholds - Comparing the CPS and “CPS-Similar” samples
The first stage of identification at infinity selects samples of demographic groups (defined
according to gender, schooling, marital status, and potential experience, except for the 50
percent threshold which does not use marital status) such that their predicted probability of
full-time full-year labor force participation exceeds some α near 1. There are two bars, at each
level of alpha, representing the dataset used to estimate the selection-corrected wage gaps; the
figure compares the CPS and the “CPS-Similar” sample. All samples use the 1975 to 1984
(work-year) pooled CPS or the 1980 Census to predict full-time full-year labor force
participation for males and females. For each dataset and threshold, convergence is calculated
by subtracting γˆ1980 from γˆ2010 (see Equation (1.3)), or the 1980 (1975-1984) estimated gender
wage gap from the 2010 (2005-2014) gender wage gap. The sample consists of white,
non-Hispanic individuals aged 26 to 55. Wage cutoffs are generated following the wage
trimming process described in Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008).
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Figure 1.6: Convergence of gender wage gaps among strongly attached groups, various
thresholds - Comparing the “CPS-Similar” and full Census samples
The first stage of identification at infinity selects samples of demographic groups (defined
according to gender, schooling, marital status, and potential experience, except for the 50
percent threshold which does not use marital status) such that their predicted probability of
full-time full-year labor force participation exceeds some α near 1. There are three bars, at each
level of alpha, representing the dataset used to estimate the selection-corrected wage gaps. The
figure compares the “CPS-Similar” sample and the full Census sample. All samples use the
1980 Census to predict full-time full-year labor force participation for females. One instance
(the darkest bar) uses the 2010 ACS to model male selection into the labor force; all others use
the 1980 Census for men’s first-stage estimates. For each dataset and threshold, convergence is
calculated by subtracting γˆ1980 from γˆ2010 (see Equation (1.3)), or the 1980 estimated gender
wage gap from the 2010 gender wage gap. The sample consists of white, non-Hispanic
individuals aged 26 to 55. Wage cutoffs are generated using Census data, following the wage
trimming process described in Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008).
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Table 1.3: Correcting the gender wage gap using the Heckman two-step estimator -
Using the CPS to control for female selection
MR (2008) Replication
Method Method
Period OLS Two-Step Bias OLS Two-Step Bias
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Variable Weights
1975-1979 -0.414 -0.337 -0.077 -0.417 -0.339 -0.078
(0.003) (0.014) (0.015) (0.003) (0.014) (0.014)
1995-1999 -0.254 -0.339 0.085 -0.259 -0.350 0.091
(0.003) (0.014) (0.015) (0.003) (0.014) (0.015)
Change 0.160 -0.002 0.162 0.158 -0.011 0.169
(0.005) (0.020) (0.021) (0.004) (0.020) (0.020)
Panel B: Fixed Weights
1975-1979 -0.404 -0.330 -0.075 -0.407 -0.333 -0.074
(0.003) (0.014) (0.014) (0.003) (0.013) (0.014)
1995-1999 -0.264 -0.353 0.089 -0.264 -0.358 0.094
(0.004) (0.015) (0.016) (0.003) (0.015) (0.015)
Change 0.140 -0.024 0.164 0.143 -0.025 0.168
(0.005) (0.021) (0.021) (0.005) (0.020) (0.020)
As in Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008), each cell summarizes the regression
results listed in Tables 1.C.1, 1.C.2, and 1.C.3. The first three columns are
taken directly from Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008). The last three columns
list the replication results. The entries are female minus male log wages,
which differ from each other in terms of (a) rows, or time period used for
estimation (1975-1979 vs 1995-1999); (b) columns, or whether the regression
includes the inverse Mills’ ratio (OLS does not include it, two-step does);
and (c) panels, or whether variable or fixed weights are used to calculate log
wages (see Appendix 1.A). The “Bias” column is the difference between the
OLS and two-step columns. The “Change” row is the difference between the
1995-1999 and 1975-1979 rows.
The regressions control for demographics interacted with sex and use the CPS
wage sample of white, non-Hispanic individuals aged 26 to 55. The wage
trimming process is described in Section 1.3.1. Bootstrap standard errors are
in parentheses.
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Table 1.8: Correcting the gender wage gap using the
Heckman two-step estimator - Using the “CPS-Similar”
sample to control for female selection, 1980 v 2000
Method
Period OLS Two-Step Bias
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Variable Weights
1980 -0.424 -0.354 -0.069
(0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
2000 -0.248 -0.340 0.092
(0.001) (0.004) (0.005)
Change 0.176 0.014 0.162
(0.002) (0.006) (0.007)
Panel B: Fixed Weights
1980 -0.420 -0.352 -0.068
(0.001) (0.004) (0.005)
2000 -0.255 -0.351 0.096
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Change 0.165 0.001 0.164
(0.002) (0.006) (0.007)
As in Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008), each cell sum-
marizes the regression results listed in Tables 1.C.4
and 1.C.5. The entries are female minus male log
wages, which differ from each other in terms of (a)
rows, or time period used for estimation (1980 vs
2000); (b) columns, or whether the regression includes
the inverse Mills’ ratio (OLS does not include it, two-
step does); and (c) panels, or whether variable or fixed
weights are used to calculate log wages (see Appendix
1.A). The “Bias” column is the difference between the
OLS and two-step columns. The “Change” row is the
difference between the 2000 and 1980 rows.
The regressions control for demographics interacted
with sex and use the “CPS-Similar” wage sample of
white, non-Hispanic individuals aged 26 to 55. Wage
cutoffs are generated using Census data, following
the wage trimming process described in Mulligan and
Rubinstein (2008). Bootstrap standard errors are in
parentheses.
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Table 1.9: Correcting the gender wage gap using the
Heckman two-step estimator - Using the
“CPS-Similar” sample to control for female selection,
1980 v 2010
Method
Period OLS Two-Step Bias
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Variable Weights
1980 -0.424 -0.354 -0.069
(0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
2000 -0.248 -0.340 0.092
(0.001) (0.004) (0.005)
2010 -0.222 -0.321 0.099
(0.003) (0.013) (0.014)
Change 0.201 0.033 0.168
(0.003) (0.014) (0.014)
Panel B: Fixed Weights
1980 -0.420 -0.352 -0.068
(0.001) (0.004) (0.005)
2000 -0.255 -0.351 0.096
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
2010 -0.236 -0.344 0.108
(0.004) (0.015) (0.015)
Change 0.184 0.008 0.176
(0.004) (0.015) (0.016)
As in Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008), each cell
summarizes the regression results listed in Tables
1.C.4 and 1.C.5. The entries are female minus
male log wages, which differ from each other
in terms of (a) rows, or time period used for es-
timation (1980, 2000, and 2010); (b) columns,
or whether the regression includes the inverse
Mills’ ratio (OLS does not include it, two-step
does); and (c) panels, or whether variable or fixed
weights are used to calculate log wages (see Ap-
pendix 1.A). The “Bias” column is the difference
between the OLS and two-step columns. The
“Change” row is the difference between the 2010
and 1980 rows.
The regressions control for demographics inter-
acted with sex and use the “CPS-Similar” wage
sample of white, non-Hispanic individuals aged
26 to 55. Wage cutoffs are generated using Cen-
sus data, following the wage trimming process
described in Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008).
Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 1.10: Gender-gap changes by marital status and
schooling - Using the “CPS-Similar” sample to control for
female selection, 1980 v 2000
OLS Two-Step Bias
1980 2000 Change Change Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: All
Conditional on -0.420 -0.255 0.165 0.001 0.164
marital status (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.007)
Not conditional on -0.446 -0.264 0.182 0.033 0.149
marital status (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
Panel B: By Marital Status
Currently Married -0.487 -0.306 0.180 -0.005 0.185
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007)
Separated -0.423 -0.264 0.159 0.002 0.157
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012)
Widowed -0.411 -0.233 0.178 0.013 0.165
(0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.018)
Divorced -0.359 -0.188 0.171 0.048 0.123
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007)
Never Married -0.208 -0.117 0.091 -0.033 0.125
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007)
Panel C: By Education
0 to 8 years -0.363 -0.261 0.102 -0.154 0.255
(0.016) (0.051) (0.053) (0.054) (0.076)
High School, not grad -0.452 -0.327 0.125 -0.092 0.217
(0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.017)
High school graduates -0.443 -0.281 0.162 0.000 0.161
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.007)
Some College -0.411 -0.241 0.171 0.021 0.150
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006)
College -0.439 -0.238 0.201 0.031 0.170
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009)
Advanced Degree -0.314 -0.192 0.122 -0.042 0.164
(0.011) (0.006) (0.012) (0.014) (0.018)
Using the “CPS-Similar” sample, each cell summarizes
the regression results listed in Tables 1.C.4 and 1.C.5.
The entries are female minus male log wages, which dif-
fer from each other in terms of (a) rows, or demographic
groups; (b) columns, or the time period used for estima-
tion (1980 and 2000) and whether the regression includes
the inverse Mills’ ratio (OLS does not include it, two-step
does); and (c) panels, or the types of demographic groups
summarized. Time-invariant, or fixed, weights are used
to calculate log wages. The “Bias” column is the differ-
ence between the OLS and two-step columns. Bootstrap
standard errors are in parentheses.
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Appendix
1.A Creating Fixed and Variable Weights
As in MR, tables that list the estimated gender wage gaps, such as Tables 1.3 and 1.4, use
variable and fixed weights to estimate log hourly wages. Variable weights differ by time period,
while fixed weights are the same across time periods. MR use identical values, except for sex, for
the male and female weights to compare how the estimated gender wage gap is affected over time
by changes in coefficients and not differences between the average full-time full-year male and
female.
Following MR, to create variable weights I use the sample of full-time full-year women
within each time period to calculate the average of the variables in the vector Z.35 I generate
fixed weights by first pooling all 10 years of CPS data, or the 1980 and 2000 Censuses, and then
using the pooled sample of full-time full-year women to calculate the average of the demographic
variables to create a weight that is the same across time periods.
To calculate the OLS gender wage gap, I substitute the weights into the OLS log hourly
wage regressions and then take the difference between the estimated female and male log hourly
wage. To calculate the Heckman two-step gender wage gap, I first use the probit coefficients and
weights to estimate an inverse Mills’ ratio for each female. Then I use the coefficients from the
Heckman wage regression to estimate women’s log hourly wages and take the difference between
35Z contains educational attainment, marital status, region, a potential experience quartic interacted with education
indicators, and marital status interacted with the number of children under the age of 6.
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the Heckman two-step-estimated female and OLS-estimated male log hourly wage to estimate
the gender wage gap.
MR use fixed weights to ensure that the average full-time full-year woman does not
change over time when estimating the gender wage gap. MR compare the estimated gender wage
gaps using variable and fixed weights to examine whether results are affected by changes in the
average full-time full-year woman over time.
Tables that estimate the “partial” effects of marital status and education, such as Table 1.4,
use fixed weights. The weights in Panel B are calculated under the assumption that all full-time
full-year women are of the marital status in a given row. All other averages of non-marital status
variables are unchanged. Similarly, in Panel C, MR assume that all full-time full-year women
attained a given level of education. Therefore, each category of marital status and educational
attainment will take on a value of 0 or 1, in their respective panels, rather than a mean value
between 0 and 1. Again, female and male weights are identical except for sex. Therefore, the male
weights also take on a value of 0 or 1 for marital status in Panel B or for educational attainment in
Panel C. As described above, I use the log hourly wage coefficients from the OLS and Heckman
two-step regressions and the weights to estimate log hourly wages and then take the difference
between the estimated female and male log wages to estimate the gender wage gap.
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1.B Factor Variables
MR use pre-generated interactions in their Heckman two-step estimations; a separate
variable for each interaction is included in the regressions. While using pre-generated interactions
does not affect the probit, OLS, and Heckman two-step coefficients, it results in incorrect marginal
effects and mis-estimated gender wage gaps.
As demonstrated in Williams (2012), if two variables and their interaction are included
as separate variables, then when calculating the marginal effects of the interaction, Stata does
not take into account that a change in the interaction affects the elements of the interaction
individually. Consequently, for the Heckman two-step estimation, I use factor variables and
re-estimate the marginal effects.
Table 1.C.12 lists the marginal effects from the first stage of the Heckman two-step method
using the same methodology described in Section 1.3.2.1 but using factor variables. Inclusion of
factor variables, rather than pre-generated interactions, does not appear to qualitatively change
the results. The primary difference between the marginal effects from MR (see Table 1.C.1) and
from the factor variable replication is the lack of a marginal effect reported for interactions in the
replication; the value of the interaction term depends on the values of its component terms, so a
separate marginal effect of the interaction cannot be estimated (Williams 2016).
I also re-estimate the gender wage gaps from Tables 1.3 and 1.4 using factor variables.36
Although, pre-generated interactions do not affect the probit and wage coefficients, they affect
the fixed and variable weights used to estimate log hourly wages and therefore the estimated
gender wage gap. Rather than using the average of pre-generated interactions, I use the product of
the average of the component variables when substituting the weights into the wage regressions.
Tables 1.C.13 and 1.C.14 list the resulting estimated gender wage gaps. The differences between
the gender wage gaps estimated using factor variables and the wage gaps estimated use pre-
36Following MR, standard errors are calculated using the non-parametric pairwise bootstrap method (1,000
replications) with seeds of 123, 456, 78, and 91.
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generated interactions are statistically significant but qualitatively similar. Within Panel A,
comparing Column 1 of Table 1.C.13 and Column 4 of Table 1.3, the OLS-estimated gender wage
gap converges less when using factor variables (0.152 log points relative to 0.158 log points).
However, relative to Column 6 of Table 1.3, selection bias is larger in Column 3 of Table 1.C.13.
For example, in Panel A, selection bias, calculated using pre-generated interactions, changes by
0.169 log points between the 1970s and 1990s. The change in selection bias calculated using
factor variables is 0.171 log points. Despite a reduced OLS-estimated wage gap convergence
when using factor variables, the difference in the changes in selection bias can be attributed to
the larger change in the Heckman two-step-estimated wage gap. In Column 5 of Table 1.3, the
selection-corrected wage gap increases by 0.011 log points, while in Column 2 of Table 1.C.13,
the estimated wage gap increases by 0.019 log points (note both of these values are statistically
insignificant, but their difference is signficant). Table 1.C.14 tells a similar story. Overall, Tables
1.C.13 and 1.C.14 continue to illustrate that the OLS the gender wage gap converges over time,
but once selection is controlled for, convergence disappears.
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1.C Additional Tables and Figures
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Figure 1.C.1: Relative gender wage gaps among strongly attached groups, various thresholds -
Comparing the replication, using the CPS, to Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008)
The figure graphs five time series comparing the replication and original Mulligan and
Rubinstein (2008) gender wage gaps, γˆt , estimated in Section 1.3.3. The y-axis is the gender
wage gap estimated in the replication divided by the gender wage gap estimated in Mulligan and
Rubinstein (2008). The differences in the estimated gender wage gaps are caused by differences
between the wage cutoffs used in the replication and in Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008).
The series differ according to the demographic groups (defined according to gender, schooling,
marital status, and potential experience, except for the x-marked series which does not use
marital status) included in the estimation. The unmarked series includes all demographic groups
to calculate the wage ratio over time. For the other series, demographic groups are selected
based on their full-time full-year labor force participation rate, which is predicted using the
first-stage coefficients estimated with 1975 to 1979 (work-year) CPS data. The calculations use
the CPS wage sample of white, non-Hispanic individuals aged 26 to 55.
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Figure 1.C.2: Gender wage gap and wage inequality time series using the CPS
Using the 1971 to 2015 CPS ASEC samples, the figure compares how the median log hourly
wage of women relative to the median log hourly wage of men has changed over time (left
y-axis). It also displays a time series of the difference in the 90th and 10th percentiles of log
hourly wages, a measure of wage inequality, by gender (right y-axis). The sample consists of
white, non-Hispanic individuals aged 26 to 55, not living in group quarters.
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Figure 1.C.3: Percentage employed FTFY by educational attainment
The figure compares how the percentage of men and women employed full-time full-year
(FTFY) by educational attainment differs between the CPS and the Census. Graphs labeled
1980 use the 1976 to 1980 (survey-year) CPS samples and the 1980 full Census sample. Graphs
labeled 2000 use the 1996 to 2000 (survey-year) CPS samples and the 2000 full Census sample.
The percentages are calculated using the CPS and Census samples of white, non-Hispanic
individuals aged 26 to 55. I use a modified definition of full-time full-year labor force
participation, as described in Section 1.4.2.2. The original definition of full-time full-year is
working at least 50 weeks per year and at least 35 hours per week. The definition is then
modified so that teachers or professors working at least 36 weeks per year and at least 35 hours
per week are classified as full-time full-year. All other occupations use the original definition.
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Figure 1.C.4: Weeks worked per year for female teachers and non-teachers in 1980 and 2000
These graphs compare how the distribution of weeks worked per year for employed females
differs between the CPS and “CPS-Similar” samples. The graphs are separated by occupation,
namely, teachers and non-teachers. Non-teachers include all occupations except teaching related
positions. Graphs labeled 1980 use the 1976 to 1980 (survey-year) CPS samples and the 1980
“CPS-Similar” sample. Graphs labeled 2000 use the 1996 to 2000 (survey-year) CPS samples
and the 2000 “CPS-Similar” sample. The CPS and Census samples consist of white,
non-Hispanic women aged 26 to 55, not residing in group quarters.
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Figure 1.C.5: Weeks worked per year for male teachers and non-teachers in 1980 and 2000
These graphs compare how the distribution of weeks worked per year for employed males
differs between the CPS and “CPS-Similar” samples. The graphs are separated by occupation,
namely, teachers and non-teachers. Non-teachers include all occupations except teaching related
positions. Graphs labeled 1980 use the 1976 to 1980 (survey-year) CPS samples and the 1980
“CPS-Similar” sample. Graphs labeled 2000 use the 1996 to 2000 (survey-year) CPS samples
and the 2000 “CPS-Similar” sample. The CPS and Census samples consist of white,
non-Hispanic men aged 26 to 55, not residing in group quarters.
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Figure 1.C.6: Percentage of females employed FTFY by educational attainment - Comparing
the 1975-1979 CPS and 1980 “CPS-Similar” sample
These graphs show how changing the definition of full-time full-year makes the 1975-1979 CPS
and 1980 “CPS-Similar” female labor force samples more comparable. The original definition
of full-time full-year is working at least 50 weeks per year and at least 35 hours per week. The
definition is then modified so that teachers or professors working at least 36 weeks per year and
at least 35 hours per week are classified as full-time full-year. The modified definition is used in
both the CPS and “CPS-Similar” samples. All other occupations use the original definition.
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Figure 1.C.7: Percentage of females employed FTFY by educational attainment - Comparing
the 1995-1999 CPS and 2000 “CPS-Similar” sample
These graphs show how changing the definition of full-time full-year makes the 1995-1999 CPS
and 2000 “CPS-Similar” female labor force samples more comparable. The original definition
of full-time full-year is working at least 50 weeks per year and at least 35 hours per week. The
definition is then modified so that teachers or professors working at least 36 weeks per year and
at least 35 hours per week are classified as full-time full-year. The modified definition is used in
both the CPS and “CPS-Similar” samples. All other occupations use the original definition.
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Table 1.C.1: Effects on the probability of working FTFY - Using the CPS to control for female
selection, 1975-1979 and 1995-1999
MR (2008) Replication
1975-1979 1995-1999 1975-1979 1975-1979 1975-1979 1995-1999 1975-1979 1975-1979
Female Female Female Male Female Female Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total Observations 116,843 102,395 116,843 112,291 116,843 102,395 116,843 112,291
Predicted Pr 0.297* 0.510* 0.307* 0.771* 0.298* 0.510* 0.308* 0.771*
Widowed 0.135* 0.024* 0.148* -0.112* 0.136* 0.024 0.148* -0.112*
Divorced 0.269* 0.156* 0.306* -0.162* 0.269* 0.156* 0.306* -0.162*
Separated 0.128* 0.065* 0.156* -0.157* 0.128* 0.065* 0.156* -0.157*
Never Married 0.284* 0.121* 0.375* -0.181* 0.284* 0.121* 0.374* -0.181*
Children 0-6 x constant -0.183* -0.158* -0.183* -0.158*
widowed -0.047 0.090* -0.046 0.090
divorced 0.008 0.032* 0.008 0.032*
separated 0.021 0.011 0.021 0.011
never-married -0.062 -0.011 -0.063 -0.010
Midwest 0.029* 0.036* 0.028* 0.019* 0.029* 0.036* 0.028* 0.019*
South 0.071* 0.037* 0.076* -0.009* 0.071* 0.037* 0.076* -0.010*
West 0.001 -0.037* 0.007 -0.058* 0.001 -0.037* 0.007 -0.058*
0-8 school years -0.153* -0.303* -0.188 -0.295* -0.153* -0.303* -0.188* -0.295*
9-11 school years -0.098* -0.228* -0.111 -0.202* -0.098* -0.228* -0.111* -0.202*
High School Degree -0.010 -0.023* -0.017 -0.061* -0.010 -0.023* -0.017* -0.061*
College Degree 0.021* 0.021* 0.028 0.047* 0.020 0.021* 0.028* 0.047*
Advanced Degree 0.193* 0.109* 0.219 0.043* 0.193* 0.109* 0.218* 0.043*
(exp−15) -0.005* -0.005* 0.008 0.005* -0.005* -0.005* 0.008* 0.005*
(exp−15)2/100 0.050* 0.058* 0.029 -0.064* 0.050* 0.058* 0.029* -0.064*
(exp−15)3/1000 -0.013 0.022 -0.076 0.031* -0.012 0.022 -0.076* 0.031*
(exp−15)4/10000 0.001 -0.024* 0.027 -0.010 0.001 -0.024* 0.027* -0.010
The table lists the probit estimates of the probability of working full-time full-year (FTFY),
evaluated at sample means. The first four columns are estimates taken from Mulligan and
Rubinstein 2008. The last four columns list the replication estimates.
Following Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008), each column with estimates of the exclusion
restriction, marital status interacted with the number of children under the age of 6, represents
the first step of the Heckman two-step method to model female selection into the labor force.
Fitted values from the columns that omit the exclusion restriction from estimation are used to
select the samples for identification at infinity. All specifications include schooling-experience
interactions (not shown). An asterisk (*) indicates statistically significant coefficients at the
95% confidence level. An asterisk beside the predicted probability of labor force participation
indicates that the overall probit equation is statistically significant. The benchmark groups
are currently married (living with spouse), some college, 15 years’ potential experience, and
Northeast region.
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Table 1.C.2: Log wage regression coefficients for 1975-1979 - Using the CPS to
control for female selection
MR (2008) Replication
1975-1979 1975-1979 1975-1979 1975-1979 1975-1979 1975-1979
Male Female Female Male Female Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Observations 57,457 27,656 27,656 58,003 27,578 27,578
Constant 3.027* 2.570* 2.665* 3.031* 2.572* 2.668*
Inverse Mills -0.077* -0.078*
Widowed -0.030 0.012 -0.009 -0.036 0.009 -0.012
Divorced -0.104* 0.041* 0.003 -0.107* 0.041* 0.002
Separated -0.104* -0.013 -0.033* -0.112* -0.014 -0.035*
Never Married -0.181* 0.112* 0.068* -0.180* 0.112* 0.068*
Midwest 0.008* -0.056* -0.060* 0.007 -0.056* -0.060*
South -0.088* -0.112* -0.121* -0.087* -0.111* -0.121*
West 0.030* 0.002 0.002 0.030* 0.002 0.002
0-8 school years -0.411* -0.381* -0.343* -0.409* -0.380* -0.341*
9-11 school years -0.272* -0.292* -0.273* -0.273* -0.293* -0.273*
High School Degree -0.091* -0.109* -0.106* -0.091* -0.106* -0.103*
College Degree 0.190* 0.198* 0.195* 0.200* 0.198* 0.194*
Advanced Degree 0.192* 0.324* 0.299* 0.231* 0.336* 0.310*
(exp−15) 0.013* -0.002 -0.002 0.013* -0.002 -0.002
(exp−15)2/100 -0.118* -0.018 -0.023 -0.110* -0.017 -0.023
(exp−15)3/1000 0.025 0.072* 0.079* 0.030 0.068* 0.075*
(exp−15)4/10000 0.006 -0.027* -0.029* 0.001 -0.025* -0.028*
The table presents coefficients from regressions on log hourly wages using
the 1975 to 1979 (work-year) CPS data. The first three columns are esti-
mates taken from Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008). The last three columns
list the replication results. Columns without a coefficient on the inverse
Mills’ ratio are estimates from OLS regressions, while columns with a coef-
ficient on the inverse Mills’ ratio are estimates from the Heckman two-step
regressions.
Following Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008), all specifications include
schooling-experience interactions (not shown). An asterisk (*) indicates
statistically significant coefficients at the 95% confidence level. The bench-
mark groups are currently married (living with spouse), some college, 15
years’ potential experience, and Northeast region.
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Table 1.C.4: Effects on the probability of working FTFY - Using the
“CPS-Similar” sample
1980 2000 2010
Female Female Female
(1) (2) (3)
Total Observations 1,705,976 2,162,273 416,743
Predicted Pr 0.313* 0.477* 0.501*
Widowed 0.115* 0.045* 0.010
Divorced 0.252* 0.166* 0.097*
Separated 0.127* 0.060* -0.002
Never Married 0.227* 0.126* 0.065*
Children 0-6 x constant -0.151* -0.124* -0.106*
Midwest 0.012* 0.029* 0.022*
South 0.053* 0.022* 0.016*
West -0.002* -0.042* -0.044*
0-8 school years -0.132* -0.313* -0.333*
9-11 school years -0.072* -0.213* -0.281*
High School Degree 0.004* -0.046* -0.073*
College Degree -0.109* -0.038* 0.013*
Advanced Degree -0.040* -0.017* 0.094*
(exp−15) 0.005* -0.013* 0.002
The table uses the 1980, 2000, and 2010 “CPS-Similar” samples
(see Section 1.4.1.1). Listed are the Heckman two-step probit
estimates of the probability of working full-time full-year (FTFY),
evaluated at sample means. The exclusion restriction is marital
status interacted with the number of children under the age of 6.
Following Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008), all specifications
include schooling-experience interactions (not shown). Wage
cutoffs are generated using Census data, following the wage trim-
ming process described in Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008). An
asterisk (*) indicates statistically significant coefficients at the
95% confidence level. An asterisk beside the predicted probabil-
ity of labor force participation indicates that the overall probit
equation is statistically significant. The benchmark groups are
currently married (living with spouse), some college, 15 years’
potential experience, and Northeast region.
69
Ta
bl
e
1.
C
.5
:L
og
w
ag
e
re
gr
es
si
on
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s
-U
si
ng
th
e
“C
PS
-S
im
ila
r”
sa
m
pl
e
19
80
19
80
19
80
20
00
20
00
20
00
20
10
20
10
20
10
M
al
e
Fe
m
al
e
Fe
m
al
e
M
al
e
Fe
m
al
e
Fe
m
al
e
M
al
e
Fe
m
al
e
Fe
m
al
e
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
To
ta
lO
bs
er
va
tio
ns
87
9,
40
3
43
3,
14
5
43
3,
14
5
1,
01
1,
82
9
73
4,
50
4
73
4,
50
4
19
9,
21
9
16
4,
62
2
16
4,
62
2
C
on
st
an
t
3.
03
8*
2.
58
5*
2.
66
4*
2.
96
4*
2.
69
3*
2.
59
4*
2.
94
3*
2.
67
7*
2.
56
7*
In
ve
rs
e
M
ill
s
-0
.0
66
*
0.
11
4*
0.
12
6*
W
id
ow
ed
-0
.0
85
*
-0
.0
10
*
-0
.0
24
*
-0
.1
29
*
-0
.0
56
*
-0
.0
50
*
-0
.1
22
*
-0
.1
00
*
-0
.1
00
*
D
iv
or
ce
d
-0
.0
95
*
0.
03
3*
0.
00
1
-0
.1
27
*
-0
.0
09
*
0.
02
1*
-0
.1
37
*
-0
.0
42
*
-0
.0
22
*
Se
pa
ra
te
d
-0
.0
72
*
-0
.0
09
*
-0
.0
26
*
-0
.1
21
*
-0
.0
79
*
-0
.0
68
*
-0
.1
21
*
-0
.1
21
*
-0
.1
20
*
N
ev
er
M
ar
ri
ed
-0
.1
88
*
0.
09
0*
0.
05
8*
-0
.1
84
*
0.
00
5*
0.
03
4*
-0
.2
01
*
-0
.0
49
*
-0
.0
30
*
M
id
w
es
t
0.
02
2*
-0
.0
28
*
-0
.0
29
*
-0
.0
71
*
-0
.1
12
*
-0
.1
07
*
-0
.1
30
*
-0
.1
36
*
-0
.1
32
*
So
ut
h
-0
.0
74
*
-0
.0
85
*
-0
.0
91
*
-0
.1
07
*
-0
.1
17
*
-0
.1
13
*
-0
.1
16
*
-0
.1
26
*
-0
.1
23
*
W
es
t
0.
03
3*
0.
02
1*
0.
02
2*
-0
.0
14
*
-0
.0
15
*
-0
.0
22
*
-0
.0
14
*
-0
.0
08
-0
.0
16
*
0-
8
sc
ho
ol
ye
ar
s
-0
.4
26
*
-0
.3
72
*
-0
.3
42
*
-0
.4
66
*
-0
.5
27
*
-0
.6
05
*
-0
.4
51
*
-0
.6
07
*
-0
.7
00
*
9-
11
sc
ho
ol
ye
ar
s
-0
.2
76
*
-0
.2
93
*
-0
.2
77
*
-0
.3
77
*
-0
.4
50
*
-0
.4
98
*
-0
.3
90
*
-0
.4
14
*
-0
.4
86
*
H
ig
h
Sc
ho
ol
D
eg
re
e
-0
.1
03
*
-0
.1
32
*
-0
.1
30
*
-0
.1
80
*
-0
.2
11
*
-0
.2
22
*
-0
.1
93
*
-0
.2
18
*
-0
.2
35
*
C
ol
le
ge
D
eg
re
e
0.
22
6*
0.
20
6*
0.
22
0*
0.
32
3*
0.
34
6*
0.
34
3*
0.
35
6*
0.
38
1*
0.
39
2*
A
dv
an
ce
d
D
eg
re
e
0.
27
5*
0.
33
4*
0.
33
9*
0.
45
1*
0.
50
5*
0.
50
5*
0.
54
5*
0.
58
4*
0.
60
7*
(e
xp
−
15
)
0.
18
8*
0.
03
1*
0.
03
1*
0.
16
6*
0.
11
5*
0.
11
7*
0.
17
7*
0.
12
3*
0.
13
3*
(e
xp
−
15
)2
/
10
0
-0
.1
01
*
-0
.0
37
*
-0
.0
43
*
-0
.0
96
*
-0
.0
68
*
-0
.0
61
*
-0
.0
65
*
-0
.0
42
*
-0
.0
37
*
(e
xp
−
15
)3
/
10
00
-0
.0
15
*
0.
03
0*
0.
03
3*
0.
00
7
0.
02
6*
0.
02
7*
0.
01
3
0.
02
2
0.
01
7
(e
xp
−
15
)4
/
10
00
0
0.
01
4*
-0
.0
08
*
-0
.0
08
*
0.
00
8*
-0
.0
06
*
-0
.0
09
*
-0
.0
05
-0
.0
07
-0
.0
07
T
he
ta
bl
e
us
es
th
e
19
80
,
20
00
,
an
d
20
10
“C
PS
-S
im
ila
r”
sa
m
pl
es
(s
ee
Se
ct
io
n
1.
4.
1.
1)
.
L
is
te
d
ar
e
th
e
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s
fr
om
re
gr
es
si
on
s
on
lo
g
ho
ur
ly
w
ag
es
.
C
ol
um
ns
w
ith
ou
ta
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
on
th
e
in
ve
rs
e
M
ill
s’
ra
tio
ar
e
es
tim
at
es
fr
om
O
L
S
re
gr
es
si
on
s,
w
hi
le
co
lu
m
ns
w
ith
a
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
on
th
e
in
ve
rs
e
M
ill
s’
ra
tio
ar
e
es
tim
at
es
fr
om
th
e
H
ec
km
an
tw
o-
st
ep
re
gr
es
si
on
s.
Fo
llo
w
in
g
M
ul
lig
an
an
d
R
ub
in
st
ei
n
(2
00
8)
,a
ll
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
ns
in
cl
ud
e
sc
ho
ol
in
g-
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
in
te
ra
ct
io
ns
(n
ot
sh
ow
n)
.
W
ag
e
cu
to
ff
sa
re
ge
ne
ra
te
d
us
in
g
C
en
su
sd
at
a,
fo
llo
w
in
g
th
e
w
ag
e
tri
m
m
in
g
pr
oc
es
sd
es
cr
ib
ed
in
M
ul
lig
an
an
d
R
ub
in
st
ei
n
(2
00
8)
.A
n
as
te
ri
sk
(*
)i
nd
ic
at
es
st
at
is
tic
al
ly
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s
at
th
e
95
%
co
nfi
de
nc
e
le
ve
l.
T
he
be
nc
hm
ar
k
gr
ou
ps
ar
e
cu
rr
en
tly
m
ar
ri
ed
(l
iv
in
g
w
ith
sp
ou
se
),
so
m
e
co
lle
ge
,1
5
ye
ar
s’
po
te
nt
ia
le
xp
er
ie
nc
e,
an
d
N
or
th
ea
st
re
gi
on
.
70
Table 1.C.6: Gender-gap changes by marital status and
schooling - Using the “CPS-Similar” sample to control for
female selection, 1980 v 2010
OLS Two-Step Bias
1980 2010 Change Change Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: All
Conditional on -0.420 -0.236 0.184 0.008 0.176
marital status (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.015) (0.016)
Not conditional on -0.446 -0.237 0.210 -0.040 0.250
marital status (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.013)
Panel B: By Marital Status
Currently Married -0.487 -0.276 0.211 0.018 0.193
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.016) (0.017)
Separated -0.423 -0.275 0.148 -0.028 0.176
(0.005) (0.013) (0.014) (0.021) (0.026)
Widowed -0.411 -0.254 0.158 -0.022 0.180
(0.008) (0.023) (0.025) (0.027) (0.037)
Divorced -0.359 -0.181 0.178 0.036 0.142
(0.002) (0.007) (0.008) (0.015) (0.017)
Never Married -0.208 -0.123 0.085 -0.057 0.142
(0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.014) (0.016)
Panel C: By Education
0 to 8 years -0.363 -0.411 -0.048 -0.346 0.298
(0.016) (0.124) (0.125) (0.131) (0.181)
High School, not grad -0.452 -0.260 0.192 -0.057 0.249
(0.005) (0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.042)
High school graduates -0.443 -0.252 0.191 0.011 0.180
(0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.017) (0.018)
Some College -0.411 -0.226 0.186 0.023 0.163
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.014) (0.015)
College -0.439 -0.218 0.221 0.053 0.168
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.015) (0.016)
Advanced Degree -0.314 -0.198 0.116 -0.038 0.154
(0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.019) (0.024)
Using the “CPS-Similar” sample, each cell summarizes
the regression results listed in Tables 1.C.4 and 1.C.5.
The entries are female minus male log wages, which dif-
fer from each other in terms of (a) rows, or demographic
groups; (b) columns, or the time period used for estima-
tion (1980 and 2010) and whether the regression includes
the inverse Mills’ ratio (OLS does not include it, two-step
does); and (c) panels, or the types of demographic groups
summarized. Time-invariant, or fixed, weights are used
to calculate log wages. The “Bias” column is the differ-
ence between the OLS and two-step columns. Bootstrap
standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 1.C.7: Effects on the probability of working FTFY - Using the “CPS-Similar” and full Census
sample to model selection
CPS-Similar Sample Full Sample
1980 1980 2010 1980 1980 2010
Female Male Male Female Male Male
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Observations 1,705,976 1,652,348 398,870 1,716,016 1,672,448 407,486
Predicted Pr 0.337* 0.734* 0.691* 0.337* 0.741* 0.679*
Widowed 0.113* -0.131* -0.173* 0.111* -0.149* -0.193*
Divorced 0.286* -0.126* -0.143* 0.283* -0.145* -0.158*
Separated 0.144* -0.112* -0.157* 0.142* -0.127* -0.173*
Never Married 0.317* -0.177* -0.207* 0.301* -0.207* -0.223*
Midwest 0.020* -0.001 -0.015* 0.020* -0.001 -0.015*
South 0.072* -0.023* -0.004 0.072* -0.008* -0.006*
West -0.002 -0.077* -0.058* -0.002 -0.063* -0.060*
0-8 school years -0.188* -0.267* -0.309* -0.194* -0.297* -0.332*
9-11 school years -0.104* -0.170* -0.292* -0.105* -0.188* -0.306*
High School Degree -0.011* -0.047* -0.086* -0.011* -0.049* -0.091*
College Degree 0.022* 0.047* 0.088* 0.022* 0.047* 0.094*
Advanced Degree 0.145* 0.014* 0.121* 0.143* 0.019* 0.129*
(exp−15) 0.075* 0.032* -0.011* 0.073* 0.019* -0.010*
The table lists the probit estimates of the probability of working full-time full-year (FTFY),
evaluated at sample means. The modified definition of full-time full-year is used. Fitted
values from the columns are used to select the samples for identification at infinity. Note, the
exclusion restriction (the number of children under the age of 6 interacted with marital status)
is omitted. The first three columns use the “CPS-Similar” sample. The last three columns use
the full Census sample, which includes individuals residing in group quarters. Columns 1 and
4 use the 1980 Census to model female selection into the labor force, and Columns 2 and 5 use
the 1980 Census to model male selection into the labor force. Columns 3 and 6 use the 2010
ACS to model male selection into the labor force. Wage cutoffs are generated using Census
data, following the wage trimming process described in Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008).
Following Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008), all specifications include schooling-experience
interactions (not shown). An asterisk (*) indicates statistically significant coefficients at the
95% confidence level. An asterisk beside the predicted probability of labor force participation
indicates that the overall probit equation is statistically significant. The benchmark groups
are currently married (living with spouse), some college, 15 years’ potential experience, and
Northeast region.
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Table 1.C.12: Effects on the probability of working FTFY - Using the CPS and factor
variables, 1975-1979 and 1995-1999
1975-1979 1995-1999 1975-1979 1975-1979
Female Female Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Observations 116,843 102,395 116,843 112,291
Predicted Pr 0.317* 0.511* 0.317* 0.759*
Widowed 0.108* 0.053* 0.141* -0.100*
Divorced 0.262* 0.168* 0.302* -0.149*
Separated 0.126* 0.069* 0.149* -0.142*
Never Married 0.248* 0.119* 0.372* -0.170*
Children 0-6 x constant -0.179* -0.153*
Midwest 0.027* 0.036* 0.027* 0.017*
South 0.068* 0.037* 0.076* -0.009*
West 0.001 -0.037* 0.007 -0.056*
0-8 school years -0.146* -0.316* -0.198* -0.251*
9-11 school years -0.072* -0.205* -0.097* -0.176*
High School Degree -0.004 -0.026* -0.014 -0.042*
College Degree 0.021 0.003 0.030* 0.037*
Advanced Degree 0.200* 0.087* 0.213* 0.029*
(exp−15) 0.006 -0.008 0.077* 0.031*
The table lists the probit estimates of the probability of working full-time full-
year (FTFY), evaluated at sample means. The probit estimates are calculated
using data from Mulligan and Rubinstein 2008, using factor variables to create
interactions rather than using pre-generated interactions.
Following Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008), each column with estimates of the
exclusion restriction, marital status interacted with the number of children under
the age of 6, represents the first step of the Heckman two-step method to model
female selection into the labor force. Fitted values from the columns without the
exclusion restriction are used to select the samples for identification at infinity. All
specifications include schooling-experience interactions (not shown). An asterisk
(*) indicates statistically significant coefficients at the 95% confidence level. An
asterisk beside the predicted probability of labor force participation indicates
that the overall probit equation is statistically significant. The benchmark groups
are currently married (living with spouse), some college, 15 years’ potential
experience, and Northeast region.
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Table 1.C.13: Correcting the gender wage gap using
the Heckman two-step estimator - Using the CPS and
factor variables, 1975-1979 and 1995-1999
Method
Period OLS Two-Step Bias
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Variable Weights
1975-1979 -0.417 -0.339 -0.079
(0.007) (0.015) (0.016)
1995-1999 -0.265 -0.358 0.092
(0.004) (0.015) (0.016)
Change 0.152 -0.019 0.171
(0.008) (0.021) (0.023)
Panel B: Fixed Weights
1975-1979 -0.409 -0.335 -0.075
(0.005) (0.014) (0.015)
1995-1999 -0.274 -0.371 0.096
(0.005) (0.016) (0.017)
Change 0.135 -0.036 0.171
(0.008) (0.021) (0.022)
As in Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008), each cell
summarizes the regression results listed in Tables
1.C.2, 1.C.3, and 1.C.12. The entries are female mi-
nus male log wages, which differ from each other
in terms of (a) rows, or time period used for esti-
mation (1975-1979 vs 1995-1999); (b) columns, or
whether the regression includes the inverse Mills’
ratio (OLS does not include it, two-step does); and
(c) panels, or whether variable or fixed weights are
used to calculate log wages (see Appendix 1.A).
The “Bias” column is the difference between the
OLS and two-step columns. The “Change” row is
the difference between the 1995-1999 and 1975-
1979 rows.
The regressions control for demographics inter-
acted with sex and use the CPS wage sample of
white, non-Hispanic individuals aged 26 to 55.
The wage trimming process is described in Sec-
tion 1.3.1. Factor variables are used to generate
interaction terms. Bootstrap standard errors are in
parentheses.
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Table 1.C.14: Gender-gap changes by marital status and schooling -
Using the CPS and factor variables, 1975-1979 and 1995-1999
OLS Two-Step Bias
1975-1979 1995-1999 Change Change Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: All
Conditional on -0.409 -0.274 0.135 -0.036 0.171
marital status (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.021) (0.022)
Not conditional on -0.436 -0.281 0.155 -0.016 0.171
marital status (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.015) (0.017)
Panel B: By Marital Status
Currently Married -0.479 -0.323 0.156 -0.040 0.196
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.024) (0.025)
Separated -0.381 -0.306 0.075 -0.085 0.160
(0.021) (0.022) (0.031) (0.036) (0.047)
Widowed -0.434 -0.262 0.172 0.005 0.167
(0.025) (0.042) (0.049) (0.053) (0.072)
Divorced -0.331 -0.200 0.131 0.008 0.123
(0.011) (0.009) (0.015) (0.020) (0.025)
Never Married -0.187 -0.137 0.050 -0.070 0.119
(0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.020) (0.024)
Panel C: By Education
0 to 8 years -0.369 -0.271 0.098 -0.209 0.307
(0.060) (0.086) (0.105) (0.110) (0.152)
High School, not grad -0.442 -0.346 0.096 -0.142 0.237
(0.020) (0.037) (0.042) (0.050) (0.065)
High school graduates -0.429 -0.302 0.127 -0.046 0.173
(0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.022) (0.024)
Some College -0.412 -0.261 0.151 -0.014 0.165
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.022) (0.024)
College -0.432 -0.255 0.177 0.014 0.162
(0.013) (0.012) (0.018) (0.026) (0.031)
Advanced Degree -0.254 -0.198 0.056 -0.075 0.131
(0.036) (0.023) (0.042) (0.045) (0.062)
As in Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008), each cell summarizes
the regression results listed in Tables 1.C.2, 1.C.3, and 1.C.12.
The entries are female minus male log wages, which differ
from each other in terms of (a) rows, or demographic groups;
(b) columns, or the time period used for estimation (1975-
1979 and 1995-1999) and whether the regression includes the
inverse Mills’ ratio (OLS does not include it, two-step does);
and (c) panels, or the types of demographic groups summa-
rized. Time-invariant, or fixed, weights are used to calculate
log wages. The “Bias” column is the difference between the
OLS and two-step columns.
The regressions control for demographics (which include mar-
ital status unless indicated otherwise) interacted with sex and
use the CPS wage sample of white, non-Hispanic individuals
aged 26 to 55. The wage trimming process is described in
Section 1.3.1. Factor variables are used to generate interaction
terms. Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 1.C.17: Correcting the gender wage gap using the
Heckman two-step estimator - Using the CPS and factor
variables, 1975-1979, 2005-2009, and 2010-2014
Method
Period OLS Two-Step Bias
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Variable Weights
1975-1979 -0.417 -0.339 -0.079
(0.007) (0.016) (0.017)
1995-1999 -0.265 -0.358 0.092
(0.004) (0.015) (0.016)
2005-2009 -0.241 -0.315 0.073
(0.004) (0.014) (0.014)
2010-2014 -0.240 -0.367 0.126
(0.005) (0.020) (0.021)
Change 0.177 -0.028 0.205
(0.009) (0.026) (0.027)
Panel B: Fixed Weights
1975-1979 -0.409 -0.335 -0.075
(0.005) (0.014) (0.015)
1995-1999 -0.274 -0.371 0.096
(0.005) (0.016) (0.017)
2005-2009 -0.259 -0.337 0.079
(0.006) (0.015) (0.016)
2010-2014 -0.270 -0.410 0.139
(0.009) (0.024) (0.026)
Change 0.139 -0.075 0.214
(0.011) (0.028) (0.030)
As in Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008), each cell summa-
rizes the regression results listed in Tables 1.C.2, 1.C.3,
and 1.C.12. The entries are female minus male log wages,
which differ from each other in terms of (a) rows, or
time period used for estimation (1975-1979, 1995-1999,
2005-2009, and 2010-2014); (b) columns, or whether the
regression includes the inverse Mills’ ratio (OLS does not
include it, two-step does); and (c) panels, or whether vari-
able or fixed weights are used to calculate log wages (see
Appendix 1.A). The “Bias” column is the difference be-
tween the OLS and two-step columns. The “Change” row
is the difference between the 2010-2014 and 1975-1979
rows. Factor variables are used to generate interaction
terms. Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 1.C.18: Gender-gap changes by marital status and schooling -
Using the CPS and factor variables, 2005-2009 and 2010-2014
2005-2009 CPS 2010-2014 CPS
OLS Two-Step Bias OLS Two-Step Bias
Change Change Change Change Change Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: All
Conditional on 0.151 -0.003 0.153 0.139 -0.075 0.214
marital status (0.008) (0.021) (0.022) (0.011) (0.028) (0.030)
Not conditional on 0.179 -0.029 0.208 0.168 -0.099 0.267
marital status (0.008) (0.016) (0.018) (0.011) (0.023) (0.025)
Panel B: By Marital Status
Currently Married 0.169 -0.003 0.172 0.162 -0.073 0.235
(0.008) (0.023) (0.025) (0.011) (0.030) (0.032)
Separated 0.163 0.014 0.149 0.149 -0.063 0.212
(0.031) (0.036) (0.048) (0.037) (0.044) (0.058)
Widowed 0.195 0.037 0.158 0.202 -0.026 0.228
(0.043) (0.047) (0.064) (0.053) (0.060) (0.080)
Divorced 0.141 0.025 0.116 0.134 -0.037 0.171
(0.015) (0.021) (0.026) (0.018) (0.028) (0.033)
Never Married 0.068 -0.042 0.111 0.029 -0.140 0.169
(0.014) (0.020) (0.025) (0.016) (0.027) (0.031)
Panel C: By Education
0 to 8 years -0.266 -0.486 0.220 -0.586 -0.879 0.293
(0.196) (0.198) (0.279) (0.358) (0.367) (0.512)
High School, not grad 0.122 -0.097 0.219 0.032 -0.298 0.330
(0.041) (0.050) (0.065) (0.076) (0.088) (0.117)
High school graduates 0.150 -0.008 0.158 0.154 -0.071 0.225
(0.009) (0.022) (0.024) (0.011) (0.029) (0.031)
Some College 0.185 0.035 0.151 0.187 -0.022 0.209
(0.010) (0.021) (0.023) (0.010) (0.027) (0.029)
College 0.192 0.050 0.142 0.193 0.006 0.186
(0.016) (0.024) (0.029) (0.017) (0.028) (0.032)
Advanced Degree 0.065 -0.050 0.115 0.030 -0.130 0.160
(0.041) (0.044) (0.060) (0.042) (0.046) (0.062)
Each cell summarizes the regression results listed in Tables 1.C.2,
1.C.3, and 1.C.12. The entries are changes to estimated gender
wage gaps, which differ from each other in terms of (a) rows, or
demographic groups; (b) columns, or the time period used for
estimation and whether the regression includes the inverse Mills’
ratio (OLS does not include it, two-step does); and (c) panels, or
the types of demographic groups summarized. Columns 1 and 2
compare the 1975-1979 and 2005-2009 CPS samples. Columns 4
and 5 compare the 1975-1979 and 2010-2014 CPS samples. Time-
invariant, or fixed, weights are used to calculate log wages. The
“Bias” column is the difference between the OLS and two-step
columns. Factor variables are used to generate interaction terms.
Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses.
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Chapter 2
The Effects of Alabama’s Presumptive
Sentencing Guidelines
2.1 Introduction
In October of 2006, Alabama began using voluntary sentencing guidelines for a select
group of property, drug, burglary, and personal offenses. The sentencing guidelines function
through the completion of sentencing worksheets, which use a point based system to determine
whether a convicted offender should serve a prison sentence and, if so, the guidelines suggest a
sentence length range based on the offender’s total score. Because worksheet usage varied across
the state, in October of 2013, the sentencing guidelines for drug and property offenses became
presumptive, or mandatory except for extenuating circumstances.
Alabama’s sentencing guidelines were created to reduce the number of non-violent
offenders’ sentenced to prison and reduce sentence length for those that receive a prison sentence.
Therefore, this paper uses state prison admissions data to study how the shift from voluntary to
presumptive sentencing guidelines affected sentence length. Figure 2.1 presents a time-series of
average sentence length among offenders admitted into prison for the commission of affected
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property and drug offenses. The figure presents results separately by race: the gray solid represents
average sentence length among black offenders, and the black solid line represents average
sentence length among white offenders. Quarter 0 denotes the quarter before the presumptive
sentencing guidelines were implemented (July to September 2013). In Figure 2.1a, two years
prior to the implementation of the presumptive sentencing guidelines, the average sentence length
among property offenders was approximately 61 months. In the two years following the transition,
the average sentence fell by 21 percent, to 48 months. Among white property offenders sentence
length fell by 14 months; among black offenders sentence length fell by 11 months. In Figure
2.1b, average sentence length fell by 10 months among white drug offenders and by 12 months
among black drug offenders.
The transition to presumptive guidelines in Alabama provides a setting where a difference-
in-differences approach can be used by comparing the sentence length of presumptive worksheet
offenses to the sentence length of those that remained voluntary. Yet, the guidelines aim to
limit judicial discretion, which may change prosecutors’ behavior; and they intend to reduce the
use of incarceration among non-violent offenders. Because of data limitations, I estimate how,
conditional on incarceration, the shift to presumptive sentencing guidelines may have affected
offense and offender composition. A change in the use of incarceration would likely affect
the type of offenders that receive a prison sentence, leading to changes in inmate or offense
composition and confounding the effect on average sentence length.
I find that the changes in composition are not consistent across offense type and race.
Following the shift to presumptive sentencing guidelines, there is no statistically significant
difference in the average number of property offenders admitted into prison, but all else equal,
the average number of white drug offenders declines. Furthermore, among white drug offenders,
there is a statistically significant decline in the average severity of admitted offenses. And while
I find statistically significant increases in the average and median age at admission following
the transition to presumptive guidelines, there are no statistically significant changes in racial
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composition.
Next, I estimate how the sentencing guidelines affected average total sentence length,
assessing whether effects differed across black and white offenders. I present estimates from a
difference regression and a difference-in-differences regression. Using personal offenses covered
by the voluntary guidelines as a control group, I find that after the guidelines became presumptive,
average sentence length for property offenders fell 23 percent, as the guidelines had intended.
Accounting for a difference in time trends across race, the transition does not have a statistically
significant effect on the change in sentence length across white and black offenders. Relative
to white personal offenders, sentence length among white drug offenders falls 11 percent. But,
following the shift to presumptive sentencing guidelines, there is no statistically significant
difference in the percent change in sentence length between black personal and drug offenders.
Lastly, I study how the effects of the transition varied across the distribution of sentence
length. Figure 2.2 graphs a time-series of percentiles of sentence length by worksheet type.
Figures 2.2a and 2.2b illustrate that the largest changes in sentence length occur in the 75th and
90th percentiles among both property and drug offenders, respectively. Note, that similar to
average sentence length in Figure 2.1, declines in sentence length begin several quarters before
the guidelines were adopted. Using quantile regressions, I find that among property and drug
worksheet offenders, the shift to presumptive sentencing guidelines is associated with a decrease
in sentence length at all percentiles except the 10th. And as expected, some of the largest changes
in total sentence length occur in the upper tail of the sentence length distribution. Furthermore,
among drug offenders, all else equal, the percent decline in black offenders’ sentence length at
the 90th percentile was larger relative to white offenders’ change in sentence length.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 describes the literature on state sentencing
guidelines, and Section 2.3 provides background on the Alabama sentencing guidelines. Section
2.4 describes the prison admissions data I use to estimate the effects of the presumptive guidelines
on sentence length. Section 2.5 analyzes how the shift to presumptive guidelines may have
86
affected offense and offender composition. Section 2.6 studies the effects on average sentence
length, and Section 2.7 uses quantile regression to study effects on sentence length across the
distribution of sentence length. Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
As of 2017, 17 states use sentencing guidelines, which fall along a continuum of voluntary
to presumptive (Mitchell 2017). Voluntary guidelines serve as a suggestion for courts; judicial
compliance is discretionary. Presumptive guidelines prescribe sentence length ranges that judges
are required to adhere to, but they can make departures as necessary. Guidelines seek to limit
judicial discretion and achieve uniform sentencing across similarly situated offenders. They
aim to limit variability in sentencing decisions by guiding decisions based on legally relevant
factors, like offense severity and prior offending, rather than extralegal factors, such as race or
sex (Engen and Gainey 2000; Miethe 1987). Some states, like Alabama, also use the guidelines
to reduce and predict prison populations by encouraging the use of alternative sanctions or
recommending shorter sentence lengths for non-violent offenders. On the other hand, some states,
like Pennsylvania, adopt guidelines because judges are viewed as too lenient (Marvell 1994).
In general, researchers find that consistent with the purpose of sentencing guidelines,
offense severity and prior offending are the principal determinants of both sentence type and
sentence length. Race and other extralegal factors also directly affect sentencing outcomes,
although to a smaller degree (Dixon 1995; Miethe and Moore 1985; Moore and Miethe 1986).
Instead, race has a relatively strong indirect effect, through criminal history, on the likelihood and
duration of a prison sentence (Miethe and Moore 1985).
Furthermore, variation in sentence length and racial disparity is largest in sentencing
decisions that involve the most discretion (Mitchell 2005; Pfaff 2006). Therefore, in Alabama,
as sentencing gudielines became increasingly binding, the shift from voluntary to presumptive
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guidelines is expected to have a stronger impact on sentencing decisions and on any racially
disparate sentences than when Alabama transitioned from no guidelines to voluntary sentencing
guidelines.
Like this paper, Edwards, Rushin, and Colquitt (2019) also studies the shift in Alabama’s
sentencing guidelines. Using trial data, the authors combine the incarceration and sentence length
decisions into one measure and analyze how this sentencing outcome is affected by both the shift
from no guidelines to voluntary sentencing guidelines and the shift from voluntary to presumptive
guidelines.1 Using a difference-in-differences model, the authors find that the transition from
voluntary to presumptive guidelines had a stronger impact on sentencing decisions than the shift
from no guidelines to voluntary guidelines. They find that when the sentencing guidelines became
presumptive for non-violent property and drug offenses, average sentencing fell between 31 and
40 percent (or by 24 to 32 months). They also find that prior to the adoption of any guidelines,
average sentencing was larger for non-violent black offenders, relative to non-violent white
offenders. The voluntary guidelines did not affect racial disparity in sentencing, but the shift to
presumptive sentencing guidelines closed the racial gap in sentencing by about 8 months.
Because the Alabama sentencing guidelines successfully altered judicial behavior, Ed-
wards, Rushin, and Colquitt (2019) studies how sentencing decisions changed across judges, who
are divided into quartiles based on sentencing toughness. Following the shift from no guidelines
to voluntary sentencing guidelines, the effect on sentencing decisions was largest among judges
in the middle quartiles of sentencing toughness. After the transition to presumptive sentencing
guidelines, the toughest judges decreased sentence length the most.
Since the difference in average sentencing between the most lenient and toughest judges
fell, the shift to presumptive guidelines may have had larger effects in the right tail of the sentence
length distribution. Additionally, Britt (2009) describes how a differential effect of offense
severity and prior record is built into sentencing guidelines. He finds that in the left tail of the
1If an individual receives probation (no confinement), they are included in the sample as a zero. Over 26 percent
of their sample receives probation or community corrections.
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sentence length distribution, where sentences are relatively short, the effects of the independent
variables are typically small because the range of possible sentence lengths is small for less
serious offenses and offenders. At higher levels of the sentence length distribution, the effects
of legal and extralegal factors increase in magnitude because as the range of possible sentence
lengths increases, these factors can play a larger role in sentence length decisions. Therefore,
in addition to analyzing changes in average sentence length, I study how the transition from
voluntary to presumptive sentencing guidelines may have had different effects across the sentence
length distribution.
This paper contributes to the literature on sentencing guidelines by providing an expansive
assessment on how the transition from voluntary to presumptive sentencing guidelines affected
Alabama’s prison population. While Edwards, Rushin, and Colquitt (2019) studies a measure
of sentencing that combines the sentence disposition and sentence length decisions, this paper
analyzes how the shift to presumptive guidelines may have affected sentence length (conditional
on incarceration). Relative to the results found in Edwards, Rushin, and Colquitt (2019), my
difference-in-differences estimates are smaller in magnitude (a decline between 30 and 41 percent
relative to a decline between 11 and 23 percent, respectively). This suggests that in addition to a
decline in sentence length, there may have been a reduction in the number of offenders receiving
a prison sentence.
This paper also studies changes in total sentence length across race. While I do not find
any statistically significant differences in the percent decline in average sentence length across
black and white offenders, there is a statistically significant difference among drug worksheet
offenders. With data on prior offending, researchers could better assess the role race plays in the
distribution of sentence length decisions as judicial discretion becomes increasingly limited in
Alabama.
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2.3 Alabama Sentencing Guidelines
In 2005, Alabama’s prisons were 213 percent over design capacity, and incarceration
alternatives, such as community supervision and drug and alcohol treatment programs, were
often underutilized (Alabama Sentencing Commission 2006). Therefore, in October of 2006, the
Alabama Sentencing Commission (ASC) implemented the Initial Voluntary Sentencing Standards
(Act No. 2006-312). The goals of the sentencing guidelines are: (1) reduce prison overcrowding
by incarcerating fewer non-violent offenders and by reducing sentence lengths for non-violent
offenders who receive a prison sentence, (2) improve the predictability of correctional populations,
and (3) eliminate unwarranted sentencing disparity among individuals convicted of the same
crime and with similar criminal histories.
Adherence to the sentencing standards occurs through the completion of a set of work-
sheets, which are designed to imitate the two primary decisions in criminal sentencing. The first
worksheet, the Prison In/Out worksheet, suggests a sentence disposition, or whether the sentence
is served in prison or through alternative sanctions. The second worksheet, the Prison Sentence
Length worksheet (and associated Prison Sentence Length Range table), recommends a sentence
length range for the duration of the sentence.
The sentencing standards provide recommended sentence length ranges for 26 felony
offenses, which account for 87 percent of the felony convictions and sentences imposed in
Alabama between October 1998 and May 2003. These offenses are split into three categories:
property (including burglary), drug, and personal. There is a Prison In/Out worksheet and Prison
Sentence Length worksheet for each offense category. While the guidelines were created to reflect
Alabama’s historical sentencing practices, the sentence length ranges for the offenses covered by
the worksheets are narrower than those under existing statutory law. The guidelines were also
designed so that drug and property offenders are less likely to receive a prison sentence, while
offenders convicted of personal offenses are more likely to receive a prison sentence.
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To develop the worksheets, the ASC analyzed 14,000 pre- and post-sentence investigative
reports to assess which offender and offense characteristics were statistically relevant for sentenc-
ing decisions (Alabama Sentencing Commission 2005). The worksheets include the following
characteristics, or sentencing factors: the most serious current offense2, additional offenses being
sentenced at the current sentencing event, an individual’s criminal history, previous incarcerations,
injury to a victim, and the possession or use of a weapon. Each offense is assigned a score
representing its relative severity, and each sentencing factor is assigned a score which represents
the factor’s relative importance in the sentencing decision.3
Next, to generate the sentence length range associated with each possible total score,
the sentence length worksheet was used to calculate scores for individuals in the five-year
cohort (1998-2003) that received a prison sentence. For each potential score within an offense
category, the middle 50 percent of all sentences imposed was calculated and served as a baseline
for the sentence length ranges. Then, small adjustments were made to reflect the guidelines’
goals. Namely, the guidelines are designed such that drug and property offenders receive
shorter sentences, while violent offenders receive slightly longer sentences (Alabama Sentencing
Commission 2005).
Alabama’s sentencing guidelines were initially voluntary because of concerns over consti-
tutionality. Prior to 2004, in states with presumptive sentencing guidelines, judges could impose
a sentence length above the maximum if they identified any aggravating factors, such as whether
the defendant was paid to commit the offense. However, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Blakely v.
Washington4 and United States v. Booker5, denied judges the authority to find aggravating factors.
Rather, juries must establish the relevant facts required to impose a sentence above the statutory
2Worksheets are to be completed for the “most serious offense” at a sentencing event, which is defined as
an event including “all convictions sentenced at the same time.” The “most serious offense” is determined by the
offense that yields the highest number of points shown on the respective Prison Sentence Length worksheet, unless a
non-worksheet offense has a higher statutory maximum penalty (Alabama Sentencing Commission 2013b).
3Scores for each of the sentencing factors can differ across offense categories, and across disposition and sentence
length worksheets within an offense category.
4542 U.S. 296 (2004)
5543 U.S. 220 (2005)
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maximum. Because the ASC did not want Alabama’s sentencing guidelines to be subject to
constitutional scrutiny, they adopted voluntary guidelines.
The ASC expected the voluntary sentencing guidelines to be adhered to in 75 percent of
the affected cases; judges would have flexibility in the remaining 25 percent to sentence outside
of the suggested ranges. However, usage varied across counties; some counties did not submit
any worksheets, others submitted worksheets for over 90 percent of the worksheet-applicable
sentencing events. During Fiscal Year 2012 (October 2011-September 2012), counties submitted
worksheets for 61 percent of worksheet-applicable sentencing events, 62.8 percent of which were
considered valid (Alabama Sentencing Commission 2014).6
In addition to worksheet submission rates, guideline adherence is also measured by com-
pliance with the worksheets’ disposition and sentence length recommendations. For example, 36.3
percent of valid worksheets for drug offenses recommended a prison sentence, and judges adhered
to the recommended “In” disposition 81.5 percent of the time. They followed the recommended
“Out” disposition 73.6 percent of the time. In terms of sentence length compliance for property
worksheet offenses, 42 percent of valid worksheets received a sentence within the recommended
range and 35 percent received a sentence above the maximum recommended sentence length.
For drug worksheet offenses, 52 percent of valid worksheets received a sentence within the
recommended range and 26 percent received a sentence above the maximum recommended
sentence length (Alabama Sentencing Commission 2014).7,8
Because worksheet adherence was so varied, the Alabama Legislature was concerned
about the legal repercussions of persistent overcrowding. Namely, in response to California’s
6Worksheets are considered valid if the conviction offense listed on the worksheet is consistent with the conviction
offense found in the State Judicial Information System (SJIS) or on sentencing orders.
7The remaining percentage of valid worksheets is due to mixed compliance, which applies to split sentences.
For most worksheets classified as mixed compliance, the incarceration portion of the split sentence fell within the
recommendations, but the total sentence length exceeded the maximum recommended sentence length.
8Note, for all worksheet offenses, overall compliance does not appear to differ much by race: when sentencing
black offenders, judges adhered to the disposition and sentence length recommendations 57.3 percent of the time,
and when sentencing white offenders, judges adhered to the guidelines 61 percent of the time.
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overcrowded prisons, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Brown v. Plata9 required
California to reduce its prison population within two years. Since Alabama had a history of
litigation concerning prison conditions, and Alabama’s prisons were more overcrowded than
California’s prisons, Alabama wanted to avoid a federal takeover of state institutions or a mandate
requiring a reduction in the prison population. Therefore, during the 2012 Regular Session, the
Alabama Legislature passed Act 2012-473, which mandated that the Initial Voluntary Sentencing
Standards become presumptive for drug and property worksheet offenses, effective October 1,
2013.
As part of Act 2012-473, property offenses covered by the voluntary sentencing guidelines
were divided into two subsets. The first property subset (referred to as “Property?) contains
burglary offenses, for which sentencing recommendations remained voluntary. The second
property subset, referred to as “Property A,? contains all other covered property offenses;
worksheets for these offenses became presumptive. Sentencing recommendations for personal
worksheet offenses remained voluntary.
Act 2012-473 also included additional drug offenses to be covered by the presumptive
sentencing guidelines. The ASC developed scores for the new offenses by accounting for the
new offenses’ severity relative to the severity (and scores) of the existing offenses; the scores
previously assigned to covered offenses and sentencing factors were not affected. Because
a relatively more severe drug offense was added (the Unlawful Manufacture of a Controlled
Substance in the first degree), the drug sentence length table had to be amended to include longer
sentence length options. After these additions were made, the ASC analyzed conviction and
sentencing data from a seven year time period and found that 95 percent of the prison sentences
for the Unlawful Manufacture of a Controlled Substance in the first degree fell within the added
sentence length ranges (Alabama Sentencing Commission 2013a).
Although judges are required to follow the disposition and sentence length recommen-
9563 U.S. 493 (2011)
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dations for presumptive worksheet offenses, Act 2012-473 defined aggravating and mitigating
circumstances that can result in departures from the sentencing recommendations.10 Furthermore,
individuals convicted of a presumptive worksheet offense are entitled to a jury trial to establish
the existence of an aggravating factor, but a jury is not required to identify the existence of a
mitigating circumstance. For presumptive worksheet offenses, departures from the sentencing
recommendations are subject to limited appellate review, while a judge’s failure to consider the
voluntary sentencing standards is not appealable (Alabama Sentencing Commission 2013b).
On December 11, 2015, the ASC adopted Act 2015-185. This “prison reform” legislation,
which became effective on October 1, 2016, created a new felony offense category (Class D)
and re-classified non-violent worksheet offenses as Class D offenses. All Class D felonies are
covered by the presumptive sentencing guidelines, but the new category lowered the maximum
sentence an individual can receive. Additional non-violent property offenses were also added to
the sentencing standards.
2.4 Data
I use the National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP), 2000 to 2016, from the Na-
tional Archives of Criminal Justice Data (NACJD), to study Alabama’s transition from voluntary
to presumptive sentencing guidelines.11 The NCRP provides monthly, offender-level admission
and release data for individuals incarcerated in state prisons. It includes offense and offender
characteristics, such as race, sex, the county where the sentence was imposed, current offense(s),
total sentence length assigned by the court, date of birth, date of admission and, if applicable,
10The ASC defines aggravating factors as “substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence
whereby the sentencing court may impose a departure sentence above the presumptive sentence recommendation for
an offense.” Mitigating factors are defined as “substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence
whereby the sentencing court may impose a departure sentence below the presumptive sentence recommendation for
an offense” (Alabama Sentencing Commission 2013b).
11United States. Bureau of Justice Statistics. National Corrections Reporting Program, [United States], 2000-
2016. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-03-21.
https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR37007.v1
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date of release.
My sample consists of black and white males in Alabama state prisons, at least 17 years
old at admission.12 Using admissions that occurred between January 2007 and December 2015, I
restrict my sample to individuals admitted for the commission of a new offense (this excludes
inmates admitted for probation and parole violations).13,14
For my analyses, I study total sentence length, conditional on admittance into state prison.
Total sentence length is the sentence length, in months, assigned by the judge for all offenses in a
given sentencing event. For presumptive worksheet offenses, judges have discretion in allocating
the consecutive sentencing of multiple current offenses, but the total sentence for all counts
cannot exceed the maximum sentence length specified in the Prison Sentence Length Range table
(Alabama Sentencing Commission 2013b). Note that in Alabama, the amount of time offenders
serve in prison is likely to be shorter than the sentence length imposed by the court, so total
sentence length is not equivalent to time served.15
In Figure 2.1, average total sentence length among both property and drug worksheet
offenders appears to fall several months before the presumptive guidelines were implemented in
October 2013. A possible explanation is that judges may have begun to adhere to the sentencing
recommendations before the worksheets became officially presumptive. The Alabama Legislature
passed the presumptive guidelines in May 2013. Through the summer and fall of 2013, members
of the ASC led 30 training sessions around Alabama, particularly in counties where judges,
prosecutors, and defense lawyers were less familiar with the worksheets. Because judges may
have started using the presumptive guidelines prior to October 2013, I drop prison admissions
that occurred between May and September 2013, which corresponds to the months in which the
12Alabama does not provide information on whether an inmate is Hispanic.
13I exclude admissions data between 2000 and 2006 because Alabama only reports a small subsample of new
admissions for that period.
14I exclude data from October to December 2016 because, as discussed in Section 2.3, the set of offenses
following the “prison reform” legislation is not necessarily comparable to the set of offenses prior to October 2016. I
also exclude January to September 2016 because there appears to be some anticipatory effects, since throughout
2016, the ASC provided trainings on the guideline modifications (Alabama Sentencing Commission 2017).
15For example, for every 30 days served, some inmates can reduce their sentence length by 75 days.
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trainings occurred.
Additionally, because of prison overcrowding, convicted offenders may wait in county jails
for up to 30 days after sentencing before being transferred to state prison (Alabama Sentencing
Commission 2006). Because the NCRP provides the date of admission into state prison, rather
than the date of the sentencing event, I exclude admissions that occurred during October 2013 -
some of the offenders recorded as entering prison in October may have been sentenced before
the drug and property worksheets became presumptive. Overall, I exclude admissions occurring
between May and October 2013 from all analyses, including the descriptive statistics.16
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics for all offenders admitted into Alabama state
prisons for the commission of a new offense. Offenses are categorized as property, drug, burglary,
personal, and other. The first four categories include both worksheet and non-worksheet offenses.
The ”other” category consists of non-worksheet offenses, such as bribery or obstruction of
justice, that cannot be categorized under property, drug, or personal. The descriptive statistics are
divided into two periods: (1) the pre-presumptive period, January 2007 to April 2013, and (2) the
post-presumptive period, November 2013 to December 2015.
Table 2.1 shows that (worksheet and non-worksheet) drug offenders make up the largest
share of new admissions - over 30 percent - and property offenders make up about 20 percent
of new admissions. Moreover, approximately 80 percent of all offenses are covered by the
presumptive and voluntary guidelines. Property worksheet offenders make up over 87 percent of
all property offense admissions, and drug worksheet offenders make up around 95 percent of all
drug offense admissions.
Next, Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics for property, drug, and personal worksheet
offenders. As in Table 2.1, the descriptive statistics are divided into the pre- and post-presumptive
time periods. Table 2.2 shows that black offenders make up over 40 percent of new admissions
among property worksheet offenders, about 52 percent of new admissions among drug worksheet
16All figures include admissions occurring between May and October 2013.
96
offenders, and over 68 percent of new admissions among personal worksheet offenders. Offenders
aged 17 to 34 make up over half of new admissions among property and drug worksheet offenders;
70 percent of personal worksheet offenders are aged 17 to 34 at the time of admission.17
To preface how the shift to presumptive sentencing guidelines may have affected sentence
length among property and drug worksheet offenders admitted into state prison, Table 2.3 breaks
down average total sentence length by race and worksheet offense category.18 On average, black
offenders receive a shorter sentence length relative to white offenders for property, drug, and
personal worksheet offenses. However, among property and personal worksheet offenders, the
difference in average sentence length between white and black offenders in the pre-presumptive
period is not statistically significant. Furthermore, controlling for county and offense fixed effects,
black offenders, on average, receive a larger sentence relative to white offenders.19
Table 2.3 also shows that among property and drug worksheet offenders, the difference
in average sentence length between the pre- and post-presumptive time periods is statistically
significant. However, among property worksheet offenders, in the post-presumptive period, the
difference in average sentence length across race is not statistically significant. Among drug
worksheet offenders, the difference in average sentence length across race and time periods is
statistically significant. Among personal worksheet offenders, while average sentence length
falls by about 19 months for black offenders between the pre- and post-presumptive periods,
the differences across race and time periods are not statistically significant. The statistically
significant differences across time periods serve as motivation for the following sections, which
investigate the extent to which differences in average sentence length between the pre- and post-
17Note that the differences across offense and offender characteristics between the pre- and post-presumptive
periods may be more indicative of a trend over time rather than a discrete change due to the shift to presumptive
sentencing guidelines.
18For individuals recorded as receiving a life sentence for a drug or property offense, I replace their total sentence
length with 360 months (the 99th percentile of total sentence length for property and drug offenses is 240 months).
19Define a county as relatively lenient if the average total sentence length imposed in the county is relatively
short. Within a worksheet category, there is little difference in average offense severity (or worksheet score) across
relatively lenient and harsh counties. Furthermore, counties that sentence less harshly on average, admit a larger
share of black offenders.
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presumptive time periods can be attributed to Alabama’s transition to presumptive sentencing
guidelines.
2.5 Composition of Alabama’s Prisons
This section describes two mechanisms through which the shift from voluntary to pre-
sumptive sentencing guidelines could affect the composition of Alabama’s state prisons, namely
through changes in the probability of incarceration and changes in prosecutorial discretion. While
I cannot observe prosecutors’ charging behavior or changes in the use of prison, this section
provides suggestive evidence that the transition to presumptive guidelines affected offense and
inmate composition.
Alabama’s sentencing guidelines were designed to reduce the use of prison, particularly
for first-time offenders. Comparing Fiscal Years 2004-2006 and Fiscal Years 2007-2008 (the shift
from no sentencing guidelines to voluntary guidelines), the use of prison for all drug and property
worksheet offenders declined by 5 to 11 percentage points (Alabama Sentencing Commission
2013a). Yet, there is no consensus in the literature on the effects of sentencing guidelines on court
commitment rates. Some researchers find that the adoption of presumptive sentencing guidelines
decreases admission rates (Nicholson-Crotty 2004; Sorensen and Stemen 2002). On the other
hand, Marvell (1995) finds that sentencing guidelines did not affect court commitments; any
changes to the prison population occurred through reductions in imposed sentence length.
Because Edwards, Rushin, and Colquitt (2019) finds that, compared to Alabama?s vol-
untary sentencing guidelines, the presumptive guidelines are more effective in altering judicial
behavior, it is plausible that the probability of incarceration further declined after the sentencing
guidelines became presumptive, particularly in counties where voluntary guideline usage was
low.20 A change in the use of incarceration would likely affect the type of offenders that receive a
20The ASC does not provide data on how the use of prison changed when the drug and property worksheets
became presumptive.
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prison sentence, leading to changes in inmate or offense composition and confounding the effect
on average sentence length. Namely, if less severe offenders are less likely to receive prison
time, then absent any changes to sentence length decisions, average total sentence length would
increase. Consequently, if judges imposed shorter sentences for non-violent offenders following
the shift to presumptive guidelines, the effect on average sentence length would be underestimated.
Furthermore, if the changing probability of incarceration is correlated with extralegal factors,
the effects of those factors on sentencing decisions in the post-presumptive period would be
mis-estimated.
In terms of changes to prosecutorial discretion, according to the hydraulic displacement of
discretion theory, when sentencing guidelines limit judicial discretion but place no restrictions on
prosecutorial behavior, discretion is shifted to prosecutors (McCoy 1984). Typically, researchers
find that following the adoption of sentencing guidelines there are little to no changes in prosecu-
tors’ charging and plea bargaining behavior, and small changes to prosecutorial discretion do not
result in significant disparities (Miethe 1987; Wooldredge and Griffin 2005). On the other hand,
Piehl and Bushway (2007) find evidence suggesting that sentencing guidelines give more power
to prosecutors relative to judges, resulting in excessive punishment.
In Alabama, Edwards, Rushin, and Colquitt (2019) finds no evidence that prosecutors
manipulated charges immediately following the shift to presumptive guidelines; there was no
change in the average severity of indictment offenses. Yet, anecdotal evidence suggests that
Alabama prosecutors may search for aggravating factors early on in cases so that defendants will
admit to them when they plead guilty (because then a jury trial is not required to establish the
existence of an aggravating factor). If this is the case, prosecutorial behavior may limit the extent
to which offenders’ sentence length decreases, since aggravating factors allow judges to sentence
outside of the range specified in the presumptive worksheets.
Therefore, I evaluate whether offense and inmate composition changed after the presump-
tive sentencing guidelines were implemented. I use OLS regressions on levels of compositional
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outcomes and linear probability models to evaluate the following: (1) admission type (new court
commitment or parole/probation violation), (2) offense composition, and (3) inmate composition,
namely age at admission and race.
As described below, the shift to presumptive sentencing guidelines is associated with
changes in the composition of Alabama’s state prisons, and effects appear to vary across race and
offense type. For example, only among white drug worksheet offenders does the probability of
being admitted through a new court commitment decline in the post-presumptive period. There
are also statistically significant increases in the average and median age at admission. Yet, racial
composition does not appear to be affected by the shift to presumptive guidelines.
2.5.1 Admission Type
I first examine whether the composition of admission types is affected by the transition
to presumptive sentencing guidelines. In particular, I focus on admissions through new court
commitments and admissions through parole or probation violations. Among property and
drug worksheet offenders, around 80 percent of admissions into prison are through new court
commitments (see Table 2.2). Parole and probation revocations make up between 17 and 19
percent of admissions.
If the probability of incarceration declined after the guidelines became presumptive, the
number of new court commitments for worksheet offenses should fall. Moreover, among property
and drug worksheet offenders, the average total sentence length for offenders admitted for a parole
violation is about 16 years; the average total sentence length among individuals admitted through
a new court commitment is less than 5.5 years. As a result, since prosecutorial discretion is not
limited by the worksheets, if prosecutors believe the guidelines to be too lenient21, especially for
individuals with a substantial criminal history, they may have an incentive to charge an individual
21Anecdotal evidence suggests that Alabama prosecutors believe the presumptive sentencing guidelines to be too
lenient and that requiring a jury trial to prove an aggravating factor increases prosecutors’ workloads (Lawson 2013;
Hare 2013).
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with a parole or probation violation instead of the commission of a new offense (assuming
violations carry a longer sentence length).22
To assess the effects of the presumptive sentencing guidelines on admission type, I first
estimate an OLS regression on the number of court commitment admissions and the number of
parole or probation violation admissions.
Yctr = β
(1)
1 Postt +β
(1)
2 Blackctr+β
(1)
3 Postt ∗Blackctr+β(1)4 ∗ t+β(1)5 Blackit ∗ t+ γ(1)c + γ(1)q + ε(1)ctr
(2.1)
Let Yctr represent the number of court commitment admissions or parole/probation violation
admissions in county c, at quarter t, and for race r. Postt is an indicator variable denoting the
post-presumptive period (November 2013 to December 2015). At quarter t, for a given admit
type, each county has two observations: the number of black offenders admitted to prison and the
number of white offenders admitted. Blackctr is an indicator for the county-level observation that
corresponds to black offenders. County fixed effects, γ(1)c , quarter fixed effects, γ
(1)
q , and separate
linear time trends (at the quarterly level) for white and black offenders are included. The linear
time trend is centered at 0 - the quarters in the pre-presumptive period are negative (or equal to
0 in the case of the quarter right before the transition). Quarters in the post-presumptive period
are positive. Regressions are run separately by worksheet offense type, and standard errors are
clustered at the county level.
The coefficients of interest in Equation 2.1 are β(1)1 and β
(1)
3 . In regressions on the
number of court commitments, if the probability of incarceration fell after the transition to
presumptive sentencing guidelines, β1 should be statistically significant, such that the number
of court commitments for property and drug worksheets fell following the policy change. If the
shift to presumptive guidelines did not differentially affect the number black and white offenders
22Prosecutors may file a parole or probation violation instead of a new case since the burden of proof is much
lower in the former. The prosecutor only needs to prove that it is more likely than not that the terms of an individual’s
parole or probation were violated. Austin and Lawson (1998) find that in California, most technical parole violations
were attributed to a new offense that was not prosecuted.
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admitted, β3 would not be statistically significant. In regressions on the number of parole or
probation violations, if prosecutors charged relatively more individuals with a violation, instead
of a new offense, in the post-presumptive period, β1 should be positive. Yet, without data on
prosecutors’ charging behaviors, a statistically significant coefficient does not prove there were
changes in how prosecutors exercised discretion.
Table 2.4 presents the coefficients from the regressions on the number of court commit-
ments (columns labeled “New Commit”) and the number of admissions for parole or probation
violations (columns labeled “Violation”).23 Even-numbered columns include a coefficient on the
interaction Postt ∗Blackctr; odd-numbered columns omit the interaction term.
Columns 1 to 4 list the coefficients from regressions using the sample of property work-
sheet offenders. For both new court commitments and parole or probation violation admissions,
the coefficients on Postt and Postt ∗Blackctr are statistically insignificant. All else equal, the shift
to presumptive sentencing guidelines does not appear to have a statistically significant impact on
the number of property worksheet offenders admitted for the commission of a new offense or for
a parole or probation violation.
Columns 5 to 8 list the coefficients from regressions using the sample of drug worksheet
offenders. In Columns 5 and 6, the coefficients on Postt are negative and statistically significant.
Therefore, in Column 5, all else equal and net of time trends, the average number of court
commitments for drug worksheet offenses falls by 0.614 in the post-presumptive period. In
Column 6, among white offenders, all else equal and net of time trends, the average number of
court commitments for drug worksheet offenses falls by 0.831 in the post-presumptive period.
And while the coefficient on Postt ∗Blackctr is not statistically significant, it is positive. A test
of β(1)1 +β
(1)
3 = 0 suggests that for black offenders, the average number of court commitments
in the post-presumptive period is not statistically different from the average number of court
23On average, about 21 individuals per county, each quarter, are admitted for the commission of a new property
worksheet offense and 7 individuals are admitted for a parole or probation violation. For drug worksheet offenses,
approximately 28 individuals per county, on average, are admitted for the commission of a new offense and 8
individuals are admitted for a parole or probation violation.
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commitments in the pre-presumptive period.
For regressions on the number of admissions through parole or probation violations, in
Column 7, the coefficient on Postt is positive and statistically significant. All else equal and net
of time trends, the average number of admissions for a parole or probation violation increases by
0.487 after the guidelines become presumptive. In Column 8, when Postt ∗Blackctr is included,
the coefficient on Postt remains positive but becomes statistically insignificant. The coefficient
on Postt ∗Blackctr is also statistically insignificant, but a test of β(1)1 + β(1)3 = 0 suggests that
among black offenders, all else equal, the average number of admissions for a parole or probation
violation increases in the post-presumptive period by 0.601.24
Next, I estimate a linear probability model to assess whether the probability of being
admitted for a new court commitment, rather than for a probation or parole violation, was affected
by the transition from voluntary to presumptive sentencing guidelines.
Yict = β
(2)
1 Postt +β
(2)
2 Blackit +β
(2)
3 Postt ∗Blackit +β(2)4 ∗ t+β(2)5 Blackit ∗ t
+X ′itβ
(2)
6 + γ
(2)
c + γ
(2)
m + γ
(2)
o + ε
(2)
ict
(2.2)
For individual i, in county c at quarter t, Yict takes on a value of 1 if an individual is admitted for
the commission of a new offense, and it takes on a value of 0 if an individual is admitted for a
parole or probation violation. Postt is an indicator variable denoting the post-presumptive period.
Blackit is an indicator for whether an offender is black. Offender- and offense-level covariates,
Xit , include the number of counts for the first offense and indicators for whether the offender
was convicted of a second or third offense. County fixed effects, γc, month fixed effects, γm,
offense fixed effects, γo, and separate linear time trends (at the quarterly level) for white and black
offenders are included. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
The coefficients of interest in Equation 2.2 are β(2)1 and β
(2)
3 . If the probability of incar-
24If Equation 2.1, with the number of parole or probation violations as the dependent variable, is run separately
by race, the coefficient on Postt is positive and statistically significant for both black and white drug worksheet
offenders.
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ceration fell after the transition to presumptive sentencing guidelines or if prosecutors began
charging individuals with relatively more parole or probation violations, β(2)1 and/or β
(2)
3 should be
statistically significant, such that the probability of being admitted into prison for the commission
of a new offense, rather than a probation or parole violation, declines after the guidelines became
presumptive.
Table 2.5 lists the coefficients from the regression on the probability of an individual
being admitted for the commission of a new offense. In Column 1, among property worksheet
offenders, the coefficient on Postt is insignificant, but the coefficient on Postt ∗Blackit is negative
and statistically significant. For white offenders, all else equal, the probability of being admitted
through a new court commitment does not appear to be affected by the shift to presumptive
sentencing guidelines. Among black offenders, all else equal and net of time trends, the probability
of being admitted for the commission of a new property worksheet offense falls by an average of
4.5 percentage points in the post-presumptive period.25 Column 2 illustrates that among white
drug worksheet offenders, all else equal, the probability of being admitted through a new court
commitment fell by an average of 4.4 percentage points after the sentencing guidelines became
presumptive. Yet, among black offenders, there is no statistically significant difference in the
probability of a court commitment admission in the pre- and post-presumptive periods.26,27
Overall, while there is no statistically significant difference in the average number of
property worksheet offenders admitted into prison following the shift to presumptive sentencing
guidelines, the probability of a black property worksheet offender being admitted through the
commission of a new offense (instead of through a parole or probation violation) decreases.
Among white drug worksheet offenders, all else equal, the average number of new court com-
mitments falls in the post-presumptive period, as does the probability of being admitted through
25A test of β(2)1 +β
(2)
3 = 0 yields a p-value of 0.0045.
26The coefficient on Postt ∗Blackit is positive but statistically insignificant, and a test of β(2)1 +β(2)3 = 0 yields a
p-value of 0.3.
27All results are robust to the inclusion of an age at admission quadratic and to the exclusion of offense fixed
effects and characteristics in Xit .
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a new court commitment. Among black drug worksheet offenders, all else equal, the shift to
presumptive guidelines does not appear to have a statistically significant effect on the average
number of court commitments or the probability of a court commitment admission.
2.5.2 Offense Composition
Prosecutors have discretion in how to charge a defendant ? file a new case or file a
parole or probation violation. They also have the authority to decide which primary offense an
individual is charged with, how many counts, and how many charges (of different offenses) to
bring against an individual. Therefore, to understand how the shift to presumptive sentencing
guidelines may have affected the composition of offenses for which a prison sentence is imposed
(possibly through changes in prosecutorial behavior), I estimate regressions on three offense
composition outcomes: (1) whether an individual is admitted for a property or drug worksheet
offense relative to all other offenses, (2) the severity of admitted worksheet offenses28, and (3)
whether a presumptive worksheet offender enters prison with a second or third offense.
First, to study how the probability an individual is admitted for a property or drug
worksheet offense, relative to all other offenses, changes after the guidelines became presumptive,
I estimate the linear probability model in Equation 2.2 (excluding offense fixed effects).29 I
estimate Equation 2.2 using two samples. In the first sample, the outcome variable takes on a
value of 1 if an offender is admitted for a property worksheet offense and 0 otherwise. In the
second sample, the outcome variable takes on a value of 1 if an offender is admitted for a drug
worksheet offense and 0 otherwise.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.6 present the coefficients from the estimation of this model.
Recall that in the prior section, there was no statistically significant difference in the average
number of property worksheet offenders admitted after the guidelines became presumptive
28Offense severity is measured using the score assigned to an offense in the Prison Sentence Length worksheet.
29From this point onward, the sample is restricted to new court commitments.
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(Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.4). But, there was a statistically significant decline in the average
number of white drug worksheet offenders admitted (Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.4). In Column 1
of Table 2.6, all else equal and net of time trends, there is no statistically significant difference
in the probability that an offender is admitted for a property worksheet offense in the post-
presumptive period. In Column 2, all else equal and net of time trends, the probability a white
offender is admitted for a drug worksheet offense, falls by 3.1 percentage points in the post-
presumptive period. The coefficient on Postt ∗Blackit is positive and statistically significant,
and a test of β(2)1 +β
(2)
3 = 0 is statistically insignificant. Therefore, among black offenders, all
else equal, there is no statistically significant change in the probability that following the policy
change.30
Next, I estimate whether average offense severity, conditional on incarceration, may have
been affected by the transition to presumptive guidelines (possibly through a reduction in the
use of prison). Holding constant prosecutors charging behavior, if individuals convicted of less
severe worksheet offenses are less likely to be incarcerated following the policy change, the
average severity of worksheet offenses among incarcerated offenders will increase. On the other
hand, it might be the case that prosecutors are changing their charging behavior for only the
most severe worksheet offenses, such that they start charging offenders with relatively more
non-worksheet offenses in an attempt to increase sentence length if an individual is convicted.31
Then, the average severity among incarcerated worksheet offenders will decline. The descriptive
statistics in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.2 show that among property worksheet offenders, there is
little change in average offense severity across the pre- and post-presumptive periods. Among
30All results are robust to the inclusion of an age at admission quadratic and to the exclusion of the characteristics
in Xit .
31The probability an individual is admitted for a presumptive worksheet offense may also be affected by the
transition to presumptive guidelines if prosecutors substitute worksheet offense charges for non-worksheet charges.
For example, an individual may be charged with possession of chemicals used in the manufacturing of drugs instead
of the applicable drug worksheet offense (Kirby 2013). There does not appear to be a statistically significant shift
from worksheet to non-worksheet offenses within a given offense. Yet, since property and drug worksheet offenses
make up at least 87 percent of all property and drug offenses, the sample size of property and drug non-worksheet
offenses is too small to detect any meaningful results.
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drug worksheet offenders, Columns 3 and 4 display a statistically significant increase in average
offense severity.
Again, I estimate Equation 2.2, this time using a continuous measure of offense severity
as the dependent variable. Offense severity is measured by the score each offense receives on the
Prison Sentence Length worksheets. I use the same covariates in Xit but omit offense fixed effects.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.6 list the coefficients from the regression on presumptive worksheet
offense severity. In Column 3, among property worksheet offenders, the coefficient on Postt is
negative but statistically insignificant. While the coefficient on Postt ∗Blackit is positive and
statistically significant, a test of β(2)1 +β
(2)
3 = 0 is statistically insignificant (the p-value is 0.12).
Therefore, there is no statistically significant difference in average offense severity following the
shift to presumptive sentencing guidelines. In Column 4, among white drug worksheet offenders,
all else equal and net of time trends, average severity falls by 7.15 points in post-presumptive
period. The coefficient on Postt ∗Blackit is statistically significant and positive. As a result,
among black offenders, there is no statistically significant effect on average offense severity after
the guidelines became presumptive.32
Lastly, because prosecutors also have the discretion to bring multiple charges, I estimate
how the adoption of the presumptive sentencing guidelines may affect whether an individual is
more likely to enter prison with a second or third offense.33 The more offenses an individual is
convicted of in the same sentencing event, the higher the worksheet score, possibly increasing
the minimum and maximum sentence mandated by the guidelines. The descriptive statistics in
Table 2.2 show that about 30 percent of property worksheet offenders are incarcerated with a
second offense and about 20 percent are incarcerated with a second and third offense. Among
drug worksheet offenders, about 24 percent are incarcerated with a second offense and about 8
32Edwards, Rushin, and Colquitt (2019) finds that the average severity of the indictment offense did not change in
the weeks following the implementation of the presumptive guidelines.
33Alschuler (1968) labels this behavior horizontal overcharging. See Miethe (1987) for a discussion of prosecutors
bringing multiple charges against a defendant in the context of Minnesota’s presumptive sentencing guidelines in
footnote 26.
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percent are incarcerated with a second and third offense.
I estimate the probability of a presumptive worksheet offender entering prison with a
second or third offense using Equation 2.2 (excluding the indicators, in Xit , for whether an
offender was convicted of a second or third offense). The dependent variable takes on a value
of 1 if an offender was convicted for a second or third offense. Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.6
present the coefficients from this regression. In Column 5, among white property worksheet
offenders, the probability of being admitted into prison with a second or third offense falls by 4.5
percentage points in the post-presumptive period, all else equal. The coefficient on Postt ∗Blackit
is not statistically significant but is positive. A test of β(2)1 +β
(2)
3 = 0 is statistically insignificant -
all else equal, black property worksheet offenders’ probability of entering prison with a second
or third offense is not statistically different across the pre- and post-presumptive periods. In
Column 8, among drug worksheet offenders, the shift to presumptive guidelines is not associated
with a statistically significant change in the probability of being admitted with a second or third
offense.34
I also run regressions on the number of counts for the first offense (results not provided),
since the worksheet score is increasing in the number of counts. Only for black drug worksheet
offenders does the average number of counts change (decrease) in the post-presumptive period.
Overall, the shift from voluntary to presumptive sentencing guidelines appears to be
associated with some changes in offense composition as measured by the probability an individual
is admitted for a presumptive worksheet offense, the average offense severity, and the probability
an individual enters prison with a second or third offense. Among white drug offenders, following
the policy change, there is a decline in the probability an individual is admitted for a drug
worksheet offense and a decline in the average severity of admitted offenses. And among white
property worksheet offenders, the probability of entering prison with a second or third offense
34All results are robust to the inclusion of an age at admission quadratic. When I exclude offense fixed effects
and the number of counts for the first offense, the coefficients on Postt and Postt ∗Blackit , in Column 8, remain
statistically insignificant but reverse sign.
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falls. Yet, without more information on changes in the use of prison or in prosecutors’ behavior, I
cannot determine the mechanism through which offense composition is affected.
2.5.3 Inmate Demographics
In the NCRP, Alabama only reports two demographic variables: age at admission and
race. Because the transition to presumptive sentencing guidelines is likely to have reduced the
probability of incarceration, particularly for first-time offenders, average age at admission may
increase (assuming age is positively associated with prior offending). Furthermore, if, for example,
first-time offenders admitted into prison in the pre-presumptive period are disproportionately
black, then the share of black offenders may fall as the probability of incarceration declines.
Similarly, the share of black offenders might decline if black offenders are disproportionately
incarcerated for less severe offenses in the pre-presumptive period (assuming these less severe
offenses are less likely to receive a prison sentence in the post-presumptive period).
2.5.3.1 Age at Admission
Figure 2.3 shows how the average and median age (at the time of admission) have
evolved over time. Quarter 0 denotes the quarter before the presumptive sentencing guidelines
were implemented. The solid black line corresponds to white offenders and the gray solid line
corresponds to black offenders. Figures 2.3a and 2.3b illustrate the evolution of the average and
median ages at admission among property worksheet offenders, respectively. They show that the
average white offender is usually younger than the average black offender. Additionally, they
illustrate that following the shift to presumptive guidelines, there appears to be an increase in the
average and median ages for both black and white offenders.
Figures 2.3c and 2.3d present a time-series of the average and median ages at admission
among drug worksheet offenders, respectively. They show that among drug worksheet offenders,
black offenders are younger on average and at the median. Furthermore, there appears to be
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an increase in the average age of black offenders. However, this increase seems to occur in the
quarter before the guidelines became presumptive. In Figure 2.3d, the changes to median age at
admission are more evident, but as with average age, the median age for black offenders increases
the quarter before the transition.
To estimate how the shift to presumptive guidelines may have affected the average age at
admission, I estimate Equation 2.2, where Yict is individual i′s age at admission (in county c, at
quarter t). I also run a median regression on age at admission, that is otherwise identical. The
coefficients of interest are β(2)1 and β
(2)
3 .
Table 2.7 presents the coefficients from regressions on age at admission using the sample of
property worksheet offenders. The first three columns list coefficients from the OLS regressions,
and the last three columns list coefficients from the median regressions. Columns 1 and 4
estimate regressions on age at admission using the sample of all property worksheet offenders. In
Column 1, the coefficient on Postt is statistically significant; on average, white property worksheet
offenders are, all else equal, about 0.887 years older in the post-presumptive period. While the
coefficient on Postt ∗Blackit is not statistically significant, a test of β(2)1 +β(2)3 = 0 suggests that,
on average, black property worksheet offenders are, all else equal, about 1.21 years older in the
post-presumptive period. Columns 2 and 3, which list coefficients estimated separately by race,
also support these conclusions. As with average age, Column 4 indicates that, following the
shift to presumptive guidelines, the median age at admission among white offenders increased
by about 1.378 years. Although the coefficient on Postt ∗Blackit is not statistically significant, a
test of β(2)1 +β
(2)
3 = 0 suggests that, at the median, black property worksheet offenders are, all
else equal, about 1.769 years older in the post-presumptive period. The coefficients on Postt in
Columns 5 and 6 are positive and statistically significant as well.
Table 2.8 presents the coefficients from regressions on age at admission using the sample
of drug worksheet offenders. The first three columns list coefficients from the OLS regressions,
and the last three columns list coefficients from the median regressions. Columns 1 and 4 estimate
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regressions on age at admission using the sample of all drug worksheet offenders. Column 1
shows that among drug worksheet offenders, the coefficients on Postt and Postt ∗Blackit are
statistically insignificant - all else equal, the average age at admission for drug offenders is not
statistically different across the pre- and post-presumptive periods.35 In Columns 2 and 3, the
coefficients on Postt , in regressions estimated separately by race, are also insignificant. In Column
4, the coefficients on Postt and Postt ∗Blackit are not statistically significant. However, a test of
β(2)1 +β
(2)
3 = 0 suggests that among black drug worksheet offenders, the transition to presumptive
guidelines is associated with a 0.63 increase in median age at admission. Similarly, the coefficient
on Postt in Column 5, which uses the sample of black drug worksheet offenders, is positive and
statistically significant. In Column 6, which uses the sample of white drug worksheet offenders,
the coefficient on Postt is statistically insignificant.36
2.5.3.2 Race
Since 60 percent of drug worksheet offenders aged 17 to 34 (at the time of admission)
are black, if the use of prison for young, first-time offenders fell, then the share of black drug
worksheet offenders may fall after the transition to presumptive guidelines. Similarly, average
severity among black drug worksheet offenders is less than that of white offenders. So if fewer,
less severe worksheet offenses result in a prison sentence, the share of drug worksheet offenders
that are black may decline in the post-presumptive period.
Figure 2.4 illustrates how the share of black offenders has changed over time. The black
solid line represents the share of black offenders among property worksheet offenders. The gray
solid line represents the share of black offenders among drug worksheet offenders. Quarter 0
represents the quarter before the sentencing guidelines became presumptive. In Figure 2.4, there
is no evident discrete change in the share of black offenders following the shift to presumptive
35A test of β(2)1 +β
(2)
3 = 0 is also statistically insignificant.
36The results among property worksheet offenders are robust to the exclusion of characteristics in Xit and offense
fixed affects. Among drug worksheet offenders, excluding these variables from the OLS regressions results in
statistically significant (and positive) coefficients on Postt .
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guidelines.
More formally, I estimate a linear probability model, estimating the probability that an
incarcerated offender is black:
Yict = β
(3)
1 Postt +X
′
itβ
(3)
2 +β
(3)
3 ∗ t+ γ(3)c + γ(3)m + γ(3)o + ε(3)ict (2.3)
Let Yict be an indicator for whether individual i, in county c at quarter t, is black. Regressions
are run separately among property and drug worksheet offenders. Postt is an indicator variable
denoting the post-presumptive period. Offender- and offense-level covariates, Xit , include the
number of counts for the first offense and indicators for whether the offender was convicted of a
second or third offense, controlling for the offense type of the additional convictions. County
fixed effects, γ(3)c , month fixed effects, γ
(3)
m , offense fixed effects, γ
(3)
o , and a linear time trend (at
the quarterly level) are included. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. The coefficient
of interest in Equation 2.3 is β(3)1 .
Table 2.9 presents the coefficients from the estimation of Equation 2.3, the probability an
incarcerated property or drug worksheet offender is black. In Columns 1 and 2, the coefficients on
post are statistically insignificant.37 Therefore, while there are statistically significant increases in
the average and median age at admission, particularly among black worksheet offenders, there
are no statistically significant changes in racial composition associated with the transition to
presumptive sentencing guidelines.
2.6 Total Sentence Length
Alabama’s sentencing guidelines are intended to reduce sentence lengths for a subset
of property and drug offenders. Yet, conditional on incarceration, the expected effect on total
37I also run Equation 2.3 separately for each age group: 17-34, 35-49, and 50+. Conditional on age group, there is
no statistically significant difference in the probability of an offender being black across the pre- and post-presumptive
periods.
112
sentence length from shifting to presumptive guidelines is ambiguous. The change in sentence
length could, instead, be driven by changes in the types of offenders receiving prison sentences.
For example, if the probability of incarceration changed, such that offenders that received shorter
sentences in the pre-presumptive period are more likely to receive an alternative sanction in the
post-presumptive period, then average sentence length would increase. Note that, at the time the
guidelines became presumptive, there were no other policy changes in Alabama that would affect
sentencing decisions.
As a starting point, I run a difference regression assessing how sentence length may
have changed following the transition to presumptive sentencing guidelines. Then, I estimate a
difference-in-differences model using personal worksheet offenses as a control group. In both
models, I also study whether the shift to presumptive sentencing guidelines had different impacts
on white and black offenders’ sentence lengths. Because the NCRP does not provide data on an
offender’s criminal history, any differences across race do not imply racial disparities in sentence
length. Instead, if race is correlated with legal factors, differences in sentence length outcomes
may be due to to prior offending (Engen and Gainey 2000).
Overall, I find that following the adoption of the presumptive sentencing guidelines,
there was a statistically significant (percent) decline in average total sentence length among
property worksheet offenders and among white drug worksheet offenders. While the difference
estimates also indicate a statistically significant decline among black drug worksheet offenders,
the difference-in-differences estimates suggest that, relative to black personal worksheet offenders,
there was no statistically significant difference in the percent change in sentence length.
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2.6.1 Difference
2.6.1.1 Methodology
First, I estimate an OLS regression on log total sentence length. The estimating equation
is:
Yict = β
(4)
1 Postt +β
(4)
2 Blackit +β
(4)
3 Postt ∗Blackit +β(4)4 ∗ t+β(4)5 Blackit ∗ t+β(4)6 Postt ∗ t
+X ′itβ
(4)
7 + γ
(4)
c + γ
(4)
m + γ
(4)
o + ε
(4)
ict
(2.4)
Let Yict represent the log total sentence length assigned to individual i, in county c, in quarter t.
Postt is an indicator variable denoting the post-presumptive period. Blackit is an indicator for
whether an offender is black. Offender- and offense-level covariates, Xit , include the number of
counts for the first offense and indicators for whether the offender was convicted of a second
or third offense, controlling for the offense type of the additional convictions.38 County fixed
effects, γ(4)c , month fixed effects, γ
(4)
m , offense fixed effects γ
(4)
o , and separate linear time trends (at
the quarterly level) for white and black offenders are included. Standard errors are clustered at
the county level. Regressions are run separately by worksheet offense type.
The coefficients of interest in Equation 2.4 are: (1) β(4)1 estimates the percent change in
sentence length associated with the shift to presumptive sentencing guidelines, (2) β(4)3 estimates
whether the transition to presumptive guidelines impacted the percent change in sentence length
differently across race, and (3) β(4)6 estimates whether the slope of the linear time trends differed
across the pre- and post-presumptive periods.
38Because average age at admission seems to increase in the post-presumptive period, I omit the age at admission
quadratic from Xit .
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2.6.1.2 Results
Figure 2.5 graphs the residuals, averaged within a quarter, from a regression on log total
sentence length, controlling for race and county, month, and offense fixed effects.39 Regressions
are run separately for property and drug worksheet offenders. The black circle markers represent
average residuals in the pre-presumptive period; the gray triangle markers represent average
residuals in the post-presumptive period. Linear fit lines, estimated separately for the pre- and
post-presumptive periods, are plotted. In Figure 2.5a, which graphs the averaged residuals from
a regression on property worksheet offenders, there is a discrete decline around the time of the
transition to the presumptive guidelines. The decline appears to start prior to October 2013
because, as discussed in Section 2.4, the ASC had led guideline trainings between May and
September 2013. As a result, judges may have begun to use the presumptive guidelines before
they had been officially implemented in October of 2013.
The graph, in Figure 2.5b, of the averaged residuals from a regression on drug worksheet
offenders illustrate that, in addition to a discrete drop around the time of the transition, average
sentence length may decline at a faster rate in the post-presumptive period. However, it is also
possible that the change in slope of the linear time trend is a continuation of a trend that changed
about 10 quarters prior to the implementation of the presumptive guidelines.40
More formally, Tables 2.10 and 2.11 present the coefficients from the OLS regressions
on log total sentence length among property and drug worksheet offenders, respectively. All
regressions include the covariates in Xit and offense fixed effects. Column 1 regresses log total
sentence length without county and month fixed effects and no interaction terms. Column 2
introduces county and month fixed effects. Column 3 adds in Postt ∗Blackit and Postt ∗t. Columns
4 and 5 include separate linear time trends for white and black offenders.
39Admissions occurring between May and October 2013 are included.
40Figure 2.1b shows that average total sentence length for black drug worksheet offenders may have started
declining about ten quarters prior to the transition to presumptive guidelines - the gap between average sentence
length for black and white offenders increases prior to the transition.
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In Table 2.10, among property worksheet offenders, the coefficient on Blackit is only
statistically significant in Columns 2 and 3, which do not include separate time trends for white
and black offenders. In Columns 4 and 5, when separate time trends by race are included, the time
trend for black offenders is statistically significant. Recall that the linear time trend is centered at
0 - the quarters in the pre-presumptive period are negative (or equal to 0 in the case of the quarter
right before the transition). Quarters in the post-presumptive period are positive. Therefore, all
else equal, Columns 2 through 5 indicate that in the pre-presumptive period, relative to white
offenders, black property worksheet offenders had longer average sentence lengths.
Furthermore, in all columns of Table 2.10, the coefficient on Postt is negative and sta-
tistically significant. In Column 3, the coefficient on Postt ∗Blackit is negative and statistically
significant, suggesting that, all else equal and net of the time trend, relative to white offenders
in the post-presumptive period, average sentence length for black property worksheet offenders
fell an additional 9.9 percent. Yet, once a separate time trend for black and white offenders is
included, the coefficient on Postt ∗Blackit becomes insignificant. Therefore, in Column 4, all else
equal and net of time trends, the average sentence length for black and white offenders falls by
approximately 17.2 percent (or 11.3 months41) in the post-presumptive period.
Table 2.11 suggests a similar story among drug worksheet offenders. The coefficient on
Blackit is statistically significant in Column 3, but becomes insignificant when separate time
trends for black and white offenders are included (Columns 4 and 5). Nonetheless, both Columns
3 and 5 suggest that, all else equal, in the pre-presumptive period, black offenders had longer
average sentence lengths relative to white offenders. In all but Column 3, the coefficient on Postt
is negative and statistically significant. In Columns 3 and 4, the coefficient on Postt ∗Blackit
is statistically insignificant, but a test of β(4)1 +β
(4)
3 = 0 indicates that, among black offenders,
all else equal, the shift to presumptive guidelines was associated with a 12.5 to 13.3 percent
41I estimate the effect in months by multiplying Postt and average sentence length (among both black and white
offenders) in the pre-presumptive period.
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decrease in average sentence length (or over 8 months).42 In Column 4, among white offenders,
average sentence length fell by 14.3 percent (about 9.5 months). The coefficients on Postt ∗ t, in
Columns 3 and 5, are also statistically insignificant. Column 5 suggests that following the shift to
presumptive guidelines, all else equal and net of time trends, average sentence length for drug
worksheet offenders fell by 8.7 percent (or 5.8 months).43
Overall, I find that following the adoption of the presumptive sentencing guidelines,
average sentence length for property and drug worksheet offenders falls, as the guidelines had
intended. All else equal, accounting for a difference in time trends across race, the transition does
not appear to affect black and white offenders differently.
2.6.2 Difference-in-Differences
2.6.2.1 Methodology
The transition from voluntary to presumptive sentencing guidelines in Alabama provides a
quasi-experimental setting where a difference-in-differences approach can be used. I use personal
worksheet offenses as the control group.44
I estimate the following difference-in-differences model:
Yict =β
(5)
1 Postt +β
(5)
2 Blackit +β
(5)
3 ∗ t
+β(5)4 Postt ∗Blackit +β(5)5 Postt ∗WSit +β(5)6 Blackit ∗WSit +β(5)7 Blackit ∗ t
+β(5)8 Postt ∗Blackit ∗WSit +X ′itβ(5)9 + γ(5)c + γ(5)m + γ(5)o + ε(5)ict
(2.5)
42The p-values on β(4)1 +β
(4)
3 = 0 (from Columns 3 and 5) are 0.003 and 0.02, respectively.
43When you include an age at admission quadratic in Equation 2.4, the coefficient on Postt ∗Blackit , in Column 3,
is negative and statistically significant. It becomes insignificant when separate time trends are included for white and
black offenders. Furthermore, among drug worksheet offenders, the coefficient on Postt ∗ t is statistically significant
when age at admission is included, but the sign on the coefficient is unchanged.
44The shift to presumptive guidelines may have affected burglary worksheet offenses, even though those work-
sheets remained voluntary. Relative to the pre-presumptive period, average total sentence length among burglary
worksheet offenders seems to increase in the post-presumptive period. Additionally, I do not use “other” offenses
and non-worksheet personal offenses because in some regression specifications, changes in black offenders’ sentence
length is associated with the transition to presumptive guidelines.
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Let Yict represent the log total sentence length assigned to individual i, in county c, in quarter t.
Postt is an indicator variable denoting the post-presumptive period. Blackit is an indicator for
whether an offender is black. WSit is an indicator for whether an individual is admitted for a
presumptive worksheet offense.45 Offender- and offense-level covariates, Xit , include the number
of counts for the first offense and indicators for whether the offender was convicted of a second
or third offense, controlling for the offense type of the additional convictions.46 County fixed
effects, γ(5)c , month fixed effects, γ
(5)
m , offense fixed effects γ
(5)
o , and separate linear time trends (at
the quarterly level) for white and black offenders are included. Standard errors are clustered at
the county level. Regressions are run separately by worksheet offense type.
In Equation (2.5), the coefficients of interest are: (1) β(5)5 , which estimates the average
change in log total sentence length between presumptive and voluntary (personal) worksheet
offenses before and after the transition to presumptive sentencing guidelines and (2) β(5)8 , which,
controlling for prison-wide trends, estimates whether the transition affected the percent change in
sentence length differently for black and white presumptive worksheet offenders.
2.6.2.2 Results
Table 2.12 displays the coefficients from the estimation of Equation 2.5. Coefficients in
Columns 1 to 3 are estimated using the sample of property and personal worksheet offenders, and
coefficients in Columns 4 to 6 are estimated using the sample of drug and personal worksheet
offenders. Columns 1 and 4 do not include separate time trends for black and white offenders.
Columns 2 and 5 exclude the coefficient on Postt ∗Blackit ∗WSit but include separate linear
time trends for white and black offenders. Columns 3 and 6 include both the coefficient on
Postt ∗Blackit ∗WSit and separate linear time trends for black and white offenders.
Among property worksheet offenders, Columns 1 through 3 of Table 2.12 show that the
45I do not include a term for WSit in Equation 2.5 because I include offense level fixed effects.
46As in Section 2.6.1.1, because average age at admission seems to increase in the post-presumptive period, I
omit the age at admission quadratic from Xit .
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coefficients on Postt ∗WSit are statistically significant. In Columns 1 and 3, the coefficients on
Postt ∗Blackit ∗WSit are not statistically significant. Therefore, estimates in Column 3 suggest
that following the transition to presumptive sentencing guidelines, sentence length fell by about
18 percent (or over 12 months) for white and black property worksheet offenders.47 Relative
to the percent change in sentence length among personal worksheet offenders, sentence length
among property worksheet offenders fell by 23 percent (or 15 months). Additionally, controlling
for prison-wide trends in sentence length, all else equal, the difference in the percent change in
total sentence length between white and black property worksheet offenders is not statistically
significant. Note that the magnitude of the OLS estimate on Postt (-0.156), in Column 4 of Table
2.10, is less than the magnitude of the difference-in-differences point estimate on Postt ∗WSit
(-0.233), in Column 3 of Table 2.12.
Similarly, among drug worksheet offenders, Columns 4 through 6 of Table 2.12 show that
the coefficients on Postt ∗WSit are statistically significant. The coefficients on Postt ∗Blackit ∗WSit
are positive but not statistically significant. Therefore, estimates in Column 6 suggest that
following the transition to presumptive sentencing guidelines, sentence length fell over 12.4
percent (or about 8 months) for white and black drug worksheet offenders.48 Relative to the
percent change in sentence length among white personal worksheet offenders, sentence length
among white drug worksheet offenders fell 11.8 percent. Yet, there is no statistically significant
difference in the percent change in sentence length between black personal and drug worksheet
offenders.49 Additionally, controlling for prison-wide trends in sentence length, all else equal, the
difference in the percent change in total sentence length between white and black drug worksheet
offenders is not statistically significant. Note that the magnitude of the OLS estimate on Postt
(-0.143), in Column 4 of Table 2.11, is greater than the magnitude of the difference-in-differences
point estimate on Postt ∗WSit (-0.118), in Column 6 of Table 2.12.
47Joint tests of significance on β(5)1 +β
(5)
5 = 0 and β
(5)
1 +β
(5)
4 +β
(5)
5 +β
(5)
8 = 0 statistically significant.
48Joint tests of significance on β(5)1 +β
(5)
5 = 0 and β
(5)
1 +β
(5)
4 +β
(5)
5 +β
(5)
8 = 0 are statistically significant.
49A joint test of significance on β(5)5 +β
(5)
8 = 0 is insignificant.
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Therefore, using personal worksheet offenders as a control group, the shift to presumptive
sentencing guidelines led to a statistically significant decline in the average total sentence length
among property worksheet offenders, all else equal. As in Section 2.6.1, there are no statistically
significant differences in the percent change in total sentence length across race (controlling
for prison-wide trends). In contrast, relative to white personal worksheet offenders, the percent
decline in sentence length among white drug worksheet offenders is relatively larger. But,
following the shift to presumptive sentencing guidelines, there is no statistically significant
difference in the percent change in sentence length between black personal and drug worksheet
offenders.
Relative to the results found in Edwards, Rushin, and Colquitt (2019), my difference-in-
differences estimates are smaller in magnitude (a decline between 30 and 41 percent relative
to a decline between 11 and 23 percent, respectively). Because Edwards, Rushin, and Colquitt
(2019) combine the disposition and sentence length decisions into one measure, this suggests
that in addition to a decline in sentence length following the shift from voluntary to presumptive
sentencing guidelines, there may have been a reduction in the number of offenders receiving a
prison sentence.
2.6.2.3 Robustness Checks
This section discusses the results from several robustness analyses. In general, personal
worksheet offenders appear to be a suitable control group. However, there are instances, prior to
2011, where the trends in log total sentence length between presumptive and personal worksheet
offenders may be systematically deviating from one another. While I would caution against inter-
preting the difference-in-differences estimates as causal, there is strong evidence that, conditional
on incarceration, the shift from voluntary to presumptive sentencing guidelines decreased average
total sentence length for property and drug worksheet offenders.
First, I investigate the parallel trends assumption. The identifying assumption for the
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difference-in-differences approach is that, in the absence of the shift to presumptive guidelines,
the change in log total sentence length among presumptive worksheet offenders before and after
the transition would have been the same as the change among personal worksheet offenders.
Otherwise, the estimated effects on sentence length may reflect differential time trends between
presumptive and personal worksheet offenders, and not changes resulting from the shift in
guidelines.
Figure 2.6 shows the evolution of average log total sentence length among presumptive
worksheet offenders and personal worksheet offenders. Figures are presented separately by race.
The gray solid line represents average log sentence length among personal worksheet offenders.
In Figures 2.6a and 2.6b, the black solid line represents the average log sentence length among
property worksheet offenders; in Figures 2.6c and 2.6d it represents average log sentence length
among drug worksheet offenders. In Figures 2.6a, 2.6b, and 2.6c, despite variation in log total
sentence length from quarter to quarter, the trends appear parallel. However, in Figure 2.6d,
average log sentence length among black drug worksheet offenders begins to decline around
April 2012, violating the parallel trends assumption.
More formally, I test whether the time trends in log total sentence length among personal
and presumptive worksheet offenders were statistically different from one another in the pre-
presumptive period. Restricting the sample to pre-presumptive admissions, and estimating
Equation 2.5 (excluding the Postt coefficients) separately among property and drug worksheet
offenders, I do not find a statistically significant difference in the worksheet-specific linear
time trends.50 I also estimate a regression with worksheet-specific quarter dummies (leads and
lags). While all coefficients on the worksheet-specific (pre-presumptive) quarter dummies are
statistically insignificant, their 95 percent confidence intervals are very large. The estimates
cannot rule out effects as large as 50 percent among presumptive worksheet offenders.
Next, I perform three placebo tests. In the first placebo test, I restrict my sample to
50This conclusion is robust to the inclusion of different sets of control variables and is not affected by whether I
use separate time trends for black and white offenders.
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personal worksheet offenders and randomly assign “treatment” status. Then, I simulate the p-
values on the coefficients of interest from Equation 2.5.51 Following the transition from voluntary
to presumptive sentencing guidelines, I find no statistically significant differences in the change
in sentence length across the “treatment” and control groups.52
In the second placebo test, I again estimate Equation 2.5, comparing the effects on log
total sentence length across “other” offenses and personal worksheet offenses. When I include
a single time trend, all coefficients of interest (equivalent to Columns 1 and 4 in Table 2.12)
are statistically insignificant. But a test of β(5)4 +β
(5)
8 is statistically significant - following the
transition to presumptive guidelines, relative to white “other” offenders, there is a statistically
significant change in log total sentence length among black “other” offenders. In the iterations
that contain a separate time trend by race (equivalent to Columns 3 and 5 in Table 2.12), all else
equal, there are no statistically significant differences in changes to log sentence length between
the alternative control group (“other” offenses) and the original control group (personal worksheet
offenses).53
Lastly, I estimate Equation 2.5, changing the date of the policy change. I exclude
admissions that occurred after May 2013 (the post-presumptive period) and run 20 regressions
using each quarter in the pre-presumptive period as the start of the placebo “post-presumptive”
period. When estimating the differences-in-differences model using the sample of drug and
personal worksheet offenders, no coefficients on Postt or on interactions with Postt are statistically
significant. When performing the joint tests of significance, I find that following the placebo
“post-presumptive” period, black drug worksheet offenders have statistically significant changes in
log total sentence length in three quarters of 2010. And, all else equal, the difference in the change
in log total sentence length between white and black drug worksheet offenders is statistically
significant in two quarters of 2010.
51I ran a simulation of 1000 repetitions and bootstrapped the standard errors on the p-values. The seed is 1234.
52Results are robust to different sets of controls.
53All results are generally robust to different sets of controls. If I only control for county, month, and offense
fixed effects, the coefficient on Postt ∗Blackit is statistically significant.
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When estimating the differences-in-differences model using the sample property and
personal worksheet offenders, the results are less encouraging. The coefficient on Postt ∗WSit and
Postt ∗Blackit ∗WSit are statistically significant when the placebo “post-presumptive” periods
are designated as either of the first two quarters of 2008. The test of joint significance on
β(5)4 +β
(5)
4 +β
(5)
5 +β
(5)
8 = 0 is statistically significant in six instances between October 2007 and
April 2009. Therefore, in these instances, black property worksheet offenders had a statistically
significant change in log total sentence length following the placebo “post-presumptive” period.
Moreover, the joint test of β(5)4 +β
(5)
4 = 0 is statistically significant in 10 instances (each quarter
between October 2007 and April 2009 and each quarter between October 2010 and April 2011).
Namely, following the placebo policy change, all else equal and controlling for prison-wide
trends, the difference in the change in log total sentence length between white and black property
worksheet offenders is statistically significant.
Given these robustness checks, personal worksheet offenders are, generally, a suitable
control group. However, because of the possible deviations in time trends prior to 2011, the
difference-in-differences estimates should be interpreted as suggestive, rather than causal.
2.7 Quantile Regression
Alabama’s sentencing guidelines are based on historical sentencing practices, with small
adjustments made so that non-violent offenders sentenced to prison receive slightly shorter
sentences than they would have received in the past. Furthermore, Edwards, Rushin, and Colquitt
(2019) shows that Alabama’s shift to presumptive sentencing guidelines forced the judges that
sentenced most harshly (pre-guidelines) to reduce their imposed sentence lengths the most.
Therefore, conditional on incarceration, rather than the shift to presumptive guidelines having a
constant effect across the distribution of sentence length decisions, the largest declines in sentence
length may occur in the right tail of the sentence length distribution.
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To illustrate how the distribution of sentence length has evolved over time, for each fiscal
year between 2007 and 2015, Figures 2.7 and 2.8 graph box plots of the total sentence length
imposed on offenders incarcerated for property and drug worksheet offenses, respectively.54,55
Within each worksheet offense category, I provide separate box plots for white and black offenders.
However, the box plots do not account for other offender and offense characteristics, so it is
possible that any differences in distributional patterns across race disappear once these factors are
controlled for. The length of each gray box represents the inter-quartile range, and the vertical
line in the gray box denotes median sentence length. The whiskers represent 1.5 times the
inter-quartile range, and the circle markers represent potential outliers.56
Figure 2.7 shows how the distribution of sentence length among individuals admitted
for property worksheet offenses has changed across the pre- and post-presumptive time periods.
Among white offenders, Figure 2.7a shows that between Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008, the
dispersion of sentence length shrank, particularly in the right tail of the distribution. The dispersion
also narrowed in Fiscal Year 2013, prior to the shift to presumptive sentencing guidelines. In the
following (post-presumptive) fiscal year, there appears to be a more dramatic shift in the 75th
percentile - sentence length fell from 84 months in Fiscal Year 2013 to 61 months in Fiscal Year
2015. At the 90th percentile, sentence length for white offenders fell from 180 months to 120
months.
Among black property worksheet offenders, Figure 2.7b illustrates a slightly different
pattern of change. The dispersion of total sentence length began to shrink in Fiscal Year 2010;
sentence length at the 75th percentile fell from 115 months to 84 months. And while the
distribution of sentence length is tighter and shifted more to the left in Fiscal Year 2015 relative
to Fiscal Year 2007, the distribution appears to be unaffected by the transition to presumptive
54Note, Fiscal Year 2007 does not include October through December 2006 (see Section 2.4).
55Alabama’s voluntary sentencing guidelines were implemented at the beginning of Fiscal Year 2007 (October
2006), and the guidelines became presumptive at the start of Fiscal Year 2014 (October 2013).
56For legibility purposes, I cap total sentence length at 400 months in the box plots. A total sentence length of at
least 400 months is not the maximum sentence length in the sample, but it is above the 99th percentile of sentence
length.
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guidelines.
Figure 2.8 shows how the distribution of sentence length among individuals admitted
for drug worksheet offenses has changed over time. Among white offenders, Figure 2.8a shows
that following Fiscal Year 2009, the right tail of the sentence length distribution widened. For
example, sentence length at the 75th percentile increased from 97 months to 120 months. Yet,
once the sentencing guidelines for drug worksheet offenses became presumptive, the dispersion
of sentence length shrank, such that sentence length at the 75th percentile fell from 120 months to
84 months.
Figure 2.8b illustrates that changes in the distribution of sentence length among black
drug worksheet offenders followed a similar pattern to that of white offenders. Sentence length is
relatively more dispersed in Fiscal Years 2010 to 2012. However, unlike the distribution among
white offenders, the sentence length distribution among black offenders narrowed in Fiscal Year
2013 (in the pre-presumptive period) and continued to shrink such that sentence length at the 75th
percentile fell from 100 months to 60 months between 2007 and 2015. And like black property
worksheet offenders, the entire distribution of sentence length shifted to the left.
Overall, Figures 2.7 and 2.8 illustrate that between 2007 and 2015, the most dramatic
changes in the distribution of sentence length decisions occurred in the right tail. However, it is
not always apparent that the shift to presumptive sentencing guidelines is the primary reason for
the changing distributions, particularly among black worksheet offenders.
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2.7.1 Methodology
To estimate the effects of race and the shift to presumptive sentencing guidelines across
the distribution of sentence length, I estimate the following equation:
Yict =βτ1Postt +β
τ
2Blackit +β
τ
3 ∗ t
+βτ4Post
τ
t ∗Blackτit +βτ5Blackit ∗ t
+X ′itβ
τ
6 + γ
τ
c+ γ
τ
m+ γ
τ
o+ ε
τ
ict
(2.6)
Let τ correspond to the 10th,25th,50th,75th, and 90th percentiles. Let Yict represent the log total
sentence length assigned to individual i, in county c, in quarter t. Postτt is an indicator variable
denoting the post-presumptive period. Blackτit is an indicator for whether an offender is black.
Offender- and offense-level covariates, Xτit , include the number of counts for the first offense and
indicators for whether the offender was convicted of a second or third offense, controlling for
the offense type of the additional convictions. County fixed effects, γτc, month fixed effects, γτm,
offense fixed effects γτo, and separate linear time trends (at the quarterly level) for white and black
offenders are included. Standard errors are bootstrapped.57
2.7.2 Results
Tables 2.13 and 2.14 list the coefficients from the quantile regression estimated using the
sample of property and drug worksheet offenders, respectively. The regression specification in
Tables 2.13 and 2.14 is identical to the regression specification in Column 4 of Tables 2.10 and
2.11 (the OLS regressions on log total sentence length).
Recall, that in the regressions estimating average log total sentence length among property
worksheet offenders (Table 2.10), black offenders received sentences that are statistically different
from white offenders. However, in Table 2.13, at each percentile, the coefficient on Blackτit is not
57Standard errors are estimated using 100 bootstrap repetitions. The seed is 1001.
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statistically significant. Only at the 75th percentile is the coefficient on the time trend for black
offenders statistically significant. Since the coefficient on the linear time trend for white offenders
is also statistically significant, all else equal, each quarter sentence length at the 75th percentile
falls an additional 0.53 percent (or less than 1 month) for white offenders and an additional 1.51
percent (or 1.45 months) for black offenders.58
Furthermore, the coefficient on Postτt is statistically significant at all but the 10
th percentile.
The coefficient on Postτt ∗Blackτit is not statistically significant. In Table 2.13, the largest percent-
age change in sentence length occurs at the 90th percentile; all else equal, sentence length falls by
over 23 percent (or about 42 months) following the shift to presumptive sentencing guidelines.
At the median, sentence length falls by 10.5 percent once the guidelines became presumptive.
Note, only the coefficients on Postτt at the 90
th and 50th percentiles are statistically different from
one another. In terms of magnitude, the OLS coefficient on Postt in Column 4 of Table 2.10 is
similar to the coefficients at 25th and 75th percentiles. But it is smaller relative to the coefficient
on Postτt at the 90
th percentile and larger relative to the coefficient at the median.
Table 2.14 presents results from the quantile regressions using the sample of drug work-
sheet offenders. Only at the 90th percentile is the coefficient on Blackτit statistically significant;
all else equal, black offenders at the 90th percentile in the pre-presumptive period have sentence
lengths that are 11 percent larger (or about 20 months) relative to those of white offenders. At
the 50th and 75th percentiles, the coefficient on the time trend for black offenders is statistically
significant. For example, among black offenders, all else equal, sentence length at the 75th
percentile falls by an additional 0.8 percent each quarter.
Additionally, in Table 2.14, the coefficient on Postτt is statistically significant at all but
the 10th percentile. Among white drug worksheet offenders, the largest percentage change in
sentence length occurs at the 75th percentile. All else equal, following the shift to presumptive
sentencing guidelines, sentence length for white offenders at the 75th percentile fell by over
58Sentence length for property worksheet offenders at the 75th percentile is 96 months.
127
16.8 percent (or about 16 months). Furthermore, the coefficient on Postτt ∗Blackτit is statistically
significant at the 90th percentile. Among black offenders, all else equal, sentence length fell the
most at the 90th percentile once the guidelines became presumptive - it fell over 25.6 percent (or
46 months). Among white offenders, total sentence length at the 90th percentile fell by about 11
percent. Because race may be correlated with legal factors that I cannot control for, the results are
not necessarily indicative of changes in sentence length due to extralegal factors.
Lastly, among drug worksheet offenders, the OLS and quantile regression coefficients on
Postτt are relatively similar; in Column 4 of Table 2.11, the OLS coefficient on Postt is -0.143. The
largest difference in the OLS and quantile regression coefficients occurs at the the 25th percentile.
Yet, the OLS regression does not capture how the change in guidelines differentially affects black
offenders’ sentence length, relative to that of white offenders.
In all, among property and drug worksheet offenders, the shift to presumptive sentencing
guidelines is associated with a decrease in sentence length at all percentiles except the 10th.
And as expected, some of the largest changes in total sentence length occur in the upper tail of
the sentence length distribution. Most notably, among drug worksheet offenders, the transition
yielded different effects across race at the 90th percentile. All else equal, the percent decline in
black offenders’ sentence length at the 90th percentile was larger relative to the decline in white
offenders’ sentence length.
2.8 Conclusion
In October 2006, Alabama instituted voluntary sentencing guidelines that were expected
to reduce overcrowding in prisons by sending fewer non-violent offenders to prison and reducing
sentence lengths for non-violent offenders sentenced to prison. In October 2013, the guidelines
became presumptive for property and drug worksheet offenses.
Since the guidelines aim to limit judicial discretion, which may change prosecutors’
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behavior; and they intend to reduce the use of incarceration among non-violent offenders, I
estimate how, conditional on incarceration, the shift to presumptive sentencing guidelines may
have affected offense and offender composition. I evaluate changes in: (1) admission type (new
court commitment or parole/probation violation), (2) offense composition (such as average offense
severity or the probability an offender enters prison with a second or third offense), and (3) inmate
composition, namely age at admission and race. I find that the changes in composition are not
consistent across offense type and race. Following the shift to presumptive sentencing guidelines,
there is no statistically significant difference in the average number of property offenders admitted
into prison, but all else equal, the average number of white drug offenders declines. Furthermore,
among white drug offenders, there is a statistically significant decline in the average severity of
admitted offenses. And while I find statistically significant increases in the average and median
age at admission following the transition to presumptive guidelines, there are no statistically
significant changes in racial composition.
Next, I estimate a difference-in-differences model with personal worksheet admissions as
the control group and find that after the guidelines became presumptive, average sentence length
for property offenders fell 23 percent. Accounting for a difference in time trends across race, the
transition does not have a statistically significant differential effect on the change in sentence
length across white and black offenders. Relative to white personal worksheet offenders, sentence
length among white drug worksheet offenders falls 11 percent. Among black offenders, there is
no statistically significant difference in the percent change in sentence length between personal
and drug worksheet offenders.
Lastly, I use quantile regressions to estimate how the effects of the transition varied across
the distribution of sentence length. I find that among property and drug worksheet offenders, the
shift to presumptive sentencing guidelines is associated with a decrease in sentence length at all
percentiles except the 10th. And as expected, total sentence length declines relatively more in the
upper tail of the sentence length distribution. Additionally, among drug offenders, all else equal,
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the percent decline in black offenders’ sentence length at the 90th percentile was larger relative to
white offenders’ change in sentence length.
Given the limitations in using prison admissions data to evaluate the effects of the
transition from voluntary to presumptive sentencing guidelines, future research could study
how the guidelines affected the probability of incarceration and prosecutorial discretion. With
more detailed information on previous criminal history, researchers could also evaluate the impact
of extralegal factors in sentencing decisions as judicial discretion became increasingly limited.
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Figure 2.4: Share of black Offenders by worksheet type
This figure graphs the share of black offenders by worksheet type. The black solid line
represents the share of property worksheet offenders that are black. The gray solid line
represents the share of drug worksheet offenders that are black. Quarter 0 corresponds to the
quarter before the property and drug offense worksheets became presumptive (July-September
2013).
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Figure 2.6: Graph of parallel trends
The top row of this figure compares a time-series of average log total sentence length among
personal worksheet offenders and property worksheet offenders. Graphs in the bottom row
compare a time-series of average log total sentence length among personal worksheet offenders
and drug worksheet offenders. Graphs are generated separately by race. The black solid line
represents average log total sentence length among property or drug worksheet offenders, and
the gray solid line represents average log total sentence length among personal worksheet
offenders. Quarter 0 corresponds to the quarter before the property and drug offense worksheets
became presumptive (July-September 2013).
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics - all offenders
Pre-Presumptive Post-Presumptive
(1) (2)
Property Offenses 0.20 0.22
(0.398) (0.416)
Drug Offenses 0.37 0.33
(0.482) (0.470)
Burglary Offenses 0.11 0.11
(0.308) (0.319)
Personal Offenses 0.21 0.20
(0.408) (0.401)
Other Offenses 0.12 0.13
(0.324) (0.338)
Property WS Offensesa 0.89 0.87
(0.318) (0.339)
Drug WS Offensesb 0.94 0.95
(0.243) (0.219)
Personal WS Offensesc 0.81 0.76
(0.393) (0.424)
N 51388 15280
The sample consists of white and black male offenders, aged
at least 17 at the time of admission. All admissions are new
court commitments. Descriptive statistics are calculated for two
periods: (1) the pre-period, January 2007 to April 2013, and (2)
the post-period, November 2013 to December 2015. Offenses
are categorized as other, property, drug, burglary, or violent. For
the first four rows, each offense category includes worksheet and
non-worksheet offenses. “Other” offenses are unaffected by the
voluntary and presumptive guidelines.
a The proportion of property worksheet offenses relative to all
property offenses (not relative to all offenses regardless of type).
b The proportion of drug worksheet offenses relative to all drug
offenses.
c The proportion of personal worksheet offenses relative to all
personal offenses.
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Table 2.3: Average total sentence length by worksheet and race
Pre-Presumptive Post-Presumptive
Property WS Offenses
White Offenders 66.53 50.10
(64.540) (50.859)
Black Offenders 64.71 44.84
(66.095) (48.606)
Drug WS Offenses
White Offenders 69.29 60.03
(70.077) (55.859)
Black Offenders 64.45 48.36
(72.839) (50.698)
Personal WS Offenses
White Offenders 170.03 168.12
(262.622) (277.944)
Black Offenders 163.90 144.92
(223.534) (173.283)
Within each worksheet offense, this table separately lists the average total sentence
length for white and black offenders. The sample consists of white and black male
offenders, aged at least 17 at the time of admission. All admissions are new court
commitments. Descriptive statistics are calculated for two periods: (1) the pre-period,
January 2007 to April 2013, and (2) the post-period, November 2013 to December
2015. All offenses covered by worksheets were voluntary as of October 2006. In
October 2013, property and drug worksheets became presumptive.
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Table 2.5: Coefficients from regressions on the
probability of admission type
Property WS Drug WS
(1) (2)
Post -0.010 -0.044**
(0.017) (0.019)
Linear Time Trend 0.001* 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Black -0.013 -0.036**
(0.013) (0.016)
Black*Post -0.035* 0.026
(0.018) (0.023)
Black*Time Trend 0.003*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Joint F-test 0.005 0.302
Offense FE X X
Month FE X X
County FE X X
N 14829 27067
∗p< 0.1; ∗∗p< 0.05; ∗∗∗p< 0.01
This table lists the coefficients from regressions
estimating the probability of admission through
a new court commitment relative to admission
through a parole/probation violation (see Equa-
tion 2.2). Regressions are run separately for prop-
erty and drug worksheet offenses. All regressions
control for the number of counts for the first of-
fense, whether the offender was convicted of a
second or third offense, and month, county, and
offense fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered
at the county level, are in parentheses. The row
labeled “Joint F-test” lists the p-value of an F-
test testing the combined significance of Postt and
Postt ∗Blackit .
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Table 2.9: Coefficients from regressions on an indicator for whether an
offender is black
Property WS Offenses Drug WS Offenses
(1) (2)
Post -0.0155 0.0081
(0.0142) (0.0116)
Linear Time Trend 0.0001 -0.0028***
(0.0007) (0.0004)
Offense FE X X
Month FE X X
County FE X X
N 11936 22417
∗p< 0.1; ∗∗p< 0.05; ∗∗∗p< 0.01
This table lists the coefficients from regressions estimating the prob-
ability an offender is black, conditional on incarceration. Column
1 uses the sample of property worksheet offenders, and Column 2
uses the sample of drug worksheet offenders. All regressions control
for the number of counts for the first offense, whether the offender
was convicted of a second or third offense, and month, county, and
offense fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered at the county level,
are in parentheses.
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Table 2.10: Coefficients from OLS regressions on log total sentence length - property
worksheet offenses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post -0.187*** -0.163*** -0.114* -0.170** -0.156***
(0.053) (0.059) (0.062) (0.075) (0.052)
Linear Time Trend -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.004 -0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Black -0.063 0.054*** 0.078*** -0.002 0.004
(0.047) (0.014) (0.019) (0.043) (0.024)
Post*Time Trend -0.002 -0.002
(0.008) (0.008)
Black*Post -0.099* 0.011
(0.051) (0.069)
Black*Time Trend -0.006* -0.005**
(0.003) (0.002)
Joint F-test 0.000 0.007
Offense FE X X X X X
Month FE X X X X
County FE X X X X
N 11929 11929 11929 11929 11929
∗p< 0.1; ∗∗p< 0.05; ∗∗∗p< 0.01
This table lists the coefficients from regressions on log total sentence length among
property worksheet offenders. All regressions control for the number of counts for
the first offense, indicators for whether the offender was convicted of a second or
third offense (controlling for the offense type of the additional convictions), and
offense fixed effects. Column 1 regresses log total sentence length without county
and month fixed effects and no interaction terms. Column 2 introduces county and
month fixed effects. Column 3 adds in Postt ∗Blackit and Postt ∗ t. Columns 4 and
5 include separate linear time trends for white and black offenders. Standard errors,
clustered at the county level, are in parentheses. The row labeled “Joint F-test” lists
the p-value of an F-test testing the combined significance of Postt and Postt ∗Blackit .
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Table 2.11: Coefficients from OLS regressions on log total sentence length - drug
worksheet offenses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post -0.145*** -0.132*** -0.045 -0.143** -0.087*
(0.049) (0.047) (0.062) (0.056) (0.045)
Linear Time Trend -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Black -0.103 0.036 0.053** -0.014 -0.009
(0.066) (0.024) (0.022) (0.050) (0.040)
Post*Time Trend -0.011 -0.011
(0.007) (0.007)
Black*Post -0.080 0.010
(0.050) (0.059)
Black*Time Trend -0.005 -0.004*
(0.003) (0.002)
Joint F-test 0.003 0.016
Offense FE X X X X X
Month FE X X X X
County FE X X X X
N 22398 22398 22398 22398 22398
∗p< 0.1; ∗∗p< 0.05; ∗∗∗p< 0.01
This table lists the coefficients from regressions on log total sentence length
among drug worksheet offenders. All regressions control for the number of
counts for the first offense, indicators for whether the offender was convicted
of a second or third offense (controlling for the offense type of the additional
convictions), and offense fixed effects. Column 1 regresses log total sentence
length without county and month fixed effects and no interaction terms. Column
2 introduces county and month fixed effects. Column 3 adds in Postt ∗Blackit
and Postt ∗ t. Columns 4 and 5 include separate linear time trends for white and
black offenders. Standard errors, clustered at the county level, are in parentheses.
The row labeled “Joint F-test” lists the p-value of an F-test testing the combined
significance of Postt and Postt ∗Blackit .
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Table 2.12: Coefficients from difference-in-differences regressions on log total sentence length
Property WS Drug WS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post 0.094 0.040 0.044 0.044 -0.013 -0.013
(0.063) (0.042) (0.069) (0.059) (0.047) (0.058)
WS*Post -0.237*** -0.233*** -0.233*** -0.122** -0.115** -0.118**
(0.057) (0.056) (0.058) (0.053) (0.054) (0.053)
Black 0.156*** 0.087*** 0.090** 0.166*** 0.098*** 0.096**
(0.036) (0.030) (0.038) (0.034) (0.030) (0.039)
WS*Black -0.089** -0.085** -0.085** -0.129*** -0.126*** -0.127***
(0.038) (0.033) (0.036) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Black*Post -0.095 -0.006 -0.094 -0.000
(0.062) (0.063) (0.064) (0.068)
WS*Black*Post 0.004 -0.001 0.009 0.006
(0.062) (0.061) (0.091) (0.091)
Linear Time Trend -0.006*** -0.003* -0.004 -0.003 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Black*Time Trend -0.005* -0.005 -0.005*** -0.005**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Joint F-test 0.001 0.001 0.151 0.150
Offense FE X X X X X X
Month FE X X X X X X
County FE X X X X X X
N 23071 23071 23071 33540 33540 33540
∗p< 0.1; ∗∗p< 0.05; ∗∗∗p< 0.01
This table lists the coefficients from difference-in-differences regressions on log total sen-
tence length among property and drug worksheet offenders. In Columns 1 to 3, coefficients
are estimated using the sample of property and personal worksheet offenders. In Columns 4
to 6, coefficients are estimated using the sample of drug and personal worksheet offenders.
All regressions control for the number of counts for the first offense, indicators for whether
the offender was convicted of a second or third offense (controlling for the offense type of the
additional convictions), and month, county, and offense fixed effects. Columns 2, 3, 5, and 6
include separate linear time trends for white and black offenders. Standard errors, clustered
at the county level, are in parentheses. The row labeled “Joint F-test” lists the p-value of an
F-test testing the combined significance of Postt ∗WSit and Postt ∗Blackit ∗WSit .
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Chapter 3
No Such Thing as a (Correctional) Free
Lunch? County-level Variation in
Responses to Realignment and Proposition
47
3.1 Introduction
In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Brown v Plata1, mandated that California reduce its
prison population from 190 to 137.5 percent of design capacity within two years (a reduction of
about 34,000 inmates). In response, California implemented a series of reforms. The first was
SB 678 (July 2009), which incentivized counties to send fewer offenders to prison for probation
failures. Because this only reduced the prison population to 179.5 percent of capacity, in October
2011, California implemented AB 109, referred to as public safety realignment. This reform
shifted the supervision responsibility for low-level offenders from the state prison system to county
1563 U.S. 493 (2011)
153
jails. Individuals convicted of “non-serious, non-violent, and non-sex-related” felony offenses
were no longer sentenced to prison; rather, they served a short time in county jail or received
non-custodial mandatory supervision (similar to probation). Within a year, the reform reduced
the prison population by approximately 27,400 offenders; but the decline in the prison population
still fell short of the court mandate. Therefore, in November 2014, California implemented
Proposition 47, which re-classified low-level felonies as misdemeanors (which carry a maximum
sentence of one year in county jail). The law also applied retroactively, such that individuals
already serving prison or jail sentences for the affected offenses, at the time of passage, could
petition to be released or have their sentences shortened.
Figure 3.1 illustrates a time-series of the prison, jail, and probation populations. Each
vertical line represents the month in which a given reform was enacted. The black dashed line
represents California’s state prison population. The reforms were meant to reduce the prison
population, and with each successive reform prison population is declining. The solid line
represents the jail population. It decreases after SB 6782, increases after Realignment, and
declines after Proposition 47. The implementation of AB 109, or Realignment, was expected
to increase the county jail population because individuals convicted of low-level offenses could
no longer be sent to state prison; they had to be sanctioned locally. On the other hand, the
jail population was expected to decline after Proposition 47 was adopted because re-classifying
offenses as misdemeanors would reduce sentence lengths for low-level offenders. Lastly, the
gray dashed line represents the number of individuals on probation. The number of people on
probation fell after SB 678, levelled off following Realignment and fell following Proposition
47.3
2The jail population may be declining following SB 678 because parole and probation violators can also be
sentenced to county jail. Therefore, if counties are reducing the rate at which they revoke probation or parole, then
fewer offenders would be sent to county jail.
3Trends in probation populations are closely tied with trends in arrests. Prior to the passage of AB 109, total
arrests had been declining. It is possible that probation populations did not continue to fall after Realignment because
counties with little jail space available were required to increasingly use alternative sanctions. And arrests began to
decline again after Proposition 47 was implemented.
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Most papers study each of the reforms individually and address whether the reforms
affected crime rates and recidivism. And while there are papers studying how AB 109 and
Proposition 47 affect the offense- and offender-level composition of county jails, there is little
information about the type of counties that were affected (in terms of county demographics and
county budgets). Because jail capacity, preferences for traditional incarceration, and the costs of
local supervision likely differ across counties, I study the variation in how counties were impacted
by AB 109 and Proposition 47. I also examine whether Proposition 47 mitigated the effects of
AB 109 in counties with the largest percent increase in the jail incarceration rate.
Figure 3.2 presents a scatter plot comparing the percent change in the prison and jail
incarceration rates following Realignment.4 There is a negative relationship between the two - the
larger the percent decline in the prison incarceration rate, the larger the percent increase in the jail
incarceration rate. In contrast to previous literature, I find no statistically significant relationship
between the percent change in the prison and jail incarceration rates following AB 109. I also find
that the fiscal impact (per resident) of AB 109 may have been largest for lower-income counties.
Figure 3.3 compares the percent change in each county’s jail incarceration rate following
AB 109 and the percent change in their jail incarceration rate following Proposition 47. There
is a weak negative correlation suggesting that counties with larger percent increases in the jail
incarceration rate following AB 109 also had larger percent declines in the jail incarceration rate
following Proposition 47. Using a regression on the percent change in the jail incarceration rate
following Proposition 47, I find that, consistent with Figure 3.3, changes in the jail incarceration
rate following AB 109 are negatively associated with percent changes in the jail incarceration
rate following Proposition 47, but the magnitude of the association differs across median income.
4I define the incarceration rate as the number of inmates per thousand county residents.
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3.2 California’s Policy Reforms
3.2.1 History of AB 109
In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court ordered California to reduce its state prison population
from 190 to 137.5 percent of design capacity. The decision was prompted by two court cases,
Coleman v. Brown5 and Brown v. Plata6, which centered on inadequate medical and mental
health care as a result of prison overcrowding. In order to comply with the order without having
to release inmates or transfer inmates to county jails, the state legislature passed AB 109 (the
Public Safety Realignment Act). Effective October 1, 2011, AB 109 shifted the supervision
responsibility for most low-level offenders from the state to the county-level. It reallocated over
30,000 offenders, who would have otherwise been sentenced to state prison, to county jail or
community supervision.7
AB 109, or Realignment, shifted the responsibility for three criminal justice populations
from the state to the county-level: (1) newly convicted low-level offenders, (2) technical violators
of probation or parole, and (3) inmates in state prison that would have been released to state
parole. These populations consist of individuals with current and/or previous convictions of
nonserious, nonviolent, and nonsexual offenses (the “non-non-non’s”); they cannot have any
prior convictions for serious, violent, or sexual offenses. Among newly convicted offenders,
individuals whose most serious offense at conviction was one of more than 500 felonies could no
longer be sentenced to state prison. Instead, they had to be sentenced to county jail or probation.8
Furthermore, once an offender?s jail sentence was served, they were released without restrictions
5No. 2:90-cv-0520 LKK JFM (PC) (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2011)
6563 U.S. 493 (2011)
7AB 109 was also designed to improve re-entry and recidivism outcomes since offenders would be closer to their
families and community-based services. It was believed that local, rather than state, authorities know how to better
address the needs of offenders and that inter-agency coordination between local sheriffs, probation departments, and
social services agencies would ease the re-entry process (Petersilia 2014; Lofstrom and Raphael 2013a).
8AB 109 did not affect sentence length; offenders sentenced to county jail can receive the same sentence length
they would have received had they been sentenced to state prison.
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or supervision.9
Additionally, AB 109 mandated that most “non-non-non” offenders that violated the terms
of their probation or parole could no longer be sentenced to state prison. Rather, as with newly
convicted offenders, they must be sentenced to county jail or receive post-release community
supervision (PRCS), which is similar to probation. AB 109 also reduced the maximum penalty
received for violations: prior to AB 109, the maximum prison sentence received by technical
violators was one year; whereas, following AB 109, the maximum penalty was 6 months in
county jail.
Another provision of AB 109 shifted state parole responsibility for non-violent offenders
to county probation departments. Prior to AB 109, most (low-level) offenders who completed
their prison sentences were paroled to their home counties and supervised by state parole agents.
Following AB 109, these offenders were now supervised by county probation departments.
Furthermore, the length of supervision declined. Before Realignment, parole supervision lasted
for up to 3 years (offenders could be discharged after 13 months if they had no new violations).
After AB 109 was adopted, individuals on PRCS were eligible for discharge at 6 months (Petersilia
and Snyder 2013).
AB 109 also provided counties with new alternatives to traditional incarceration and
probation. Felony offenders could receive a split sentence, which is a combination of a term in
county jail and mandatory supervision.10 And certain offenders under probation could receive
“flash incarceration,? in which an offender that violates community supervision is sentenced for
up to 10 days in county jail without undergoing the process for traditional revocation (Petersilia
and Snyder 2013).
Lastly, because the fiscal responsibility for a large number of offenders was suddenly
shifted to counties, California dedicated $2.3 billion to be allocated to counties over the first
three years of realignment. Initially, fund allocations were calculated using a formula that
9This is true only for offenders who did not receive a split sentence.
10Mandatory supervision follows the same terms, conditions, and procedures of traditional probation.
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took into account the number of offenders estimated to be realigned to the counties (60%),
a county?s adult population (30%), and how much a county reduced its prison incarceration
rate, under SB 678, prior to AB 109 (10%) (Bird and Hayes 2013). However, counties with
low pre-AB 109 prison incarceration rates were at a disadvantage ? because they would have
smaller realignment population projections, they would receive less assistance. Since the first-
year allocation formula only captured the shift in the fiscal responsibility from the state to
counties at the time of realignment, rather than the total burden counties would incur managing a
larger offender population over time, the allocation formula in the second year of realignment
changed. Second- and third-year allocations were calculated by taking the maximum of four
options: doubling the first year?s allocation, using the first-year allocation formula with updated
population counts, using only the size of the projected realignment population, or using only the
size of a county’s adult population.
3.2.2 History of Proposition 47
However, AB 109 did not sufficiently reduce the prison population below the court-
mandated target (Bird et al. 2018). Therefore, effective November 14, 2014, Proposition 47 (Prop
47) re-classified a set of low-level drug and property offenses from felonies to misdemeanors and
sentenced misdemeanants up to one year in jail.11,12 These new misdemeanor provisions did not
apply to offenders who had one or more convictions for violent felonies.
Additionally, offenders that were incarcerated for the re-classified offenses before Novem-
ber 2014 could petition the original trial court for resentencing. If the petitioner was determined
eligible and did not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, the court would recall
the sentence and impose a new one under the new misdemeanor provisions. The resentenced
11Some of these offenses were considered wobblers, offenses that could be charged either as felonies or as
misdemeanors (at prosecutors’ discretion) .
12Proposition 47 re-classified the following felonies to misdemeanors: drug possession, shoplifting, receiving
stolen property, forgery of checks, bonds or bills, writing checks with insufficient funds, and petty theft.
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prison term imposed could not be longer than the original one, and resentenced petitioners
were given credit for time served.13 For individuals who already completed their sentences for
Prop 47 offenses, Proposition 47 gave them the opportunity to reduce the felony conviction to a
misdemeanor.
The California Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO), in Taylor (2015), estimated that each
year 40,000 offenders are convicted of Prop 47 offenses. Between the adoption of AB 109 and
the adoption of Prop 47, approximately 90 percent of offenders that received felony convictions
for Prop 47 offenses were sentenced to county jail and/or community supervision. The remaining
10 percent received prison sentences. Therefore, the effect on counties’ criminal justice workload
was twofold. On the one hand, the 10 percent of offenders that once received prison sentences
became the county’s responsibility. On the other hand, Prop 47 was expected to free up bed space
in county jails since offenders convicted of Prop 47 offenses serve shorter sentences in county jail
(a maximum of one year relative to a sentence between 16 months and 3 years). Furthermore,
individuals on trial for Prop 47 offenses were less likely to be held in jail as they awaited the
conclusion of their trial (since the offenses were now misdemeanors). But while Prop 47 had the
ability to reduce overcrowding (and mitigate the impacts of Realignment), if capacity-constrained
jails used the additional bed space to reduce early releases, the effects of Prop 47 on the size of
the jail population would have been smaller.
3.3 Literature Review
There has been considerable research, at the state-level, on California’s criminal justice
reforms - particularly AB 109. There are also some studies that examine county-level variation
in responses to AB 109. They primarily examine how the jail population has changed, both
in terms of offender and offense characteristics. I have not come across a paper that assesses
13Resentencing did not apply to individuals with one or more convictions of certain crimes, including but not
limited to serious or violent felonies and/or sex offenses.
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the county-specific fiscal impact of AB 109 or Proposition 47. Nor have I found research on
how Proposition 47 mitigates the effects of AB 109 (at the county-level). Typically, research
has focused on whether the reforms affected crime rates and recidivism, sometimes exploiting
county-level variation in pre-reform prison incarceration rates.14
3.3.1 AB 109
AB 109, or Realignment, led to an immediate decline in prison admissions. Prison
releases were slower to fall, but within a year admissions and releases had balanced out and, as in
Figure 3.1, the prison population stabilized (Lofstrom and Raphael 2016). Studying county-level
variation in jail capacity constraints and counties’ response to AB 109, Lofstrom and Raphael
(2013a), show that decreases in prison incarceration rates led to increases in jail incarceration
rates, but not at a one-to-one rate. They find that, on average, a county?s jail population increased
by one inmate for every three individuals no longer sentenced to state prison.
Lofstrom and Raphael (2013a) also provide evidence of jail crowd-out effects due to Re-
alignment. They find that individuals convicted of felonies and parole violations were displacing
pre-trial (or unsentenced) inmates and individuals serving time for misdemeanor offenses. There
is also evidence of increases in capacity-constrained (or early) releases, particularly in counties
with court-ordered population caps.15 In counties with population caps, because of capacity
constraints, for every four realigned offenders, one sentenced inmate per month was released
early. In counties without a court-ordered population cap, one sentenced inmate for every 16
14Lofstrom and Raphael (2013b), Lofstrom and Raphael (2016), and Sundt, Salisbury, and Harmon (2016) find
no evidence that the passage of AB 109 affected violent crime rates. There appears to be small increases in property
crime rates, primarily among auto thefts. Bird and Grattet (2017) find that, following AB 109, statewide recidivism
rates slightly increased. Following the passage of Proposition 47, Bartos and Kubrin (2018) find no impact on violent
crimes, but it may have led to increases in larceny and auto thefts. Bird et al. (2018) find that recidivism fell after
Proposition 47.
15There are 18 counties with a court-ordered cap on jail populations and 20 counties with self-imposed caps.
Population caps are imposed at the jail level, not the county level. As of March 2014, of the 119 county jail facilities,
39 were under a court-ordered population cap. Population caps have been in place for decades and are rarely
terminated (Lawrence 2014).
160
realigned offenders was released early (Lofstrom and Raphael 2013a).16
Verma (2016) also studies county-level variation in responses to AB 109. But rather than
using a continuous measure of the change in the jail incarceration rate, Verma uses a binary
measure of decarceration (a decrease in both the jail and prison incarceration rates). She divides
counties into groups based on their pre-AB 109 trajectories of prison incarceration rates and finds
that counties with a consistently low incarceration rate were more likely to decarcerate. Verma
also finds that decarceration is the most likely response among counties with the highest prison
incarceration rates. Moreover, in contrast to Lofstrom and Raphael (2013a) her results suggest
that jail occupancy was not a significant factor in shaping pre-AB 109 prison incarceration rate
trajectories, and it did not appear to predict decarceration.
In addition to studies of state- and county-level variation in offender and offense char-
acteristics, Lin and Petersilia (2014) trace how counties used the funds they received as part
of Realignment. They find that counties that allocated more of the funds to law enforcement
were responding to local criminal justice needs, such as higher law enforcement expenditures, a
higher incarceration rate for drug felonies, and higher serious crime rates. Counties that allocated
relatively more funds to treatment programs and social services had higher rates of black unem-
ployment and lower probation expenditures. The authors did not find that median income, county
revenues per resident, operational expenditures for jails, or jail overcrowding had a statistically
significant association with a county’s decision on how to allocate AB 109 funds on enforcement
and treatment programs.
Within the literature on AB 109, like Lofstrom and Raphael (2013a), my results suggest
that jail capacity constraints play an important role in how counties respond to an increasing
offender responsibility. And, in addition to increased use of early release, I provide evidence
that capacity-constrained counties may also be using relatively more probation to manage their
offender caseload. However, I do not find the change in prison incarceration rates to predict
16Capacity-constrained releases are not a result of Realignment, but their use increased after AB 109 was
implemented (Turner, Fain, and Hunt 2015).
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changes in the jail incarceration rate. I, instead, find that the pre-AB 109 share of offenders sent
to prison, relative to jail, has a statistically significant association with the percent change in jail
incarceration rate.17 Additionally, this paper further contributes to the literature by providing
an estimate of the fiscal impact of AB 109 on each county, and it assesses whether low-income
counties were disproportionately affected by AB 109.
3.3.2 Proposition 47
Fewer papers study the county-level variation in responses to Prop 47, which re-classified
a subset of drug and property offenses from felonies to misdemeanors. Like the research on AB
109, the literature on Prop 47 describes the effects of re-classification on offense and offender
composition in county jails and describes the role that jail capacity constraints may play in the
change in the jail population.
Nguyen et al. (2016) show that following the implementation of Prop 47, the average
daily jail population fell by about 8,000 inmates, which brought the entire California jail system
below its rated capacity for the first time since the passage of AB 109. They also find that the
number of individuals serving sentences for Prop 47 offenses in county jail declined by 50 percent,
which contributed to a 9 percent decline in the total jail population in the year following Prop 47.
Furthermore, as suggested by Taylor (2015), there is evidence that capacity-constrained jails used
some of the newly freed jail space to house offenders they would have otherwise had to release
early (Nguyen et al. 2016; Grattet et al. 2017).
In addition to studies analyzing the changes in jail composition, some papers have
projected the fiscal savings counties would accrue following the passage of Prop 47. Males
and Buchen (2014) predict the savings for three large California counties by estimating the
contribution of each county to the total number of people affected by Prop 47. They estimate
17Note, the dependent variable in Lofstrom and Raphael (2013a) is a change in (levels of) prison incarceration
rates. I use the percent change in prison incarceration rates as the dependent variable.
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annual statewide cost savings (as a result of freed jail space) to range between $400 to $700
million. Romano (2015) uses the average annual marginal cost of a jail inmate (estimated by
the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation) and the estimated annual decline
in the number of jail inmates to calculate that county jails could have expected total savings
of $203 million. Unlike these papers, I use the measured changes in county jail populations to
estimate the county-by-county fiscal impacts of Proposition 47. I also contribute to the literature
on Proposition 47 by exploring how it might mitigate the effect of increasing jail incarceration
rates (and, therefore, increasing fiscal responsibility) in counties most affected by Realignment.
3.4 Data
There are 58 counties in California. I omit Alpine, Sierra, and San Francisco counties
from all analyses.18 To study changes to California’s criminal justice system, I combine data
from a variety of sources. The total adult population in prison as of December 31 is provided
by the California Sentencing Institute, a project of the Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice
(CJCJ).19 Monthly data on the average daily (jail) population and the number of inmates released
from jail is provided by the Board of State and Community Corrections’ (BSCC) Jail Profile
Survey. Monthly data on adult probation populations is provided by Open Justice, which collects
data maintained by California’s Department of Justice (DOJ).
Recall that AB 109 became effective in October 2011. Because state prison populations
are only available for December, I keep comparisons consistent across prison, jail, and probation
populations by using the December average daily population and the total probation caseload at
18Alpine does not maintain its own county jail system (Lofstrom and Raphael 2016), and the State Controller’s
Office (SCO) does not provide information for San Francisco that is comparable to the data reported for all other
counties (California Budget & Policy Center 2017). I do not have complete criminal justice data for Sierra County.
19County prison population data refers to the county where an individual was sentenced. This is the same county
where the crime was committed, and is usually the county an offender lives in. Upon release from state prison,
inmates are returned to their county of commitment. Changes in prison incarceration rates at the county level are
generally representative of changes in the extent to which counties are incarcerating their local residents in the state
system. 90 percent of individuals released from prison return to the county where they were sentenced (Beck 2006).
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the end of December. To estimate percent changes in the jail incarceration rate coinciding with
Realignment, I use the difference in average daily jail populations (per county resident) as of
December 2010 and December 2012.20 Similarly, I estimate the percent change in the state prison
population (per county resident) between December 2010 and December 2012. The percent
change in the probation population is calculated in the same manner. To estimate the percent
change in releases following AB 109, I compare the total number of releases (per county resident)
in October 2010 through September 2011 to the total number of releases (per county resident) in
October 2011 through September 2012.21
Prop 47 became effective in November 2014. To estimate percent changes in the jail
population (per county resident) following its implementation, I use the difference in average
daily populations (per county resident) as of December 2013 and December 2015. I estimate the
percent change in the state prison population (per county resident) between December 2013 and
December 2015. To estimate the percent change in releases following Prop 47, I compare the
total number of releases (per county resident) in November 2013 through October 2014 to the
total number of releases (per county resident) in November 2014 through October 2015.
Because some county jails faced capacity constraints prior to AB 109, they may not have
been able to absorb offenders (that would have previously been sentenced to prison) without
increasing jail capacity or releasing inmates early. Therefore, I include a measure of the jail
population-to-capacity ratio. Using rated design capacities provided by the BSCC22, I estimate
county-level, pre-AB 109 jail population-to-capacity ratios by taking the ratio of the December
2010 average daily jail population and the rated capacity as of July 2010. I calculate the post-AB
109 (pre-Prop 47) jail population-to-capacity ratio by taking the ratio of the December 2013
average daily population and the July 2013 rated capacity.
To describe the counties affected by the passage of AB 109 and Prop 47, all county-level
20I choose December 2012, rather than December 2011, since it took about a year for AB 109 to achieve full
effect in terms of prison and jail population changes.
21I define releases as the sum of pre-trial releases and capacity-constrained releases.
22Source: Rated Capacities of Type II, III, and IV Local Adult Detention Facilities
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characteristics are pre-AB 109.23 This includes median income, the share of the county population
that is black or Hispanic, arrests per thousand residents, the percent of the county population
represented by the urban population, the number of probationers per thousand residents, and the
number of jail and prison inmates per thousand residents.24 I also include a county-level index
for racial heterogeneity using a measure similar to the Theil index. Heterogeneity is defined as
the absolute value of ∑i pilog(pi), where pi is racial group i’s share of the population.25 Values
closer to one in absolute value indicate greater racial heterogeneity.
I also create pre-AB 109 measures of prison and probation use. I estimate the share of
offenders counties housed in state prison, relative to the sum of prison and jail inmates. This
measures the extent to which a county used state prison, rather than jail, as a way to incarcerate
offenders. Additionally, I estimate the share of offenders receiving probation, relative to the sum
of prison inmates, jail inmates, and probationers. This measures a county’s use of alternative
sanctions.
Furthermore, I estimate the impact AB 109 and Prop 47 may have had on county budgets.
For example, the estimate of the fiscal impact of AB 109 is meant to provide a rough approximation
of the amount jail expenditures would have had to increase to accommodate the rise in offender
caseload. County budgets are reported by the State Controller’s Office (SCO). To measure total
county-level spending per resident, I use “total expenditures during the fiscal year” from Fiscal
Year 2011 (July 2010 to June 2011).26 I use county spending on adult detention centers as a
measure of jail expenditures.27
23For annual-level characteristics, I use 2010 data. For values that are reported monthly, I use observations from
December 2010.
24Sources: Median income, in 2010 dollars, is from the Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE).
County population estimates are from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual Estimates of the Resident Population by Sex,
Race Alone or in Combination, and Hispanic Origin: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2018. Arrest data is provided by Open
Justice using data from the Monthly Arrest and Citation Register (MACR). The percent of the the total population of
the county represented by the urban population is listed in the 2010 Census Urban Area List Files, 2010 Percent
Urban and Rural by County.
25All classifications of race (listed in the intercensal estimates) are used to calculate the heterogeneity index.
26See California Budget & Policy Center (2017).
27See California Budget & Policy Center (2017). I only use the county’s operational budget due to missing data
on capital outlays.
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To estimate the fiscal impact of the reforms on each county, I first calculate the average
pre-AB 109 cost per jail inmate (or jail expenditures divided by the average daily jail population
in 2010). Then, I estimate the fiscal impact of AB 109 by multiplying the average cost per jail
inmate and the change in the number of jail inmates (between December 2010 and December
2012). Similarly, to calculate the fiscal impact of Prop 47, I multiply the average pre-AB 109
cost per jail inmate and the change in the number of jail inmates between December 2013 and
December 2015.
Lastly, in addition to estimates of fiscal impact, I use data on the first-year allocation
of AB 109 funds provided to each county. County-level data on AB 109 first-year allocations
is listed in Bird and Hayes (2013). To assess the extent to which the AB 109 funds mitigated
the fiscal impact of sudden jail population increases, I use the sum of the funds designated for
managing the “realigned” offender population and for start-up costs associated with increasing
jail capacity.
3.5 County Descriptive Statistics
Before discussing county-level variation in the effects of AB 109 and Prop 47, I group
counties by median income and describe county-level demographics, county budgets, and counties’
criminal justice systems. Table 3.1 stratifies counties into three equally-sized groups according to
the distribution of median income. The table is divided into three panels: (1) county demographics,
(2) county-level fiscal measures, and (3) county-level criminal justice indicators.
Panel A illustrates that, in California, counties in the bottom third of the distribution of
median income are more rural and less racially diverse than counties in the middle and top thirds
of the distribution. Panel B lists the counties’ pre-AB 109 total expenditures and jail expenditures
(averaged within terciles of median income). Moving from the bottom to the top third of median
income, total county expenditures per resident declines. One possible explanation is that in
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counties with higher median incomes a larger share of the population is concentrated in urban
areas. And in areas that are more densely populated, the city, rather than the county, covers the
cost of municipal services.
Next, Panels B and C show that jail expenditures among the top third of counties, where
median income is high, make up a larger share of total expenditures. However, on average, these
counties have the lowest number of jail inmates per thousand residents. In addition, counties in
the top third of the median income distribution have the largest jail expenditures per jail inmate
(the average cost of a jail inmate), but the lowest jail expenditures per resident. This can not be the
result of unused jail space (which would contribute to relatively higher overhead costs per inmate),
because, on average, counties in the top third of median income have a higher pre-AB 109 jail
population-to-capacity ratio. Instead, a possible explanation is that property values and labor
costs are higher in counties with a higher median income, and these relatively more expensive
jails in high median income counties are occupied by fewer inmates.
Lastly, to illustrate how median income is distributed across counties categorized by their
incarceration rates, Figure 3.4 presents a scatter plot of counties’ pre-AB 109 prison and jail
incarceration rates. The vertical and horizontal lines represent the median prison incarceration rate
and the median jail incarceration rate, respectively. The black circle-markers represent counties
that fall below the median of median income, and the gray circle-markers represent counties
that lie above the median. This graph illustrates, like Panels A and C of Table 3.1, that counties
with larger median incomes use prison and jail less (possibly because of lower crime rates).
Counties below the median of median income generally lie in the “above median prison and jail
incarceration” rates quadrant. Recall that Lofstrom and Raphael (2013a) show that counties with
higher pre-AB 109 prison incarceration rates experienced larger changes in prison incarceration
rates following the adoption of AB 109. Therefore, combined with Figure 3.4, this suggests that,
on average, counties with low median income had a larger number of offenders (per resident) to
absorb into county supervision once AB 109 was implemented.
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3.6 AB 109
Effective October 1, 2011, AB 109 shifted the supervision responsibility for most low-
level offenders from the state to the county-level by narrowing the set of felony offenses that
could receive a prison sentence. Figure 3.2 compares the percent change in each county’s prison
and jail incarceration rates following AB 109. It illustrates that counties that experienced larger
percent declines in the prison incarceration rate also experienced larger percent increases in their
jail incarceration rate. However, as discussed in Lofstrom and Raphael (2013a) and illustrated in
Figure 3.2, the magnitude of the change in the jail incarceration rate is less than the magnitude
of the change in the prison incarceration rate (this is true in both levels and percent change).
This suggests that variation in counties’ demographics, economies, and use of state prison (or
incarceration in general) can contribute to variation in the extent to which county jails absorb
realigned offenders.
3.6.1 AB 109 and the Criminal Justice System
I begin by describing counties’ criminal justice features based on where they lie in the
distribution of the percent change in the jail incarceration rate (or the number of jail inmates
per thousand residents). Table 3.2 stratifies counties into three equally-sized groups according
to the distribution of the percent change in jail incarceration rates following AB 109. The table
is divided into two panels: (1) pre-AB 109 criminal justice characteristics and (2) changes in
criminal justice populations (and behavior) following Realignment.
On average, counties in the bottom third of the distribution of changes in jail incarceration
rates experienced declines in their jail incarceration rate. Counties in the top third experienced
(percent) increases in their jail incarceration rates that were about 4 times larger than increases
among counties in the middle third. Panel A shows that there is a positive association between
the percent change in the jail incarceration rate and the percent of incapacitated offenders that are
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in prison – or the share of offenders counties house in state prison relative to the sum of prison
and jail inmates. Namely, if, prior to AB 109, counties sent relatively more offenders to prison
(rather than jail), then following Realignment, the county would become responsible for a larger
percentage of realigned offenders than counties that were less reliant on state prisons. And because
counties in the top third of the distribution have smaller pre-AB 109 jail population-to-capacity
ratios, their county jails can absorb relatively more realigned offenders.
However, in Panel B, there is no evident relationship between the percent change in
the prison incarceration rate and the percent change in jail incarceration rate. On average, the
largest percent decline in the prison incarceration rate occurs in the middle third of counties. This
suggests that county jails vary in their capacity to absorb realigned offenders, or that counties
may have preferences for alternative sanctions like probation.
In Panel A, relative to counties in the middle and top thirds of the distribution, counties
in the bottom third of the distribution are subject to more capacity constraints (the average
pre-AB 109 jail population-to-capacity ratio is 93.57 percent). These counties also sentence
a larger share of offenders to probation (rather than prison or jail). This does not necessarily
indicate a preference for alternative sanctions. Because the jails in counties in the bottom third
are relatively more capacity-constrained, they may be forced into using more probation so as
not to exceed rated capacity. Furthermore, Figure 3.1 shows that the number of individuals on
probation was declining prior to Realignment (possibly due to declining arrest rates, as discussed
in Section 3.1). Yet, in counties in the bottom third of the percent change in the jail incarceration
rate distribution, the probation population fell the least (Panel B). Therefore, because of the
high, pre-AB 109 capacity utilization rates, it is possible that counties in the bottom third of the
distribution substituted probation for county jail sentences. On the other hand, counties in the
top third of the distribution continued to experience relatively larger declines in the probation
population following AB 109. Because these counties had the capacity to absorb offenders that
would have otherwise received a prison sentence, they had no need to use alternative sanctions.
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Similarly, Panel B shows that counties in the bottom third of the distribution experienced
the largest percent increase in releases. As in Lofstrom and Raphael (2013a), to avoid exceeding
rated capacity, some counties may have had to release relatively more offenders through capacity-
constrained releases (early release) or pre-trial releases.28 Therefore, because there may be a
jail crowd-out effect, the percent change in jail incarceration rates is small. On the other hand,
counties in the top third of the distribution experienced a much smaller percent increase, on
average, in county jail releases because they had the capacity to absorb realigned offenders.
3.6.2 Fiscal Impact
Although California provided funding to assist counties in managing an increased offender
caseload, differences in the demographic, economic, and criminal justice characteristics of
counties could have affected the magnitude of AB 109’s fiscal impact. Like Table 3.2, Table
3.3 divides counties into three equally-sized groups according to the percent change in the jail
incarceration rate following AB 109. It focuses on counties’ fiscal characteristics and on the
possible fiscal effects of Realignment.
Recall that the fiscal impact per resident is calculated by multiplying the average cost
per jail inmate (or jail expenditures per jail inmate) by the change in the number of jail inmates
following AB 109. In Table 3.3, counties in the bottom third of the distribution have the highest
average cost per jail inmate. However, among those counties, the jail incarceration rate declined.
The middle third of the distribution has the lowest average cost per jail inmate. And because their
percent increase in the jail incarceration rate is almost 4 times smaller than that of counties in the
top third of the distribution, counties in the top third of the distribution experience a much larger
fiscal impact per resident - a possible $29.77 increase per resident in jail expenditures, relative to
a $7.30 increase per resident.
Furthermore, among counties in the bottom and middle thirds of the distribution, on
28This is especially true if counties have a court-ordered population cap.
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average, the AB 109 funds per resident (provided by the state) cover the estimated impact of
AB 109. Yet, among counties in the top third of the distribution, the AB 109 funds per resident
cover less than half of the estimated fiscal impact. While my estimate of fiscal impact is a rough
measure of how AB 109 may have affected the county budget, this suggests that the first-year
allocation of AB 109 funds may not have been distributed to the counties that needed the funds
the most.29 This is further emphasized by the fact that comparing jail expenditures per resident
between Fiscal Year 2011 and Fiscal Year 2013, expenditures per resident only increased by 0.32
percent in counties in the bottom third of the distribution. Jail expenditures per resident increased
by 5.84 percent, on average, among counties in the top third of the distribution.
Lastly, moving from the bottom third of the distribution to the top third, (the average
of) median income declines. So, counties that experienced the largest percent increase in jail
incarceration rates were the least well-off in terms of median income. To assess the relation-
ship between median income and fiscal impact per resident, Figure 3.5 presents two maps of
California’s counties shaded by median income (Figure 3.5a) and shaded by the AB 109 fiscal
impact per resident (Figure 3.5b). As median income increases, the shading becomes lighter.
Because median income and the fiscal impact per resident are negatively correlated, as the fiscal
impact per resident increases, the shading becomes darker. Therefore, if counties with the lowest
level of median income are impacted the most by AB 109, then they should be shaded the same
color across Figures 3.5a and 3.5b. Figure 3.5a shows considerable geographic concentration in
median income. Counties in northern California have the lowest levels of median income and
counties along the coast of southern and central California have the largest levels median income.
While there is less geographic concentration in fiscal impact per resident, most counties below
the median of median income appear to experience above median fiscal impacts.
29Figure 3.A.1, in Appendix 3.A, presents two maps of California’s counties to illustrate whether relatively more
AB 109 funds per resident were allocated to counties that experienced large (estimated) fiscal impacts. Figure 3.A.1a
shades counties by the magnitude of the AB 109 fiscal impact per resident. Figure 3.A.1b shades counties by the
magnitude of the AB 109 funds per resident received. As the fiscal impact per resident increases and as AB 109
funds received (per resident) increase, the shading becomes darker.
171
Overall, it appears that the passage of AB 109 placed a larger fiscal burden on lower-
income counties and AB 109 funds may have been disproportionately allocated to relatively
richer counties, who are more capacity-constrained and, therefore, may use cheaper alternatives
to incarceration. Note, however, that I am only looking at the impact on jail expenditures. AB
109 also shifted state parole supervision to county probation departments, so probation caseloads
and costs would have also increased. A more complete picture of the fiscal impact of AB 109
would examine how both jail and probation costs were affected.
3.6.3 Regression on the percent change in jail incarceration rates
More formally, I estimate a regression of the percent change in the jail incarceration
rate on the percent change in the prison incarceration rate, conditional on pre-AB 109 county
characteristics.
%∆Jailc = α1 +β1 ∗%∆Prisonc+β2 ∗Capacityc+Xc ∗β3 + εc (3.1)
Let %∆Jailc represent the percent change in the jail incarceration rate following AB 109 in county
c. %∆Prisonc represents the percent change in the prison incarceration rate following AB 109 in
county c. Capacityc represents a county’s pre-AB 109 jail population-to-capacity ratio. Let Xc
be a vector of county-level, pre-AB 109 covariates including median income, the share of the
county’s population that is black or Hispanic, the share of incapacitated offenders in state prison,
and the share of all offenders that are under probation. The error term is denoted by εc. I estimate
robust standard errors.
Table 3.4 displays the coefficients from the regression on the percent change in the jail
incarceration rate. Column 1 includes all variables listed in Equation 3.1 except for the jail
population-to-capacity ratio. Column 2 includes the capacity ratio. In Column 1, the coefficient
on the percent change in the prison incarceration rate is negative but not statistically significant.
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The sign of β1 suggests that, conditional on the pre-AB 109 characteristics in Xc, as the percent
change in the prison incarceration rate falls, there is an associated increase in the average percent
change in the jail incarceration rate (see Figure 3.2). However, in Column 2, the coefficient on
%∆Prisonc becomes positive when the pre-AB 109 jail population-to-capacity ratio is included
as a regressor; it remains statistically insignificant.
In Columns 1 and 2, the coefficient on median income is negative and statistically
significant. This suggests that, as illustrated in Table 3.3, a decline in median income is associated
with an increase in the percent change in the jail incarceration rate. Additionally, the coefficient
on the percent of incapacitated offenders in prison (relative to offenders in jail and prison) is
positive and statistically significant. Like Table 3.2, this illustrates that, all else equal, counties
that used prison relatively more than jail, prior to the passage of AB 109, also experienced an
increase in the average percent change in the jail incarceration rate.
In Column 2, the coefficient on the jail population-to-capacity ratio is negative and
statistically significant - all else equal, an increase in the capacity ratio is associated with a decline
in the average percent change in the jail incarceration rate. As with Table 3.2, this suggests that
counties that were capacity-constrained prior to AB 109 experienced smaller (percent) changes
in the jail incarceration rate. Table 3.2 also suggests that these counties likely had to increase
the number of offenders released from jail or increase the use of alternative sanctions. Note that
including the jail population-to-capacity ratio reverses the sign on the coefficients on the share
of the county population that is black or Hispanic and the percent of all offenders that are on
probation.
In all, I find that, consistent with previous literature, capacity-constrained counties expe-
rienced smaller percent increases in the jail incarceration rate (on average). In order to absorb
the increased offender caseload, Table 3.2 suggests that these counties increased their use of
early release and possibly probation. In contrast to previous literature, I do not find a statistically
significant relationship between the percent change in the prison and jail incarceration rates
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following AB 109. Most notably, I find that the fiscal impact (per resident) may have been the
largest for lower-income counties.
3.7 Proposition 47
Next, I study the extent to which the implementation of Proposition 47 mitigated the effects
of AB 109. Figure 3.1 illustrates how California’s prison, jail, and probation populations changed
following the adoption of Prop 47. While there were small changes to the prison population (black
dashed line), there was a discrete decline in the county jail population (black solid line).30 Figure
3.3, which presents a scatter plot of the percent change in the jail incarceration rate following
AB 109 and the percent change in jail incarceration rate following Prop 47, illustrates a weak
negative correlation, such that counties with larger percent increases in the jail incarceration rate
following AB 109 had larger percent declines in the jail incarceration rate following Prop 47.
However, since the association is weak, Figure 3.3 suggests that other county-level characteristics
might explain the percent change in the jail incarceration rate following Prop 47 and that it may
not have brought cost savings to the counties most impacted by AB 109.
3.7.1 Proposition 47 and the Criminal Justice System
Section 3.6 showed that the counties which experienced the smallest percent increases
in their jail incarceration rates following AB 109 were more likely to be capacity-constrained.
As a result, these counties increased their use of pre-trial and early releases so that they could
absorb the realigned offender population. Following the implementation of Prop 47, which
was expected to increase jail space through shorter sentence lengths, all counties experienced a
decline in their Prop 47 jail populations. However, due to the Prop 47-induced availability of jail
space, counties with high pre-AB 109 population-to-capacity ratios may not have needed to use
30There is also a sharp decline in the probation population (gray dashed line). Bird et al. (2018) finds that Prop 47
sharply reduced arrests, which is strongly correlated with probation populations.
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capacity-constrained releases as often. Consequently, the overall jail incarceration rate may have
only changed slightly for these counties (Nguyen et al. 2016).
Table 3.5 stratifies counties into three groups based on the distribution of the percent
change in the jail incarceration rate following Proposition 47. Counties in the lower third of
the distribution experience a (percent) decline in the average jail incarceration rate that is twice
as large as that of counties in the middle third of the distribution. Counties in the top third of
the distribution experience, on average, an increase in the jail incarceration rate following the
implementation of Prop 47.
While counties in the lower third of the distribution experienced larger percent increases
in the jail incarceration rate following AB 109, there is little difference between the percent
change in jail incarceration rates after AB 109 in the middle and top thirds of the distribution.31
Furthermore, the average pre-AB 109 jail population-to-capacity ratio does not differ much
across the three groups. Interestingly, counties that experienced the largest percent decline in
the jail incarceration rate after Prop 47 had the largest average post-AB 109 (pre-Prop 47) jail
population-to-capacity ratio. It is possible that the counties in the bottom third of the distribution
experienced a large change in the population-to-capacity ratio because they increased their use of
early releases at a smaller rate relative to counties in the top third of the distribution. Following
Prop 47, counties in the bottom third of the distribution experienced larger percent declines in the
use of pre-trial and early release.
Table 3.5 also shows that among counties in the bottom third of the distribution of the
percent change in jail incarceration rates following Prop 47, the pre-AB 109 share of property
arrests (relative to all offense types) was, on average, larger relative to that of counties in the
middle and top thirds. Counties that arrest relatively more property offenders may experience
larger percent decreases in the jail incarceration rate since most of the offenses re-classified by
31Figure 3.A.2, in Appendix 3.A, illustrates the percent change in each county’s jail incarceration rate following
AB 109 (Figure 3.A.2a) and following Prop 47 (Figure 3.A.2b). Prop 47 does not appear to decrease the jail
incarceration rate more in counties whose jail incarceration rate increased the most (in percent) due to AB 109.
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Prop 47 were low-level property offenses.
Overall, Table 3.5 does not appear to provide a clear relationship between the change in
jail incarceration rates following AB 109 and Prop 47. Namely, Prop 47 does not appear to undo
the effects of AB 109 in the counties most affected by Realignment. In fact, stratifying counties
across the percent change in jail incarceration rates following AB 109 (as in Table 3.2), the largest
percent decline in jail incarceration rates after Prop 47 (on average) was among counties that
experienced decreases or small increases in jail incarceration rates after AB 109.
3.7.2 Fiscal Impact
Given that Prop 47 does not appear to undo much of the increases in jail incarceration
rates due to AB 109, I would not expect Prop 47 to relieve the fiscal burden placed on counties
most impacted by AB 109. Like Table 3.5, Table 3.6 stratifies counties into three groups based
on the distribution of the percent change in the jail incarceration rate following Proposition 47.
Note that, on average, the top third of the distribution experienced an increase in jail incarceration
rates; around 25 percent of California’s counties experienced an increase in the jail incarceration
following Prop 47. Relative to counties in the bottom and middle thirds, these counties had
relatively lower median incomes, on average.
Recall that fiscal impact is defined as the product of the pre-AB 109 average jail inmate
cost (or jail expenditures per inmate) and the change in the jail population. A negative fiscal
impact per resident indicates cost savings (since the number of offenders fell after Prop 47).
Therefore, the bottom third of the distribution experienced the largest potential fiscal benefit
from the reduced jail incarceration rate. These counties also experienced, on average, the largest
fiscal impact from AB 109 and had higher median incomes. However, Table 3.3 showed that
the counties that experienced the largest AB 109 fiscal impact had lower median incomes, on
average.
Similarly, Figure 3.6 presents a scatter plot of the fiscal impact (per resident) of AB 109
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and the fiscal impact (per resident) of Prop 47. The black circle-markers represent counties that
fall below the median of median income, and the gray circle-markers represent counties that
have above-median median income. The fiscal impact of Prop 47 is multiplied by -1 so that a
positive value represents savings. Figure 3.6 illustrates a (weak) positive relationship between
the fiscal cost of AB 109 and the fiscal savings from Prop 47. Yet, most below-median median
income counties lie below the 45 degree line, indicating that among low-income counties the
fiscal savings from Prop 47 did not mitigate the fiscal impact of AB 109. On the other hand,
counties with above-median median income are more concentrated along the 45 degree line,
suggesting that among high-income counties the savings generated by Prop 47 did a better job
of easing the fiscal impact of AB 109. As a result of Table 3.6 and Figure 3.6, in the following
section I include an interaction term between median income and the percent change in the jail
population following AB 109 to assess whether the effect of the latter depends on median income.
3.7.3 Regression on the percent change in jail incarceration rates
More formally, I estimate a regression of the percent change in the jail incarceration
rate following Prop 47 on the percent change in the jail incarceration rate following AB 109,
conditional on pre-AB 109 county characteristics.
%∆JailProp47c = α2 + γ1 ∗%∆JailAB109c + γ2 ∗ Incomec+ γ3 ∗%∆JailAB109c ∗ Incomec
+ γ4 ∗CapacityProp47c +XProp47c ∗ γ5 +uc
(3.2)
Let %∆JailProp47c represent the percent change in the jail incarceration rate following Prop 47 in
county c. %∆JailAB109c represents the percent change in the jail incarceration rate following AB
109 in county c. CapacityProp47c represents a county’s post-AB 109, pre-Prop 47 jail population-
to-capacity rate. Incomec is county c’s pre-AB 109 median income. Let X
Prop47
c be a vector of
county-level, pre-AB 109 covariates including the share of the county’s population that is black
177
or Hispanic and the share of total arrests that are for property offenses. The error term is denoted
by uc. I estimate robust standard errors.
Table 3.7 presents coefficients from the regression on the percent change in the jail
population following Proposition 47. In Column 1, I include the share of total arrests that are
for property offenses. Prop 47 reduced several low-level property offenses from felonies to
misdemeanors. Therefore, in counties in which a larger share of arrests are for property offenses,
there might be larger declines in the jail incarceration rate, all else equal. Because median income
is strongly (and positively) correlated with the share of property offense arrests, I omit median
income from the regression in Column 1. Columns 2 and 3 include median income as a covariate
(and omit the share of property arrests). Column 3 includes the interaction term between median
income and the percent change in the jail population following AB 109.
Across all columns, the coefficient on the post-AB 109 jail population-to-capacity ratio
is negative, and it is statistically significant in Columns 1 and 3. All else equal, as jails become
more capacity-constrained the percent change in the jail incarceration rate following Prop 47
declines. This is also evident in Table 3.5, where counties in the bottom third of the distribution
of the percent change in the jail incarceration rate after Prop 47 have a larger post-AB 109
population-to-capacity ratio (on average).
In Column 1, the coefficient on the share of arrests for property offenses is negative and
statistically significant. As the share of property arrests increases, the percent change in the jail
incarceration rate declines, suggesting that counties which arrest relatively more individuals for
property offenses are more likely to be impacted by the re-classification of low-level property
offenses.
In Columns 1 and 2, the coefficient on the percent change in the jail incarceration rate
following AB 109 is negative; it is only statistically significant in Column 2. Therefore, as
illustrated in Figure 3.3, as the percent change in the AB 109 jail incarceration rate increases,
the average percent change in the Prop 47 jail incarceration rate declines. Unlike Table 3.5, the
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regression coefficients in Columns 1 and 2 indicate that, all else equal, Prop 47 appears to mitigate
the effects of AB 109.
In Column 2, the coefficient on median income is negative and statistically significant,
such that, all else equal, as median income increases the average percent change in the jail
incarceration rate declines. Like Table 3.5, this suggests that Prop 47 may have impacted jail
incarceration rates in counties that are better off, unlike AB 109 which imposed a relatively larger
fiscal burden on counties with low median incomes.
Lastly, like Column 2, the coefficients on %∆JailAB109c and Incomec in Column 3 are
negative and statistically significant. Furthermore, the coefficient on the interaction term,
%∆JailAB109c ∗ Incomec, is positive and statistically significant. Therefore, all else equal, the
effect of a one percent increase in the jail incarceration rate (following AB 109) is smaller for
counties with higher median incomes. Or for each thousand dollar increase in median income,
counties with larger percent increases in the jail incarceration rate have smaller changes in the
outcome variable.
In all, I find that, as with AB 109, the jail population-to-capacity ratio continues to be
associated with how counties respond to the adoption of Prop 47. I also find that while the
relationship between the percent change in jail incarceration rates following AB 109 and Prop 47
is more ambiguous in Table 3.5, the coefficients in Table 3.7 suggest that the percent change in
the jail incarceration rate following AB 109 is negatively associated with the percent change in
the jail incarceration rate following Prop 47, but the magnitude of the association differs across
median income.
3.8 Conclusion
In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court mandated that California reduce its prison population
from 190 to 137.5 percent of design capacity. In response, California implemented a series of
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reforms. The first was SB 678 (July 2009), which incentivized counties to send fewer offenders to
prison for probation failures. Because SB 678 did not sufficiently reduce the prison population, in
October 2011, California implemented AB 109. This reform shifted the supervision responsibility
for low-level offenders from the state prison system to county jails. While AB 109 successfully
reduced the prison population, the number of state prison inmates did not fall below the court-
mandated target. Therefore, in November 2014, California implemented Proposition 47, which
re-classified low-level felonies as misdemeanors.
As a result of AB 109, counties faced an increased offender caseload, and variation in
counties’ demographics, economies, and use of state prison (or incarceration in general) may
have contributed to variation in the extent to which county jails absorbed realigned offenders.
While I do not find a statistically significant relationship between the percent change in the prison
and jail incarceration rates following AB 109, I find that in order to absorb the increased offender
caseload, counties whose jails were capacity-constrained, increased their use of early release and
possibly probation. Most notably, I find that the fiscal impact (per resident) may have been the
largest for lower-income counties and that the AB 109 funds allocated to counties fell short in
covering counties? increased costs, particularly among counties that experienced the largest fiscal
impact.
Next, I study the extent to which the implementation of Prop 47 mitigated the effects
of AB 109. I find that the jail population-to-capacity ratio continues to be associated with how
counties responded to the adoption of Prop 47. I also find that the percent change in the jail
incarceration rate following AB 109 is negatively associated with the percent change in the jail
incarceration rate following Prop 47, but the magnitude of the association differs across median
income. While Prop 47 may have mitigated some of the effects of AB 109, I find little evidence
suggesting Proposition 47 mitigated the fiscal impacts of AB 109 among low-income counties.
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Figure 3.1: Number of offenders receiving prison, jail, or probation over time
This figure illustrates a time-series of California prison, jail, and probation populations. Each
vertical line represents the date in which a given reform was enacted. SB 678 was implemented
in July 2009, AB 109 (or Realignment) in October 2011, and Proposition 47 in November 2014.
The black dashed line represents California’s state prison population in December of each year
(left y-axis), and the black solid line represents the average daily jail population in each month
(left y-axis). The gray dashed line represents the number of individuals on probation in each
month (right y-axis).
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Figure 3.2: Scatter plot of the percent change in prison and jail incarceration rates following
AB 109
This figure presents a scatter plot comparing the percent change in prison (x-axis) and jail
(y-axis) incarceration rates following the implementation of AB 109. Each point represents a
different county. The incarceration rate is defined as the number of inmates per thousand
residents. Jail and prison populations as of December 2010 and December 2012 are used to
calculate the percent change in jail and prison incarceration rates. The black line has a slope of
-1. Counties that fall on the black line experienced equally-sized percent changes in jail and
prison incarceration rates (in absolute value).
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Figure 3.3: Scatter plot of the percent change in jail incarceration rates following AB 109 and
Proposition 47
This figure presents a scatter plot comparing the percent change in jail incarceration rates
following AB 109 (x-axis) and the percent change in jail incarceration rates following
Proposition 47 (y-axis). Each point represents a different county. The incarceration rate is
defined as the number of inmates per thousand residents. The percent change in the jail
incarceration rate following AB 109 is calculated by comparing the average daily jail
populations per thousand residents as of December 2010 and December 2012. The percent
change in the jail incarceration rate following Proposition 47 is calculated by comparing the
average daily jail populations per thousand residents as of December 2013 and 2015. The black
line has a slope of -1. Counties that fall on the black line experienced equally-sized percent
changes in the AB 109 and Prop 47 jail incarceration rates (in absolute value).
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Figure 3.4: Scatter plot of counties’ prison and jail incarceration rates, separated by median
income
This figure presents a scatter plot of counties’ pre-AB 109 prison and jail incarceration rates,
defined as the number of prison and jail inmates per thousand residents. The vertical and
horizontal lines represent the median prison incarceration rate and the median jail incarceration
rate, respectively. The black circle-markers represent counties that fall below the median of
median income, and the gray circle-markers represent counties that lie above the median of
median income.
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Figure 3.6: Scatter plot of the AB 109 and Proposition 47 fiscal impacts, separated by median
income
This figure presents a scatter plot of the fiscal impact of AB 109 per resident (x-axis) and the
fiscal impact of Prop 47 per resident (y-axis). Each point represents a different county. The AB
109 fiscal cost (or fiscal impact) is defined as the pre-AB 109 average cost per jail inmate (or jail
expenditures per resident) multiplied by the change in the number of jail inmates between
December 2010 and December 2012. The Prop 47 fiscal impact is defined as the pre-AB 109
average cost per jail inmate multiplied by the change in the number of jail inmates between
December 2013 and December 2015. This value is then multiplied by -1 to obtain the Prop 47
fiscal savings. The black circle-markers represent counties that fall below the median of median
income, and the gray circle-markers represent counties that lie above the median of median
income. The black line is a 45 degree line (slope of 1).
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for counties by tercile of median income
Bottom 3rd Middle 3rd Top 3rd
Panel A: County Demographics
Median Income 39,370 48,863 65,646
(2,855) (3,613) (9,772)
Share of County Pop. Urban 55.64 73.54 90.00
(27.12) (24.81) (11.79)
Share of County Pop. Black 1.94 4.80 4.13
(1.38) (3.56) (4.23)
Share of County Pop. Hispanic 26.32 33.79 28.61
(21.93) (16.58) (12.19)
Heterogeneity Index 0.54 0.67 0.72
(0.12) (0.22) (0.25)
Panel B: Fiscal Measures
County Expenditures Per Resident 1,845 1,638 1,326
(494) (700) (210)
Perc. County Expend. Spent on Jails 4.91 5.56 6.16
(1.13) (1.27) (2.20)
Jail Expenditures Per Jail Inmate 32,727 40,907 46,333
(9,023) (16,381) (17,359)
Jail Expenditures Per Resident 88 91 81
(22) (44) (28)
Panel C: Criminal Justice Indicators
Arrests Per Thousand Residents 14.78 11.98 9.09
(3.10) (2.31) (1.41)
Jail Inmates Per Thousand Residents 2.71 2.18 1.76
(0.96) (0.59) (0.34)
Prison Inmates Thousand Residents 5.03 4.79 2.94
(1.70) (1.82) (1.05)
Pre-AB 109 Jail Pop-to-Capacity Ratio 80.31 82.20 88.00
(23.65) (22.51) (16.90)
Counties are sorted into three equally-sized groups based on the distri-
bution of median income. The table is divided into three panels: (1)
county-level demographics, (2) measures of county-level expenditures,
and (3) criminal justice indicators. Characteristics in Panel A are pre-AB
109 demographics (using 2010 data). Panel B uses county expenditures
from Fiscal Year 2011 (July 2010 to June 2011). Panel C uses the average
daily (jail) population as of December 2010 and the prison population as
of December 31, 2010.
187
Table 3.2: AB 109 - counties by tercile of percent change in the jail incarceration rate
Bottom 3rd Middle 3rd Top 3rd
Panel A: Criminal Justice Indicators
Perc. Change Jail - AB 109 -3.91 9.82 37.04
(6.28) (3.57) (21.39)
Perc. Incapacitated Offenders in Prison 58.55 64.81 69.27
(7.64) (7.25) (8.33)
Perc. All Offenders Under Probation 67.70 62.87 65.60
(12.79) (15.24) (13.06)
Pre-AB 109 Jail Pop-to-Capacity Ratio 93.57 83.39 74.31
(22.19) (17.64) (19.39)
Panel B: Changes in Sanctions
Perc. Change Prison - AB 109 -21.61 -24.71 -22.50
(9.60) (6.44) (8.24)
Perc. Change Probation - AB 109 -3.37 -6.49 -14.26
(38.72) (21.93) (22.36)
Perc. Change Releases - AB 109 87.96 47.88 16.61
(158.22) (134.69) (50.85)
Counties are sorted into three groups according to the distribution of the percent
change in jail incarceration rates between December 2010 and December 2012.
The table is divided into two panels. Excluding the first row, Panel A lists
descriptive statistics for counties’ pre-AB 109 criminal justice characteristics
(using 2010 data). Panel B lists descriptive statistics for the percent change in
the prison incarceration rate, the percent change in probation population per
thousand residents, and the percent change in pre-trial and capacity-constrained
(early) releases.
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Table 3.3: AB 109’s fiscal impact - counties by tercile of percent change in the jail incarceration
rate
Bottom 3rd Middle 3rd Top 3rd
Perc. Change Jail - AB 109 -3.91 9.82 37.04
(6.28) (3.57) (21.39)
Jail Expenditures Per Jail Inmate 42,866 36,304 41,089
(17,118) (15,731) (13,932)
Fiscal Impact Per Resident - AB 109 -2.21 7.30 29.77
(4.99) (3.44) (20.32)
AB 109 Fund Allocations Per Resident 8.79 10.59 11.38
(2.91) (3.55) (3.04)
Perc. Change Jail Expend. Per Resident - AB 109 0.32 3.87 5.84
(7.72) (7.81) (17.70)
Jail Expenditures Per Resident 99 77 83
(38) (31) (25)
Median Income 56,364 51,560 46,991
(16,370) (10,359) (9,015)
Counties are sorted into three groups according to the distribution of the percent change in
jail incarceration rates between December 2010 and December 2012. All characteristics,
except for the percent change in the jail incarceration rate and the percent change in jail
expenditures per resident, are pre-AB 109. County expenditures are from Fiscal Year 2011
(July 2010 - July 2011). Fiscal impact is defined as the average cost per jail inmate (or jail
expenditures per resident) multiplied by the change in jail inmates between December 2010
and December 2012.
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Table 3.4: Regression on the percent change in the jail incarceration rate -
AB 109
(1) (2)
Perc. Change Prison - AB 109 -0.062 0.202
(0.268) (0.252)
Median Income (in thousands) -0.473** -0.323*
(0.199) (0.182)
Share of County Pop. Black 0.018 -0.137
(0.945) (0.756)
Share of County Pop. Hispanic -0.025 0.162
(0.151) (0.113)
Perc. Incapacitated Offenders in Prison 0.998*** 0.823***
(0.211) (0.216)
Perc. All Offenders Under Probation 0.211 -0.018
(0.203) (0.182)
Pre-AB 109 Jail Pop-to-Capacity Ratio -0.530***
(0.159)
Mean Pct. Chg in Jail 14.73 14.73
N 55 55
∗p< 0.1; ∗∗p< 0.05; ∗∗∗p< 0.01
This table lists coefficients from a regression on the change in the
jail incarceration rate following the implementation of AB 109
(see Equation 3.1). County-level, pre-AB 109 covariates include
median income, the share of the county’s population that is black
or Hispanic, the share of incapacitated offenders in state prison
(relative to the sum of offenders in jail and in prison), and the share
of all offenders that are under probation (relative to the sum of
offenders in jail and prison, and on probation). Column 2 includes
the jail population-to-capacity ratio as a regressor. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses.
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Table 3.5: Proposition 47 - counties by tercile of percent change in the jail incarceration
rate
Bottom 3rd Middle 3rd Top 3rd
Perc. Change Jail - Prop 47 -20.47 -8.42 10.61
(8.84) (3.47) (12.38)
Perc. Change Jail - AB 109 20.44 11.13 12.74
(31.14) (16.20) (13.81)
Pre-AB 109 Jail Pop-to-Capacity Ratio 84.79 82.27 83.69
(22.92) (16.85) (23.62)
Post-AB 109 Jail Pop-to-Capacity Ratio 105.59 94.04 89.62
(25.44) (13.60) (16.25)
Perc. Change Releases - AB 109 36.26 40.21 66.41
(103.56) (105.10) (153.42)
Perc. Change Releases - Prop 47 -39.21 -37.30 -21.13
(81.12) (46.05) (108.90)
Share of Arrests - Property 23.42 22.78 21.15
(3.86) (4.75) (4.24)
Counties are sorted into three groups according to the distribution of the percent
change in jail incarceration rates between December 2013 and December 2015.
The percent change in the jail incarceration rate following AB 109 is estimated
using the average daily jail population (per thousand residents) in December
2010 and December 2012. The percent change in the jail incarceration rate
following Prop 47 is estimated using the average daily jail population (per thou-
sand residents) in December 2013 and December 2015. The pre-AB 109 jail to
population-to-capacity ratio takes the ratio of the December 2010 average daily
jail population and the rated capacity as of July 2010. The post-AB 109 (pre-Prop
47) jail population-to-capacity ratio takes the ratio of the December 2013 average
daily population and the July 2013 rated capacity.
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Table 3.6: Proposition 47’s fiscal impact - counties by tercile of percent change in
the jail incarceration rate
Bottom 3rd Middle 3rd Top 3rd
Perc. Change Jail - Prop 47 -20.47 -8.42 10.61
(8.84) (3.47) (12.38)
Fiscal Impact Per Resident - Prop 47 -22.11 -7.93 10.39
(19.99) (6.07) (13.61)
Fiscal Impact Per Resident - AB 109 16.61 9.47 9.89
(26.48) (12.84) (12.43)
Median Income 57,369 49,354 48,129
(14,299) (10,220) (11,749)
Counties are sorted into three groups according to the distribution of the
percent change in jail incarceration rates between December 2013 and De-
cember 2015. County expenditures are from Fiscal Year 2011 (July 2010 -
July 2011). The fiscal impact due to AB 109 is defined as the average cost per
jail inmate (or jail expenditures per resident) multiplied by the change in jail
inmates between December 2010 and December 2012. The fiscal impact due
to Proposition 47 is defined as the pre-AB 109 average cost per jail inmate
(or jail expenditures per resident) multiplied by the change in jail inmates
between December 2013 and December 2015.
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Table 3.7: Regression on the percent change in the jail incarceration rate - Proposition 47
(1) (2) (3)
Perc. Change Jail - AB 109 -0.137 -0.151* -0.823***
(0.083) (0.085) (0.274)
Share of Pop. Black -35.992 -73.023 -72.967
(73.917) (62.241) (53.795)
Share of Pop. Hispanic 10.890 -5.069 -5.737
(11.758) (13.201) (13.008)
Share of Arrests - Property -1.594**
(0.643)
Post-AB 109 Pop-to-Capacity Ratio -0.236** -0.153 -0.185*
(0.102) (0.109) (0.107)
Median Income (in thousands) -0.404*** -0.446***
(0.144) (0.148)
Perc. Change Jail AB 109 * Median Income 0.015**
(0.006)
Mean Pct. Chg in Jail -5.79 -5.79 -5.79
N 55 55 55
∗p< 0.1; ∗∗p< 0.05; ∗∗∗p< 0.01
This table lists coefficients from a regression on the percent change in the jail in-
carceration rate following the implementation of Proposition 47 (see Equation 3.2).
County-level, pre-AB 109 covariates include the share of the county’s population
that is black or Hispanic, and either median income or the share of total arrests
that are for property offenses. Column 1 includes the share of arrests for property
offenses. Columns 2 and 3 include median income. Column 3 includes a the jail
population-to-capacity ratio as a regressor. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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